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This thesis examines the Political Economy of the Accession of Central and
Eastern European Countries to the European Union. It focuses on the process
of accession from the perspective of the applicant countries and the
constraints they face. For this purpose the thesis examines the literature of
transition economics with a particular emphasis on macro-economic
modelling and contrasts the findings with literature on the accession process.
It demonstrates that there is a need to apply the transition literature to the
accession process by using economic modelling. The thesis recognises that the
position of the applicant countries is path dependent and thus sets out the
main historical developments. The thesis demonstrates that groups of
applicant countries share a certain degree of common historical development,
particularly in the later half of the second century. The thesis then examines
the transition up to date with a particular emphasis on the relationship with
the European Union, to determine the starting point of the accession process.
This part of the thesis shows that some of the countries have fallen behind in
the accession process and face further difficult reforms. The next section of the
thesis models the accession process and derives theoretical conclusions. The
conclusions show that constraints play an important part in the accession
process. In particular the thesis identifies the main constraints as political
feasibility, time consistency and uncertainty. Furthermore the theoretical
conclusions demonstrate that countries at different stages of the accession
process need to pursue different strategies. The thesis then applies the
theoretical conclusions by examining the literature on the applicant countries
to identify the presence of constraints. The thesis demonstrates that the
constraints are present in all the applicant countries, but, as predicted by the
theoretical model, the presence of constraints is most frequent in those
countries furthest away from accession. The thesis concludes that some
countries face an increasingly difficult accession process, which might lead to
the postponement or even abandonment of accession.
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Scenario 1: Triumphant Markets
"The countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Cyprus and Malta all joined
between 2005 and 2008"
(Scenarios Europe 2010, p. 17).
Scenario 2: The Hundred Flowers
"Faced with this new set of hurdles, only four countries managed to stay on
course and join the Union. The other applicant countries were weakened
for years to come: exhausted by fifteen years of sacrifice and economic
injustice, their populations were no longer prepared to listen to promises of
a brighter future. Reforms stagnated, economic activity and investment ran
out of steam, and Central and Eastern Europe sank into long-term economic
and political instability"
(Scenarios Europe 2010, p. 25-26).
Scenario 3: Shared Responsibilities
"The European Union, for its part, is still in the process of digesting the
recent enlargement towards Central and Eastern Europe... : between 2004
and 2009 thirteen new states have joined the Union"
(Scenarios Europe 2010, p. 34).
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Scenario 4: Creative Societies
"The result was a delay in enlargement: the first Central and Eastern
countries did not join the Union until 2008 and negotiations with the others
are likely to take a few more years yet. The Union particularly tarnished its
reputation by its blatant disregard for the applicant countries: while its
social and environmental demands became stricter from one European
Council to the next, it failed to introduce new aid mechanisms and its
Central European partners inevitably perceived the new criteria as further
pretexts for delaying their accession"
(Scenarios Europe 2010, p. 41).
Scenario 5: Turbulent Neighbourhoods
"The eastern parts of the continent are permanently destabilised by Russia:
organised crime's hold over the leading elites continues to grow, there is
ongoing conflict between central government and the regions and the
economy is in a parlous state"
(Scenarios Europe 2010, p. 48).
Quotes taken from the discussion paper of the European Commission's Forward
Studies Unit by Bertrand, Michalski & Pencil
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INTRODUCTION
When in 1989 the revolutions of Eastern Europe swept away the
communist regimes, it became clear that a new era in European history had
begun. It showed that one of the most ardent wishes of these new
democracies was to belong to the most successful process of international
relations - the economic integration of a large number of diverse economies
within the European Union. In particular, ten Central and Eastern European
Countries (CEECs) applied to join the European Union as soon as possible -
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania,
Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia1. But, as yet, the outcome of this process is
unknown. The quotes preceding this introduction give an indication of the
range of possible outcomes.
After the transformation in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) at the
end of the 1980s, one of the first questions to emerge was whether there was a
place for these countries in the existing international organisations of Western
Europe. In particular, the wish of some of these countries to belong to the
European Union (EU) was voiced soon after the communist regimes
disintegrated. After the initial enthusiasm of both the countries of CEE and
the Western European states, it became clear that the difficulties of this radical
change in the political and economic geography of Europe were vastly
underestimated. These difficulties still crucially influence the relationship
between the countries of Europe and not only make the timing of accession
doubtful, but may even make accession impossible if not addressed in the
near future. Thus, it is of extreme importance to analyse the given difficulties
and to suggest policy options to remove the obstacles to further integration in
Europe.
' Cyprus, Malta and Turkey have also applied, while recently Croatia has moved towards application
since the death of Tudjman, the nationalistic president of Croatia (frontier-free Europe, 2000).
9
The thesis uses a political economy framework, because one of the
crucial features of the transition process is the interaction of politics and
economics. Paul Hare notes:
"Even more so than in more settled and developed economies, there are few
aspects of economic policy in transition economies that can be fruitfully and
comprehensively discussed without making some reference to their political
configuration" (p. 11,1992).
An emphasis is also placed on the historical development of the
accession applicants to ensure that they are understood in context:
"Serious judgements about the spectacular failure of the communist regimes
can be arrived at only after thoroughly analysing the social and economic
realities in Eastern Europe in historical context ... On the basis of such
analysis it is possible to draw conclusions about socio-economic policies for
the reconstruction of the societies and economies of these countries"
(Teichova, p. 19,1997).
The applicant countries face a difficult transformation. Not only do
they need to complete the transition process from a communist planned
economy to a market-oriented democracy, but they also need to prepare for
membership of the European Union (EU). The purpose of this thesis is to
analyse the optimal process by which their aspirations can be reconciled with
numerous obstacles. The thesis recognises the heterogeneous nature of these
countries while emphasising the similarities in the process they face. It will
show that numerous differences exist in their historical development,
geographical situation, population, current economic situation and their
readiness to become full members of the EU. But it will also be demonstrated
that they share a number of similarities, which allows the theoretical analysis
of the accession process. These similarities can be identified when regarding
the historical development of these countries, especially in the avalanche-like
process of disintegration of the Communist regimes, which they experienced
in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
Furthermore, their relationship with the European Union has been
characterised by their similarities rather than their differences. They all face a
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very costly process, which will take a number of years. At the end of this
process, they hope to be full members of the EU. In the meantime, they can
expect to encounter political and economic obstacles on the way to full
membership, which might impede the progress of their integration with
Western Europe. Some evidence of constraints are apparent, especially for
those countries furthest removed from membership. All of the accession
countries face a lengthy process, which needs to be managed effectively, in
order to achieve the optimal transition to membership. They begin the process
from different starting points, given their historical differences, which will
make the process more difficult for those applicants furthest from accession.
Chapter 1 of this thesis examines the literature relevant to the accession
process. It surveys the literature on the economics of transition with particular
emphasis on the macro-economic modelling of a large-scale institutional
reform process. This chapter also examines the literature available on the
relationship between the European Union and Eastern Europe. More recent
evidence of constraints in the literature will be examined in Chapter 5.
To be able to understand the process of accession, it is necessary to
understand not only the present economic and political situation but to
understand the underlying structure of these countries. Chapter 2 analyses
the historical background of the applicant countries, paying particular
attention to the Cold War period and the subsequent revolutions. The chapter
examines the historical developments leading to the starting point of the
transition process to determine historical trends, which might influence the
accession process.
Chapter 3 provides a detailed account of each applicant's experience
since 1989, highlighting their relationship with the European Union in the last
decade. A study will be made of the present economic structure of these
countries, which is used to determine the degree of transformation needed to
become a member of the European Union. The chapter will provide an
overview of the transition process, highlighting problems in the introduction
of economic reforms. Chapters 2 and 3 are necessarily detailed in terms of
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each applicant's historical development, with a particular emphasis on the
second part of the twentieth century. These chapters illustrate how the CEECs
have developed to determine the starting point of the accession process.
Furthermore, the problems and challenges arising from the historical context
still determine many of the underlying economic conditions of the applicants,
and, more crucially, many of the attitudes and behaviour patterns of the
population are still strongly influenced by the historical context of the
applicants.
The fourth part of this thesis will focus on a theoretical
examination of the accession process. The literature findings introduced in
Chapter 1 are used to construct theoretical models to highlight problem areas
of the accession process. A particular emphasis is placed on Political Economy
models, which prove to be useful in analysing this interface of politics and
economics. This model will identify economic constraints and the inter¬
relation of these constraints with the choices of the applicant countries and
the EU.
The findings of the model are examined in light of the present situation
of the CEECs in Chapter 5. The recent literature on the applicant countries is
examined to identify the presence and prevalence of the economic constraints
identified in Chapter 4. This analysis identifies winners and losers of the
accession process and possible future developments are suggested.
The conclusions of this thesis draw together the results of the previous
analysis. The conclusions identify possible outcomes of the accession process
and comment on the current situation of the applicant states. The conclusions
comment on the likely outcomes of the accession process, in particular
whether and when the different candidate countries will gain full
membership of the EU. The thesis thus follows a timeline until the starting
point of the accession process. The accession process is then modelled to
analyse underlying trends. These findings are then examined in light of
evidence from the applicant countries to determine the likely prospects for
membership for each of the CEECs.
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The structure and methodology of the PhD can be summarised in the
following schematic table:
Table 1.1: Methodology of the PhD
Structure of the thesis Introduction
Methodological Background Literature Review (Chapter 1)
Socio-economic Background Historical Developments (Chapter 2)
Starting point of Accession Process Reforms and the West (Chapter 3)
Economic Modelling The Model (Chapter 4)
Application of the Model Evidence of Constraints (Chapter 5)
Prospects for EU membership Conclusions
The thesis demonstrates that each of the different strands of methodology,
namely the historical development, the initial transition process, the economic
modeling and the evidence of constraints, need to be combined to provide a
complete understanding of the accession process.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
a) Economics of Transition
This chapter focuses upon the economics of transformation. In
particular, it summarises the discussion which has been taking place since the
CEEC countries committed themselves to establishing a market economy.
One of the main debates has been on speed and sequencing of this
transformation. This discussion will be particularly relevant to Eastern
enlargement of the EU as it can be applied to the process of preparation of
these countries for full membership, as well as giving an impression of the
current state of economic reform in Eastern Europe. It will also show the
difference in attitude from the initial enthusiasm of the CEECs for integration
into the EU and the current state of postponement and faltering public and
political support in Central and Eastern Europe.
Transition economics has become an important branch of economic
theory. This is reflected in the breadth of writing on the subject. The subject is
being taught in many universities and excellent textbooks are now available.
It is difficult to single out any of these textbooks but "Winds of Change" by
Gros and Steinherr, (1995) and "The Economics of Post-Communist
Transition" by Blanchard, (1997) are important contributions to the field. A
further textbook on transition economics has been written by Marie Lavigne,
(1995). In her book she concludes:
"The main 'economic consequences of the East' are still ahead, and
ambivalent. The optimists contend that the recession in the East has
bottomed out or is soon to do so. Growth in these countries will stimulate the
end of recession in the West. The markets will be successfully implemented.
The 'green shoots' of the private sector are visible everywhere and will soon
be blooming. The pessimist sees a protracted recession, little structural
change, and seeds of conflict and disorganisation on top of open wars in some
areas of the CIS and in Yugoslavia. Capitalism has won; moreover, it is now
free from critics, as the questioning of its failures, in terms of social injustice
or inequality in income distribution, can immediately be discarded as a
resurgence of communist ideology" (p. 256).
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Further literature has been collected by Mark Knell, (1996). In his book, "The
Economics of Transition", subjects such as structural adjustment and growth
prospects in Eastern Europe are examined.
The main approach to transition economics has been microeconomic
theory and empirical modelling. The issues of stabilisation, privatisation and
price liberalisation have received particular emphasis. One of the early papers
summarising the microeconomic issues in transition economics is
"Microeconomics of Transition in Eastern Europe" by Paul Hare, (1990). He
highlights the need for market-type institutions to instil confidence in the
economy. Furthermore, he shows that it is crucially important to establish a
functioning capital market to facilitate economic development, as well as
introducing reforms to create a competitive labour market. He concludes that
these issues need to be addressed in the context of political constraints:
"There is no doubt that political constraints and the need to set priorities
between policies, all of which may well appear to be equally urgent, impose
severe difficulties for economic policy" (Hare, p.13).
The problems of the transition process are further explored in Hare's
Discussion Paper, "Investment, Growth and Industrial Renewal in the
Transition Economies" (1997). Here, Hare identifies some major problems -
namely that the CEECs started the transition process with institutions,
production facilities and technologies adapted to the centrally planned
system. He concludes that current growth rates in the CEECs might not be
sustainable and that it is even less likely that the CEECs will achieve the even
higher growth rates necessary to catch up with the EU.
Other authors have used microeconomic data to test certain
assumptions about key issues of the transition process. For example Konings,
Lehmann and Schaffer (1995) have used Polish data to determine job flow
patterns, concluding that there are statistically significant differences between
the state and the private sector. Hughes and Hare, (1994) used a similar
methodology in their paper, "The International Competitiveness of Industries
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in Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland". Other papers have also
focused on individual issues in microeconomic transition, for example, "A
Note on Insider Privatization and Restructuring" by Guzel Bilialova, (1997).
Other examples of literature on enterprise restructuring has come from the
field of business studies (see for example Dickinson, 2000). A link between the
microeconomic transition and EU accession is less common. Another example
which charts the result of manufacturing firms in the Czech Republic is
"Capital Market Imperfections, Uncertainty and Corporate Investment in the
Czech Republic" by Lensink and Sterken, (1999). A paper by Carlin, Estrin
and Schaffer, "Measuring Progress in Transition and towards EU Accession.
A comparison of manufacturing firms in Poland, Romania and Spain", (1999)
shows that Poland is starting to catch up with EU member states, while
Romania still has a long way to go.
Apart from enterprise restructuring, another issue, which has been
prominent in the transition literature, is trade. As Jim Rollo summarises:
"Since the beginning of transition in Central and Eastern Europe, a
considerable literature has grown up on two aspects of the process. First is the
role of trade in transition. Typically this literature focused on exchange rate
issues, the impact of trade liberalisation at home, and trade barriers abroad.
The second aspect is that of enterprise adjustments" (1998).
Jim Rollo himself has greatly contributed to this literature, as well as
writing on more general transition subjects. In his paper "EU enlargement
and the world trade system" (1995), he examines the effect of EU enlargement
on world trade, noting that accession is unlikely to happen quickly:
"The negotiations could not begin before 1997 always assuming a positive
Commission opinion - and the earliest date for membership would be around
2000. Malta and Cyprus who already have opinions on their membership may
also join at that time. That suggests a post-EFTA enlargement wave of
between 4 and 7 countries by the end of the Century" (1995).
As discussed later in this thesis this timetable has slipped substantially with
the first accession being likely to happen in 2003 or even later. In an earlier
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paper with J. Stern, Jim Rollo examines the economic prospects of the
candidate countries and the associated effects on trade. Having constructed
an optimistic and a pessimistic scenario he concludes that the pessimistic
scenario is more likely:
"The conclusion is that, in this optimistic scenario, the assumed growth rates
and the resulting demand for foreign exchange generate foreign private
capital inflows on a scale that would seem to be very difficult to achieve ...
This means that the best case scenario is unlikely unless domestic
consumption is enormously constrained to make way for investment" (1992).
Many of the contributors to the trade debate are collected in a book
edited by J. Flemming and J. Rollo, "Trade, Payments and Adjustment in
Central and Eastern Europe", (1992), which includes authors such as P.
Aghion, D. Gros, P. Hare, G. Hughes, P. Messerlin, and D. Rosati. The general
theme of the book is to extend trade liberalisation, as well as finding
mechanisms to integrate the CEECs into the European trading system by
finding appropriate institutional arrangements. Alan Winters in his
discussion paper, "Who should run trade policy in Eastern Europe and
how?", (1994), examines the institutional factors in trade policy decision
making.
An interesting contribution to the macro-economic transition debate is
a collection of prize-winning essays on the international finance and exchange
rate policies. These essays are collected by the Amex Bank Review awards,
edited by Richard O'Brien. They include contributions from authors, such as
Gros & Steinherr, Rollo and Seabright. These essays address questions such as
exchange rate depreciation after the unification of Germany (Gros & Steinherr
in O'Brien, p. 52-67), the effect of exchange rate policy on competitiveness
(Seabright in O'Brien, p. 68-78) and the challenge of defining Europe
Agreements as either a free trade arrangement or as stepping stones to
membership (Rollo in O'Brien, p. 80-92).
Constraints in the transition process have become a more prominent
subject of academic literature. A recent paper modelling political constraints
17
is "The Dynamics of Political Support for Reform in Economies in Transition"
by Dani Rodrik, (1995). He concludes:
"if radical reform is endorsed by state-workers at the outset, the same
workers will eventually want to slow it down" (p. 22,1995).
Dariusz Rosati, (1992), goes into more applied detail on the political
processes in the transition countries ("The Politics of Economic Reform in
Central and Eastern Europe"). He highlights that transition economics is often
focused on limited reform programmes and that:
"it tends to ignore the fact that, contrary to initial expectations, the
transformation imposes considerable costs on major social groups supporting
the transformation" (p.4).
This imposes severe constraints on the political system:
"It all depends on the abilities of the new political elites to carry out the first
stage of transformation in a way that will not require too much sacrifice from
too many" (ibid. p. 21).
Another example of the problems of political constraints is by
Whitefield & Evans, (1994), in "Mass responses to transition and the
formulation of political cleavages in Eastern Europe". There are, however,
many avenues left to explore. Persson and Tabellini, in "The Size and Scope
of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians" (1999),
examine the impact of different electoral systems and processes on the
outcomes of government policy and the frequency of corruption - an
interesting approach which could be applied to the transition countries.
One of the most startling aspects of the transition process is a large fall
in output in the years following transition, which was not predicted by
standard macroeconomic models. This clearly indicated that there was
something qualitatively different about the process of transition, which could
not be explained by standard methodology. An attempt to explain this
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phenomenon is made by Roland and Verdier (1997). They link the output fall
to the liberalisation of prices - a necessary step in the transition from planned
to market economy. The main argument is based on a model, which illustrates
the lack of market co-ordination. They conclude that the causes of the output
fall can be disruptions of the previously existing production links, falling
investment and the absence of replacement investment. Their main result
indicates that the disruption of the 'big bang' liberalisation2 might be
necessary in some countries (notably China), but can be avoided in other
transition economies. They conclude:
"Here, we show that such a form of gradual liberalization has the effect of
smoothing output dynamics and reducing, or even eliminating, the initial
output fall after liberalization" (p.13).
Recently, more authors have used macroeconomic models to examine
the applicant countries ten years after the transition. Evzen Kocenda (1999) in
"Limited Macroeconomic Convergence in Transition Countries" uses a panel
unit-root test as an econometric tool. Despite prior expectations, the results
show that the transition countries have not converged towards each other.
Only the leading transition countries, namely the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland, show any convergence, while the Baltic States, Slovakia and the
Balkan countries are lagging behind. Kocenda concludes that:
"The tests for convergence in macroeconomic fundamentals among the CEE
countries show that a limited level of convergence has occurred only for a
restricted number of countries at the advanced stage of the transition process"
(P-12).
A further examination of the situation in the applicant countries, 10
years after the transition comes from a paper by Tito Boeri, (1999), "Optimal
Speed of Transition 10 Years After". He examines the predictions of the
Optimal Speed of Transition (OST) theory, in light of the evidence of the last
decade. He finds that contrary to initial expectations, transition has involved
- Introduction of all reforms as quickly as possible.
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stagnant unemployment pools, large flows to inactivity and low worker
mobility. He stipulates that the closure of state enterprises is not a choice
variable for the applicants' governments but that this process is determined
endogenously in the transition countries. He believes that governments need
to use other policy instruments to manage the transition process, namely
unemployment benefits:
"Thus it is still necessary to ascertain which policy instruments, if any, can be
activated by policy-makers in countries shifting from one economic system to
another. The generosity of non-employment benefits is a key variable
governments can rather freely adjust particularly at early stages of the
transformation process ... and one that has the potential to significantly affect
the pace and characteristics of labour market adjustments" (p.15).
A further examination of the policy lessons from the transition process
is "Ten Years of Transformation: Macroeconomic Lessons" by Charles
Wyplosz, (2000). He maintains that despite problems, the 'big bang' approach
was mainly justified, but acknowledges that in many countries the way
reforms were introduced did not follow any clear-cut approach. He concludes
that the approach chosen has more to do with the feasibility of different
approaches than with a pre-decided strategy.
The literature shows that economic models can be applied to the
transition process - a methodology Roland and Dewatripont, (1991) pioneered
early on in the transition period. This approach tries to capture the essence of
the transition process by utilising macroeconomic modelling. Modelling this
transition has been attempted by only a handful of writers. A useful paper
surveying the literature on macroeconomic modelling is by Duo Qin ("On
Macro Economic Modelling of the Transition Process", 1998). He comments
on the breadth of literature on transition, in general, yet he laments the
relatively limited literature using the modelling approach:
"But so far the literature is dominated by country studies reporting and
documenting the reforms ... Textbooks on the subject have also appeared ...
Neither country studies nor textbooks are covered by the present discussion.
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Instead, it will be focused narrowly upon the nascent and relatively meagre
literature which tackles the subject via the formal modelling approach" (Qin,
p.4,1998).
He explains the origin of models, which advocate the 'big bang' approach.
Mainly they originated with economic models of disequilibrium. One of
many examples of this approach can be found in Blanchard et al (1992) in the
paper "Reform in Eastern Europe". Despite favouring a 'big bang' approach,
Qin mentions that this approach has severe limitations when applied to the
transition economies:
"An outstanding problem of the 'big bang' approach is the likelihood of
serious macroeconomic instability caused by severe regime shocks (Qin, p. 5,
1998).
There are few theoretical papers which have formalised a model of
gradual transition (e.g. Newbery, 1991). The issue of sequencing has driven
developments of these macroeconomic models of transition:
"As far as the impact of various types and sizes of shocks are concerned,
another issue has surfaced, namely, the issue of policy sequencing with
respect to the optimal speed as well as macroeconomic stability of reforms,
since many policy shocks are interdependent, and often complementary with
each other, but with different time effects. Pioneer work on this issue has been
carried out by Dewatripont and Roland (1992; 1996)" (Qin, p. 5,1998).
This pioneering work was started by Dewatripont and Roland in "The
virtues of Gradualism and legitimacy in the transition economy", (1991). This
was followed by the main paper in the field "Transition as a process of large -
scale institutional change" (1996). Gerard Roland explored some of these
issues in "The role of political constraints in transition strategies", (1994) and
"On the speed and Sequencing of Privatization and Restructuring", (1994),
which have also contributed to the debate on optimal policies of transition.
The 1996 paper is especially important, as it is one of the few papers using
macroeconomic modelling in the transition process. Their approach is the
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basis of the theoretical modelling used later in this thesis and is explored in
some detail below.
They categorise the objectives of the transition process under four
different subheadings:
1) To improve allocative efficiency.
Allocative efficiency is mainly improved by freeing prices, thus removing the
artificial price system created by the planned economies of Eastern Europe. It
also has to be mentioned that an attempt to regulate competition has to be
made to break-up the large state monopolies, which have often been created
in the former communist countries.
2) To stabilise the macroeconomy.
Stabilisation includes the attempt to limit inflation and exchange rate
fluctuations, as well as attempting to stabilise the Public Sector Borrowing
Requirement (PSBR) and the balance of payments. Furthermore, there has to
be an emphasis on keeping unemployment as low as possible while reforming
the economy. However, too low unemployment can prevent reaping
efficiency gains associated with some unemployment. These gains not only
come from firms working more efficiently but also from the increase in
incentive for people to maintain their employment and thus improve effort
and efficiency. C. Shapiro and J. Stiglitz (1984), demonstrate this in their
paper, "Equilibrium Unemployment as a Discipline Device". While some
unemployment is thus necessary to keep the transformation process moving
forward, at the same time unemployment should be kept low to decrease
insecurity, loss of human capital, loss of potential output, high burdens on the
government budgets and the social costs of unemployment, such as crime and
migration.
3) To provide better incentives to make firms respond to market signals.
This applies especially to the privatisation process, which allocates ownership
to one group or the other. Thus, it will determine which sets of objectives will
be used in a firm's future decisions. This also applies to the firms remaining in
public hands as the government has to decide whether these firms face
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"hard" or "soft" budget constraints. Hard budget constraints refer to a policy
by which the credit institutions, if still controlled by government institutions
or regulation, do not bail out firms, which are facing financial difficulties and
tolerate associated bankruptcies and unemployment. Soft budget constraints
mean that the firms do not face a competitive credit arrangement and thus,
misallocation of resources in investment decisions will be unavoidable.
4) To create government institutions "adequate" for a market economy.
Dewatripont and Roland state that there are different views on "adequate"
institutions:
"but there is a relative consensus on a) the need for political and institutional
stability b) the need to protect private property rights from encroachment (by
government but also by the Mafia) and to protect taxpayers from rent-seeking
of behaviour of pressure groups towards government" (1996, p.2).
They also state that these four objectives are generally agreed upon,
but that the constraints, which these countries face, are emphasised
differently by different economists. These constraints are summarised as
follows:
1) Uncertainty ofoutcomes.
These are present at both aggregate and individual level. There is a problem
of having no "blueprint" for a market economy, deriving from theoretical
debate within the field of economics and variations in actual practice in the
Western world. Furthermore, problems of achieving the overall goal, once
defined, are implicit in the transition process. There is neither a
comprehensive, nor a consensual theory of transition, and no examples where
full transition has been achieved in the real world. This aggregate uncertainty
means that there are no clear ideas of costs and which groups have to pay
them, and implies that uncertainty is prevalent on an individual level. For
individual agents there is the threat of unemployment, unknown in the
former planned economies, and policy makers and other economic agents
have to make investment decisions taking a high level of uncertainty into
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consideration. The problems of speed and sequencing of transition mean that
political support is unstable.
2) Complementarities and interactions between reforms.
Complementarities appear when two reforms are essential to achieve one or
more of the objectives mentioned above. For example, when one attempts to
improve allocative efficiency, it is necessary to address price controls as well
as questions of ownership. Dewatripont and Roland (1996) mention that
contrary to appearance, this does not necessarily mean that 'big bang'
programmes are optimal.
3) Political constraints.
These are emphasised particularly in the paper, as transition means that there
will be winners and losers and thus the governments need to create political
constituencies for difficult reforms.
These constraints mean that the speed and sequencing of reform is
debated. In particular, the question of whether to free the economy at the
earliest possible time and all at once ("big bang" reform) or whether to have a
drawn out process (gradual reform), has been debated with strong arguments
being presented for both points of view.
The preceding part of Dewatripont and Roland's paper (1996)
commences with an analysis of uncertainty of the outcome of partial reform.
The key concepts, here, are the presence of an option value for reversal and
the introduction of a reform, containing significant information value. These
concepts are crucially important in determining the costs of "big bang" versus
a gradual approach. They conclude that:
"If early reversal is less costly than full reversal and the first reform is
informative, gradualism will be preferable to "big bang" provided learning is
fast enough relative to the interim efficiency loss, that is, provided that [the
possibility of early reversal] is close enough to one. Otherwise "big bang" will
be superior"(p. 5).
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This discussion suggests that, in the presence of reversal costs and aggregate
uncertainty, a key determinant in the choice of "big bang" versus gradualism
is:
"the degree of informativeness about future outcomes "(ibid. p. 5),
rather than the outcome of partial reform.
Given this justification for gradualism, Dewatripont and Roland
conclude that in this framework it can be demonstrated that reforms, which
are more popular (because of a positive discount rate for future outcomes)
and riskier (because the option value for early reversal increases with the
variability of the first-period outcome), should be implemented first. This has
implications for the timing of transition programmes. If there is an option
value attached to early reversal, gradualism will have ex ante a higher
outcome and thus will be more popular than "big bang" strategies.
Gradualism will thus start earlier than "big bang" programmes and will tend
to be implemented in countries where the perception of a crisis situation is
particularly high. Reforms have to be complementary for gradualism, as
otherwise each reform would be judged on its own and be implemented
immediately or never. But given this framework, one might even implement a
second reform, which might ex ante look unattractive, as there is momentum
for further reform if the first reform was successful:
"Because of reform complementarity, implementing the second reform is
necessary in order to keep the benefit from the first one, and also to avoici the
cost of reversing it" (1996, p. 6).
Political constraints, in the context of accession, are discussed in more
detail later in this thesis. As Dewatripont and Roland state:
"They are particularly relevant for transition countries in which the move to
democracy preceded the move to the market" (p. 7).
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To further illustrate, one has to introduce a model with heterogeneous
populations to capture the effect of redistribution, which is unavoidable in
transition economies. This means that one introduces individual uncertainty,
which is caused by aggregate uncertainty. To illustrate, we will use the
example of two statistically independent reforms, reform A and reform B.
Aggregate uncertainty is represented by both reforms having a positive
outcome G occurring with a probability p and a negative outcome L occurring
with a probability (1-p). Each reform has a reversal cost of r/2. Here,
Dewatripont and Roland remove the effect of lagged learning by using y = 1,
where y represents a time lag factor. Thus for simplicity, "immediate
learning" is assumed. The introduction of two different populations to
demonstrate redistributive effects follows. Ex ante all individuals are assumed
to be identical, but the reforms have different effects on both groups. Reform
1 will benefit 2/3 of the population ex post by adding an individual benefit of
g for this group on top of the aggregate outcome, while 1/3 of the population
have a loss of -2g for each individual on top of the aggregate outcome. Reform
2, in contrast, will benefit 1/3 of the population ex post by yielding a gain of
2g, while the other 1/ 3 of the population loses -g, both on top of the aggregate
outcome. After both reforms are implemented, the reversal cost becomes
2*r/2= r. For the median voter, these assumptions mean that the ex post
overall distributive effect of both reforms will be neutral. Ex ante, each reform
is also distributively neutral when taken individually, but each individual
reform is not distributively neutral ex post. This means that the sequencing of
both reforms might crucially affect the political feasibility of reform
continuation. The median voter will only go ahead with the second reform if
the benefits of the second reform outweigh the costs. A discussion of each
case, in turn, now follows.
If reform 1 is implemented first (GR12), and the outcome is positive, (i.e.
G) then the median voter will vote for the second reform, knowing he is
among the relative winners of the first reform if:
P(2G+g) + (l-p)(G+L+g) > -r/2
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Dewatripont and Roland use the condition that the outcomes of the reform on
the L.H.S must outweigh the reversal costs on the R.H.S. by using the symbol
>. This section introduces the symbol > to signify that the median voter will
still vote for reform if he is indifferent to continuation or reversal. If reform 1
produces the outcome, L, we will have the continuation condition given by:
p(l+G+g) + (l-p)(-r) > - r/2
The next step involves an examination of the case of reform 2 being
introduced first (GR21). Initially, the continuation condition is (if the first
reform outcome is G):
p(2G-g) + (l-p)(g+L-g) > -r/2
The median voter will continue (if the first reform produces a loss of L) if:
p(L+G-g) + (l-p)(-r) >-r/2
Here, one can already see that continuation is more difficult under GR21 than
under GR12:
"In particular, there are parameter values such that continuation is decided
under GR12 if and only if G is realised, while under GR21, reversal can never
be avoided. In that case GR12 is optimal and GR21 is clearly not" (Ibid., 1991, p.
9).
Dewatripont and Roland also note that more irreversibility ex post can be a
mixed blessing, since it reduces the option value of early reversal, which
might be a reason for the political acceptability of GR ex ante. For a reformist
government this might entail introducing important reforms with a "big
bang" when ex ante is feasible, by using the window of opportunity present at
the beginning of the transition period as this would eliminate the option of
early reversal. Here, we can see that these models introduce
"the case for "big bang" (which takes advantage of windows of opportunity
to introduce reforms that are costly to reverse) and the case for gradualism
(which relaxes ex ante political constraints and creates irreversibility through
correct sequencing, building constituencies for further reform)" (ibid., 1991, p.
9).
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Dewatripont and Roland refer to models concerning the political
business cycle and credibility by Persson and Svensson, (1989), "Why a
Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-inconsistent
Preferences" and Alesina and Tabellini, (1995), "A Positive Theory of Fiscal
Deficits and Government Debt". These arguments were reinforced in a later
paper by Persson and Tabellini (1997) "Political Economics and
Macroeconomic Policy". Here, the authors survey the macroeconomic
literature on incentive constraints, demonstrating the scope of issues this
approach has been applied to. These models focus on the problem of time
inconsistency, which is seen as a central problem in government policy. Time
inconsistency in the context of transition processes can be described as
follows: If a government makes a commitment to implement reform R at the
time t, than the market, ideally, should adapt their policies to this reform
plan. If the market adapts, the government will be tempted to negate the
commitment to reap the benefits of market adaptation without incurring the
cost of reform. As the markets anticipate the negation of the commitment,
they will not adapt and thus the prior benefits of the reform are lost. This
means that the commitment of the government is time inconsistent. An
example of this time inconsistency in the context of transition economies
might be the stabilisation measures, which could attract large-scale
investment. As governments commit themselves to strict monetary policy,
they expect investments to come in, which can partially offset the recessionary
impact of these measures. But as soon as the investments are in place, the
government will have an incentive to relax monetary policy, which means
that, if investors have foresight, investments will not come into the country in
the first place.
To remove the problem of time inconsistency, there are a variety of
possible solutions, which can influence the behaviour of firms and
governments. These often concern institution building, which might be part of
the objective mentioned before, to build "adequate" institutions for a market
economy. It is necessary to briefly explain what we mean by constituency
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building. As the part of the economy, which is in private hands, expands
during the transition period, more and more people, and lobby groups, are
funded by the private sector and thus the number of people supporting
reform increases. Other people who are disadvantaged by further reforms can
be compensated by transfer systems, which are financed by the gains from
previous successful reforms.
In the context of reforms we can consider the possibility of present
governments using the window of opportunity to constrain future
governments. An obvious example might be privatisation, which would be
almost impossible to reverse in future. This could favour "big bang"
approaches as long as the possibility of re-election is exogenous. There is,
however, an argument which favours gradualism if the possibility of
continuing a reform process is endogenous. Here the government could stay
in power by introducing popular reforms at first, which could build
constituencies for future reforms and future re-election.
One can also use the reform strategies to influence voting behaviours,
which are called "divide-and-rule tactics" (Dewatripont and Roland, 1991).
They postulate that, given a country with three types of workers, types 0, 1
and 2, working in the sectors 0, 1 and 2 respectively, we can construct the
following reform pay-off table:
Table 1.a.1 Reform Pay-offs without transfers
Net gain of tvpe 0 Net gain of tvpe 1 Net gain of tvpe 2
Reform 1 gi h gi
Reform 2 g2 g2 I2
Reform 1 + 2 gl + g2 ll + g2 I2 + gi
With g, > 0 > k for i = 1,2.
One has to note, here, that a discount factor would have to be taken into
account if the scheme is judged cursive. One has, however, to recognise that a
small discount factor makes gradual reform ex mite less feasible (as a discount
29
factor between 0 and 1 means that future gains or losses are comparatively
less unimportant).
To have a reform implemented, 2/3 of the voters must support the
measure. Dewatripont and Roland conclude that if h +g2 and h + gi are
negative then "big bang" strategies are not feasible, while gradual strategies
can be maintained. This can easily be shown with a numerical example,
extending the original analysis.
Assuming gi = 0.7, g2 = 0.6, h = -1 and I2—I, we can construct the
following pay-off table:
Table 1.a.2 Reform pay-off without transfers - Numerical example
Net gain of type 0 Net gain of type 1 Net gain of type 2
Reform 1 0.7 -1 0.7
Reform 2 0.6 0.6 -1
Reform 1 + 2 1.3 -0.4 -0.3
Here, only a gradual method is possible, as a "big bang strategy" will be
opposed by 2/3 of the voters. Gradualism is only possible if voters are
"myopic" as gradualism means that 2/3 of the society will lose out in this
scenario in the long term. That is to say that, if big bang is impossible, a
gradual approach will only be feasible if the gains from the transition process
will accumulate only to a minority of people in the population. This could
only be made feasible in the long term by introducing a transfer, as voters
have to be kept satisfied over the longer term, which is crucial to maintaining
political stability. Assuming that a transfer cost t of 0.1 exists (which has to be
paid at the point in time when the money is taken from the earner) and
transfers will be used by the government to make the two losing types
indifferent between reform and no reform, and it takes at least two periods to
implement the transfer scheme (i.e. it will be taxed in period t and paid out in
period t+2) we will get the following pay-off table:
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Table 1.a.3 Reform Pay-offs with transfers - Numerical Example













Net gain from the
transition process
0.4 0 0
The transfer has been chosen so that in no period more than 1/3 of the people
are losing out, thus making it feasible. Other distributions would also be
feasible. The point of this example is to show that without redistribution
through transfers, this reform plan will always be unfeasible. It is feasible
with transfers in the long term, as there are no losers from this process. One
has to note that even if everyone is better off in the long term, there is still an
argument to make sure that the majority of people have a positive income in
each period. This can be explained by assuming that people are concerned
with maintaining a minimum standard of living. If the losses in one period
push their standard of living below their expected minimum standard, they
might vote against reform even if they know that in the long term they would
benefit from this process. This is an argument, which is reinforced by
uncertainty over future outcomes. It could also explain the initial output fall
experienced in transition as the sum of benefits and costs is negative in the
first two periods. "Big bang" is not feasible as can be seen in the following
table, as long as redistribution takes time to function:
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Table 1.a.4 Reform Pay-off under a 'big bang' strategy
Net gain of type 0 Net gain of type 1 Net gain of type 2
Period 1 1.3-a-0.7= 0.5 -0.4 -0.3
(reform 1+2)




Net gain from the 0.5 0 0
process
This shows that even though there is less loss from the transfer (a instead of
2a), this scheme is not politically feasible. Thus, one can construct a model in
which there is credibility in a transfer scheme, which will provide gains to all
types from the transition process. How these transfers are implemented is a
matter of political choice, as one could also envisage a scheme by which only
one of the loser groups is compensated and, correspondingly, there is a long-
term majority of 2/3 instead of the whole population supporting the process.
"Big bang" strategies are not feasible because of the time lag in the transfer
process. Even though the time lag is an artificial construction, it represents a
real problem of the transition economies. This problem is the ineffectual tax
collection mechanism as well as ineffectual rules for transfers. Furthermore, at
the moment it is almost impossible to collect any taxes because of the
recessionary effect on the economies, which are hit by recent falls in output
and large unemployment. This makes it almost impossible to compensate
disadvantaged groups in the current period.
Therefore, if there is a necessity for one reform to be implemented
before another can take place, we might have a situation in which, in the short
and in the long term, the only possible path to implement the reforms is a
gradual one. This could be the case if, for example, prices have to be liberated
and firms have to be privatised before the effect on the allocation of resources
is noticeable and increases in employment start to take place. This could
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create losses for a large number of people and, in the short term, might not be
politically feasible. If privatisation occurs first and those benefits are
distributed so that the disadvantaged groups from price liberalisation will be
compensated, then this might enable the price liberalisation, which together
will increase allocative efficiency in the long term.
Dewatripont and Roland, (1996) also discuss transfer schemes.
However, they focus on the effect of gradualism on the size of the transfers,
not the feasibility aspect of transfers. They firstly concentrate on asymmetric
information in the context of transfers and conclude that under these
circumstances, gradualism dominates a "big bang" strategy and is the time
consistent optimum whenever budget considerations are of importance. This
reinforces the conclusions reached previously within this thesis.
Finally, they discuss the effect of possible secession on transfer
schemes. Here, secession, or the threat of secession alters the majority of
structures within a country. They conclude that:
"The possibility of secession allows here a reduction in the amounts of
transfers paid to the losers from reform since it changes the status quo in case
of rejection of reform proposal" (Dewatripont and Roland, 1996, p. 14).
Thus, Dewatripont and Roland, and the extensions in this section
analysis, present a theoretical argument that demonstrates that gradualism
under uncertainty and political constraints, can be the only feasible path to
reform. The importance of these arguments is reinforced in other papers.
Roland (1994) in "The role of political constraints in transition strategies"
emphasises the advantage of a "big bang" strategy in terms of constraining a
successor government, but recognises that one needs windows of opportunity
to make "big bang" feasible. He still maintains that gradual strategies create
irreversibility by creating constituencies.
He summarises seven limitations of a gradual approach:
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1) The option value of early reversal has to be positive.
2) Gradualism may be ineffective if a window of opportunity exists and a
'big bang' package is feasible.
3) Gradualism may be ineffective if there is no learning process, which
creates benefits from the first reform.
4) The use of the above described "divide-and-rule tactics" might not be
possible under all democratic frameworks.
5) The option value of reversal deters investment.
6) Without a critical mass of reforms, there might be a problem of signalling
the future political feasibility of the economic reform programme to
economic agents.
7) The wrong sequencing of reforms might be more damaging than a "big
bang" approach.
He shows that in many Visegrad countries gradual reforms have been
implemented and concludes that the 'big bang' approach emphasises how
speed in reforms may constrain a successor government, whereas the
gradualist approach tries to design the sequencing of reforms to build, at each
stage of transition, constituencies for further reform. These issues are crucially
important when these models are applied to the debate on the preparation of
Eastern Europe for EU membership.
The above illustrates that analysis of the transition process by using
macro-economic models has contributed important aspects to the discussion
of transition. In particular, the models have demonstrated that under certain
circumstances a gradual approach can be optimal. The 'big bang' approach, so
widely advocated in the immediate aftermath of the revolutions, can be the
more costly approach. Furthermore, the models have shown the importance
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of constraints in the accession process. The constraints, which can alter the
reform path of a country, are particularly important in the context of
constituency building. Political constraints, related to the distributive effects
of reforms and voting patterns, can cause the abandonment of reforms if
sequencing is not taken into account. The problems of sequencing are
reinforced by complementarities of reforms, which have to be taken into
account to determine the correct transition strategy. Transfers are crucially
important in enabling certain reform strategies and need to be modelled
explicitly.
Furthermore, time inconsistency plays an important role in the transition
process. As governments have no mechanism to commit credibly to a reform
path, the incentive to cieviate from a pre-announced strategy can be over¬
riding. As a consequence the announcements of government strategy are
disbelieved, entailing a more costly reform path, indicating that Time
Inconsistency is present.
The final important constraint is uncertainty, which is pervasive in the
transition process. Uncertainties generally increase the cost of transition and
can alter the optimal path to the creation of a functioning market economy.
These models are designed to model the transition, not the accession,
process. Even though it is necessary to take into account the constraints raised
by the macro-economic models of the accession process, the models need to
be adapted to take into account the specific circumstances, of the relationship
with the European Union. In addition, any model of the accession process
must account for the historical starting point and the institutional and cultural
background of the applicant countries. The following section reviews the
literature, which examines the relationship with the European Union, while
the following chapters determine, respectively, the historical starting point of
the applicant countries and their current position in the accession process.
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Chapter 1: Literature Review
b) Literature on the Accession Process
The models described in the previous section relate to the transition
process, not to the relationship of the CEECs with the European Union. In this
field, modelling is rare, if not almost non-existent. This thesis attempts to
address this imbalance. Yet there exists a vast amount of literature on the
accession process, mainly from a political or international relations
perspective. Historical accounts of Eastern Europe and the accession process
are also numerous. A notable overview of European history is Norman
Davies' "Europe". The book covers European history comprehensibly but due
to its compact nature cannot give a detailed account of all events. For a factual
examination of the transition period, the compilation "Eastern Europe and the
Commonwealth of Independent States" published by Europa Publications
covers the details of the transition period in great accuracy. The compilation is
written by a number of authors, examining each CEEC's history and
economy, as well as some essays on overarching developments. This can be
usefully contrasted to the developments in the EU, summarised in the book
"Western Europe 2000" also by Europa Publications. However, only a few
authors have examined the accession process from an economic perspective.
One of the most notable books on the subject is Richard Baldwin's
"Towards an integrated Europe", (1992). He states that it is unlikely that EU
membership, for the applicant countries, will take place for decades, given the
constraints faced by the EU. The problems he mentions include the reforms of
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the European Structural Funds
(ESFs) and the associated EU budget reforms. Furthermore, he discusses the
necessary institutional reforms, as well as migration and security issues.
He also demonstrates that the CEECs face major challenges in institutional
reforms, as well as facing an ever-increasing EU integration process. He
warns that excluding the CEECs from parts of the European integration could
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lead to a perception of second class membership. Baldwin advocates the
creation of an intermediate, all inclusive agreement for the CEECs, in
preparation for membership, an argument which is taken up in later literature
(see, for example, Dangerfield, 2000).
Many of Baldwin's issues were further investigated in his conference
paper, "Concepts and Speed of Eastern Enlargement", (1996). He reiterates
the problems of Eastern enlargement and parallels the accession process with
an engagement, where the wedding date has not been set and the bride price
could pose problems. The issues associated with the EFTA enlargement are
examined in Baldwin et. al. (1995) "Expanding Membership of the European
Union", which explores some of these issues in the context of Europe's latest
accession3.
A further book examining the scope of the reforms the transition
countries faced is "The New Eastern Europe: Western Responses" (Rollo,
1990). The book demonstrates the multitude of actors involved in the process
and the possible policies they can pursue (Rollo, Table 6.1). Rollo expresses
doubt about the prospects of quick membership:
"To try to absorb the East-Central Europeans (and the Balkans in due course),
with their economic structures in transition and their lower standard of living,
is difficult to contemplate. The prospect of managing a community of up to 25
states, all at different levels of economic development, is daunting" (ibid., p.
114).
This doubt has been proven to be justified, but now the community is facing
an enlarged group of applicants with the possibility of more applications to
come4.
J The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden in 1995.
4 Currently there are 15 memberstates and 13 countries have applied to join. Further possible
applicants include the EFTA countries (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland), as well as
further Balkan states (Albania, Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia (FYROM), possibly Montenegro and, in
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Susan Nello's, "The New Europe", (1991) focuses on the economic
relationship between East and West. It gives a good overview of the economic
relationships during the Cold War and shows how trade could develop in
different sectors. However, the book goes further and considers the reforms
necessary in the East and what the West could do to aid this transition. The
book also discusses possible future developments and warns that reforms
need to take place on both sides:
"It remains to be seen whether the European integration process can maintain
the momentum required for such far-reaching changes" (p. 265).
Eater discussions address specifically the accession process and
associated constraints. "Back to Europe: Central and Eastern Europe"
(Henderson (ed.), 1999) reviews many of the issues relevant to the accession
process. The book addresses three major issues of the accession process:
security, structural EU reforms and political developments in the CEECs.
Even though some positive aspects are analysed, the book shows the scope of
problems remaining in the accession process. Another book addressing the
specific question of accession is "The Enlargement of the European Union"
(Avery and Cameron, 1998). The authors detail, specifically, enlargement as a
process, which needs to be addressed in its own right. They catalogue the
developments of recent years, including the developments since the official
response, to the applicants of the CEECs, of the Commission, Agenda 2000.
They warn that the accession process will be long and difficult, yet they
emphasise that this process also offers opportunities to improve the
fundamental structure of Eastern Europe and, thus, to increase living
standards throughout the continent.
The problems of uncertainty of timing are reflected in many papers. For
example, Galinos ("Central Europe and the EU: Prospects of Closer
Integration", 1994) considers that even though the EU acknowledged Eastern
the longer term, Yugoslavia) and even the Eastern states of Byelorussia, Moldavia, the Ukraine and
maybe even Russia itself. This could mean a long-term membership of the EU of around 40 states.
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European aspirations, rapid accession is unlikely and the hopes of the CEECs
might well prove to be over-optimistic. Jan B. de Weydenthal, (1994),
acknowledges that there are many problems in the accession process, yet re-
emphasises that political considerations might well overrule economic
concerns.
Dobroczynski (1994) emphasises the serious constraints still impeding
accession ("Eastern Chances for creating Europe's Unified Economy"). He
reinforces the necessity for socio-economic forces and societies to participate
in this process:
"Positive mobilization of society will to a large extent depend on how the
new regimes cope with the twin challenges of economic reconstruction and
harmonisation of the interests and attitudes of different social groups" (Ibid,
p. 12).
This process does, however, depend on the CEECs undertaking fundamental
reform of civic society and shouldering the corresponding costs:
"If Eastern Europe wants to be admitted to the European Economic
Community on an association and eventually full membership basis, it will
have to carry out quickly a vast number of reforms - and of a far more serious
nature than at first glance might appear" (Ibid. p. 19).
The scope of necessary transitions is also discussed in Paul Hare (1996),
"How far is Eastern Europe from Brussels", with a particular view to those
reforms necessary to achieve compatibility with the EU's common market. He
regards the process as resulting in a segmented Europe:
"the G1 countries [Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovenia] will
become full members of the EU within a fairly short time, say within five
years, that the G2 countries [Baltic States] may enter in the subsequent five
years (conceivably also including Slovakia from G3), with the remaining
countries either never entering the EU or joining much later" (p. 9).
Even this pessimistic timetable is in danger of slipping behind, with the G1
countries being unlikely to join before 2003-2005.
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A further attempt to examine the lessons from the accession process is
by Hans-Werner Sinn (1999) in "EU Enlargement, Migration and Lessons
from German Unification". He examines German Unification, which provides
the first example of a transition country joining the EU. He uses a formal
model to predict that there will be migration from the new EU members to
the existing ones, which is later reversed. He asserts that this migration is
efficient and should not be constrained. Yet he does not address the problem
of political resistance to large-scale inward migration, already evident in
many EU countries.
The inter-disciplinary nature of the process makes it impossible to
catalogue anything resembling the complete literature in the field. The
literature examined in this chapter provides only a broad overview of the
background to the accession process. Further literature will be examined
through Evidence of Constraints in Chapter 5. The review in this chapter has
shown that there is a neeci to combine the methodology employed by
transition economists with the particular features of the accession process. To
understand the accession process it is necessary to establish the background
of the applicant countries and the starting point of the accession process. The
following chapter examines the historical development of the applicant
countries, while Chapter 3 examines the current situation and the applicants'
relationship with the European Union.
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Chapter 2: Historical Development
a) Issue Definition and Country Classification
The accession process cannot be understood without taking into
account the historical trends in the applicant countries. Despite the many
changes these countries have gone through, some of the issues have remained
throughout history and need to be understood in context. Alice Teichova
notes about the transition period:
"The same aspects have once more emerged as the central problems of the
Eastern European economies at the present time. They are concerned, in the
first place, with land reforms, in the second place, with lack of capital, and, in
the third place, with market problems" (1997, p. 7).
The desire to become members of the EU is rooted deeply in the
insecurity and conflict of Europe over the last centuries. Daniel Daianu notes:
"One can [also] detect another meaning which crosses ideological borders and
has defined the evolution of these societies throughout this century, the quest
of catching up with the West, an idea which obsessed national politicians in
the interwar period, communist leaderships bent on proving the alleged
superiority of their system, and which, today, is reflected in the ardent desire
to join the European Union" (in Teichova, 1996, p. 83).
The fear of Soviet domination can only be understood in the context of
the Cold War and the subsequent revolutions. Furthermore, the economic
starting point of the accession process is determined by policies pursued by
the communist regimes, which crucially influence the scope of, and the ability
to deal with, the political and economic reforms which are necessary to create
a functioning market economy. The tendency of state intervention and a lack
of democratic legacy are also crucially important to understand the
communist period. Teichova notes about the CEECS:
"They had a long tradition of massive state intervention in their economies
which continued throughout all political and social changes practically until
the present time - except for interwar Czechoslovakia. Although even in this
case government controls were tighter than in similar democratic states with a
capitalist economy. Most importantly, when taking into account historical
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realities, none of the Central and Southeast European states - again except for
interwar Czechoslovakia - have experienced a democratic system with a
parliamentary form of government, i.e. a pluralistic political system which is
held to be compatible with a functioning market economy" (1997, p. 5).
The final section of this chapter examines the revolutions in CEE,
demonstrating the speed and scope of changes people had to accommodate at
the beginning of the transition period. Many of the events are, by necessity,
examined in extensive detail, especially in demonstrating the turning points
of the country's history. It is impossible to overstate the importance of
historical developments for the CEECs. The whole transition and accession
process is a continuation of the much longer historical trends prevalent in
Europe. A more detailed historical examination is beyond the scope of this
thesis but for a comprehensive account of Europe's history see Norman
Davies, "Europe - A History", (1997).
To appreciate the development of the CEECs, it is necessary to analyse
their geographical situation, their history, their current economic situation
and their relationship with the European Union. In this chapter the historical
development of the applicant countries is examined up to and including the
revolutions, which shook the continent at the end of the 1980s and the
beginning of the 1990s. The chapter examines the economic geography of the
applicant countries and shows that the starting point for different groups of
countries is quite different, in particular when regarding proximity to the
European Union. Furthermore, their initial resource endowment anci the
structure of each economy varies widely. The chapter continues by examining
the cultural and political institutional background of these countries. It shows
that despite the differences, there is a degree of shared history. In particular,
the experiences within the pre First World War balance of power and the
descent into dictatorship in the post war period and the Second World War,
demonstrate a certain similarity in institutional history. Additionally, the
shared experiences of the Cold War and the revolutions are similar in all the
applicant countries. The chapter, thus, illustrates the distinctive differences
between the applicant countries, which makes their starting points of the
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accession process distinctly different, whilst demonstrating that there are a
number of important similarities. These are especially noticeable when the
countries are divided into groups according to their shared experiences.
For the analysis in this chapter the ten applicant countries5 have been
divided into four groups, which, to a certain degree, share a common history.
In particular, they have been divided into the following groups6:
- Group V. The Visegrad7 countries {the Czech Republic (Prague), Hungary
(Budapest), Poland (Warsaw) and Slovakia (Bratislava8)9}.
- Group 2: Slovenia (Ljubljana10)11 {former Yugoslavia}.
- Group 3: The Baltic States {Estonia (Tallinn), Latvia (Riga) and Lithuania
(Vilnius)}.
- Group 4: South-Eastern Europe {Bulgaria (Sofia) and Romania (Bucharest)}.
Each of these groups has its own unique features, which can be seen
clearly when examining their borders and geographical position. The
examination of the applicant countries' geographical situation is important to
set them in the context of the EU to the West and Russia to the East.
Furthermore, the geographical position of the applicant countries is important
in their relation with each other, which is partially determined by the many
changes of borders detailed later in this chapter. The proximity, or distance,
from the EU will also influence crucially the accession process. The EU is
unlikely to admit a country, which has no direct borders or sea links to the
EU. Furthermore, the neighbouring EU countries will also have the most
15 Cyprus, Malta and Turkey, even though they have applied to join the EU, are treated separately in the
accession process.
6 The Capital cities of each country are shown in brackets.
7 Named after the Central European Free Trade Agreement which was founded by a common
declaration of the heads of state of Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland at Visegrad /Hungary on the
15.2.1991 (Der Fischer Weltalmanach '95, p. 773-774).
^ Or PreBburg, as it was known within the Habsburg Empire.
9 Slovakia is included here due to the shared history with the Czech Republic within Czechoslovakia.
The separate development of Slovakia after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia will be discussed in
detail later.
Or I.aibach, as it was known within the Habsburg Empire.
' ' Slovenia is not included in any of the other groups, because historically the history of Yugoslavia
diverges from the other groups.
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interest in accession of these countries, acting as a possible advocate for
membership within the EU.
Group 1 borders on Germany and Austria to the West, while sharing a
border with Russia12, Byelorussia and the Ukraine to the East. Hungary shares
borders in the South with Slovenia, Croatia and Serbia, and also with
Romania to the East. Poland also shares a border with Lithuania and it is the
only country, in Group 4, with access to the Baltic Sea. While the other
countries are landlocked, they share some of the most important European
rivers between them, most notably the Danube (Donau), the Vistula
(Weichsel), the Odra (Oder) and the Vltava (Elbe).
Group 2 borders Austria and Italy to the West and also shares borders
with Hungary and Croatia. Slovenia is a mountainous country and it is the
only applicant country with access to the Adriatic Sea.
Group 3 is characterised by Russia and Byelorussia to the East and the
Baltic Sea to the West. Despite close connections to Scandinavia, they share no
direct land border. Lithuania's only frontier with Russia is to the West13 and it
has borders with Byelorussia to the East and Poland to the South.
Finally, Group 4 borders on Yugoslavia to the West14 and the Black Sea
to the East. The internal shared border for the most part is the Danube and
Bulgaria borders Macedonia15, Greece and Turkey to the South. Romania
borders the Ukraine and Moldavia to the East anci shares a border with
Hungary to the West.
All of the groups share a border with a present EU member state anci
each group has access to a major waterway. Romania would, however, need
another applicant16 to gain membership before sharing a direct border with
the EU. Lithuania would need Poland to join, to share a land border, while
The city of Kaliningrad, East Prussia (formerly Konigsberg) has been under the control of Russia
since the Second World War.
'J See footnote above
14 In particular they border the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia, which together with Montenegro and the
former autonomous region of Kosovo (now part of Serbia) make up Yugoslavia.
FYROM, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.
'6' 1 lungary or Bulgaria.
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Latvia needs Lithuania to join to share a border on land and Estonia would
need Latvia, Lithuania and Poland to join17.
There are also substantial differences in the resource endowment these
countries have within their borders. These have created some specialisation in
industry as well as different methods of energy generation. The COMECON,
the Soviet-dominated equivalent of the EU, enforced further specialisation.
Group 1 has substantial coal production18 and usage, as well as using
nuclear energy to generate electricity in most countries19. Oil and gas are
mainly imported from Russia through an existing network of pipelines. There
is some iron and steel production, as well as manufacturing industry,
especially for mechanical engineering, car manufacturing and shipbuilding20.
A substantial, but declining, percentage of the workforce is engaged in
agricultural activity.
Group 2 is still economically characterised by the legacy of Yugoslavia.
Slovenia has a nuclear power station which it shares with Croatia21 and it
produces and uses lignite for energy production. There is some
manufacturing related to mechanical engineering and there is also some
chemical production. There is still a substantial workforce in agriculture and
Slovenia has a growing tourism sector.
The Baltic States have a large service sector, which is partially
explained by financial activity. These countries also produce a large number
of products in the primary sector and still have a substantial part of the
workforce employed in agriculture. There are few industries and these are
engaged mainly in chemicals and textiles. A relatively large share of trade is
'7 This is however not a major obstacle to integration as the Baltic Sea connects both Reval and Riga
relatively directly with Helsinki and Stockholm.
Hard Coal as well as lignite, which is mainly used as an energy provider, as it is cheaper but it is
also more environmentally damaging.
'0 At Pak in Hungary, at Dukovny and Temelin in the Czech Republic and at Bohunice and the
planned power station at Mochovce, in Slovakia. Poland does not have a nuclear power programme.
Shipbuilding is taking place in Poland, even though this industry seems to be in substantial decline.
-' At Krsko in Slovenia.
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conducted with Russia22, which also supplies most of the energy to these
countries. In Group 3 only Lithuania has a nuclear plant23, which is due to
shut down as one of the conditions of accession.
The countries in Group 4 have a more diversified economy, albeit in a
very uncompetitive state. These countries rely mainly on primary products
for exports, but they also produce iron, steel, ships, chemicals, and products
associated with mechanical engineering. Bulgaria also has a large tobacco
industry and some tourism along the Black Sea. Romania produces oil and
gas and Group 4 also has nuclear energy for electricity production24. There is
an especially large part of the workforce engaged in agriculture in Romania25
but Bulgaria also has a large percentage of the workforce in this sector.
It is clear that the applicant countries have some geographical
similarities, but their differences in location create different foreign and
economic policy pre-occupations, as well as defining the main contact
partners within the EU for each of these groups. It is clear that Group 1 will
gravitate naturally towards Germany arid Austria, while Group 2 is
concerned with Austria and Italy. Group 3 has its closest links with the
Scandinavian countries, even though they share no direct land border. Group
4 has some contacts with Greece, but is generally the most remote from the
European Union.
It is necessary to emphasise that the inter-relations between the
applicant countries are crucially important. Due to their history, in particular
the developments after the First World War and the Second World War, they
all had or have some border disputes with each other or other neighbouring
countries. These will be examined in more detail later when the recent history
of these countries is analysed and they will also feature in the relationship of
Imports: Estonia 46%; Latvia 30% (reflecting the lower requirement of energy imports); Lithuania
41%. Exports: Estonia 25%: Latvia 29%; Lithuania 24%.
(1993; Source: Harenberg Landerlexikon, p. 265).
At Ignalina, which is due to be shut down even though the country heavily depends on this energy
for the time being.
At Kozludy in Bulgaria and Cernavoda in Romania.
25 20.3% in 1991 (Source: Harenberg Landerlexikon, p. 347)
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these countries with the Western states. The disputes over land confiscated
after the Second World War have already lead to disputes of applicants with
EU member states. Furthermore, border disputes, and the associated ethnic
minorities within the applicants' territory, can result in conflict, as seen in the
territory of former Yugoslavia.
The mix of industry in these countries, as well as their large
agricultural sector will be re-examined when the current position is analysed,
in Chapter 3. It is, however, clear that each of these countries still faces some
substantial problems to be able to fulfil the obligations of membership, as
their industries are neither highly diversified, nor competitive in most cases.
The history of these countries is inextricably bound to their present
state and it requires further examination. The policies these countries have
pursued and their geographical and economic situation can only be
understood when they are set in the context of their history. The strength of
aspirations for membership have to be analysed by taking the primary motive
of their application into account - to ground their society firmly in the
Western European system of security and economic co-operation. For this
part of the thesis, the groupings introduced earlier in this chapter will be
used. They are useful in providing a categorisation of these countries, in
terms of their shared experiences. It is, however, necessary to emphasise that
no CEEC is strictly comparable to another and thus, the analysis will return to
individual countries frequently.
The history of all of these countries will be discussed until the
revolutions at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. The
reforms and transformation of each country resulted in a chain reaction,
which finally lead to the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the
communist bloc. The history of the CEECs is interwoven in recent
developments and will, thus, be examined as a coherent whole in the next
chapter of this thesis. This part of the thesis will analyse the history of the
CEECs from their beginning, until the late 20th century. The analysis will
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mainly focus on the 20th century itself, as this period is most relevant to the
accession process. Nevertheless, long-term trends will also be discussed.
In the first part of this section the ancient history of these countries is
discussed, culminating in the First World War. The second part will discuss
the inter-war period and their subsequent involvement in the Second World
War. Subsequently in this section, the period after the Second World War is
analysed, which is characterised by Soviet dominance and the Cold War. The
next part of the chapter will then discuss the revolutions, which have taken
place in the last part of this century.
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Chapter 2: Historical Development
b) Early History and FirstWorld War
The historical detail is examined in this thesis for a number of reasons.
Without understanding the historical developments and historical trends, the
present position of the applicant countries cannot be determined or
appreciated. Furthermore, the historical development shows how these
countries have come into existence and it illustrates the changes in boundaries
and attitudes, which have occurred in their history. This sense of historical
identity, partially driving the revolutions of the 1980s and the 1990s, defines
the applicants' countries wish to become part of the European integration
process. The violent history of this century has also caused a strong desire for
stability and security in CEE, which is seen as being deliverable by
membership of the EU. Finally the transition and the accession process are
part of a much longer process of historical developments and can be seen as
one episode of a long-term search for identity in CEE. As historical identity
can crucially influence the political process, in particular where no previous
democratic history can shape new beliefs, it is essential to determine the
applicants' historical development.
Group 1 - the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia -
contains countries, which derive their present territory predominantly from
the changes after World War I and World War II. They do, however, have a
much longer history, albeit not necessarily as independent countries at all
times. Their histories have been characterised by changing alliances and
territories, resulting from their central position in the heart of Europe. Black
summarises their position in relation to Western Europe by observing:
"While the western European Powers founded great trading and colonial
empires in the early modern period, the states of central and eastern Europe
were involved in a bitter fight for survival"(1990, p. 282).
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The struggle between the European states and the powers to the east has
been a major theme in the history of the last millennium. This has lead to
numerous wars being fought in the territory these countries occupy and the
wish for integration can be extrapolated from these conflicts, as a method to
prevent further conflict.
Poland can look back on a long history, which has often resulted in
repartitions of the Polish State. The Polish people have been known to settle
in the general area since the 11th century. They are predominantly Slavic and
most of the population is Catholic26, but there were always areas settled by
different ethnic groups and most notably ethnic Germans. They were united
in a kingdom with Lithuania in 156927; this kingdom surviving until the late
18th century. The precarious situation of Poland did however involve a
balancing act between the major European powers. With the Habsburg
Austrian-Hungarian Empire to the South, the Tsarist Russia to the East and
the newly emerging Prussia to the West, this balancing act could not be
maintained indefinitely. Poland was annexed at different times by different
powers according to the state of the conflict between them. It changed hands
in 1772, 1793 and 1795. Poland, together with some Swedish Baltic
possessions, was the main issue in the Great Northern War between Russia
and Sweden and their various allies. Russia managed to gain territory in the
18th century and:
"By mid-century Russian hegemony in Eastern Europe was well
established"(Black 1990, p. 287).
Poland had already been forced to cede most Eastern provinces to Russia and
the remaining kingdom was only very limited in territory. The Congress of
Vienna in 1815 legitimised this kingdom:
-6 At present roughly 95% of Poles see themselves as Catholic.
There had been a personal union of the Jagiellonian kings since 1385 but in 1569 the Polish-
Lithuanian Rzeczpospolita (republic) was formed.
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"A so-called 'Congress Kingdom' was set up, nominally independent but its
monarchy hereditarily vested in the Romanov dynasty Most Poles
continued to live under Prussian rule in Poznan under the Austrian rule in
Galicia, or under Russian rule in the vast expanses of Lithuania, White
Russia, and the Ukraine."(Gildea, 1987, p. 59)
Finally, in 1864, it formally became a part of the Russian Empire where
it remained until the First World War. The German invasion of Tsarist Russia
and the subsequent defeat of the Russian Empire28, which was sealed by the
treaty of Brest-Litovsk in 1918, meant that large parts of Polish territory were
ceded to Germany until the end of the war. The Russian Empire disintegrated
into civil war, which ended in Bolshevik victory, but it was too weak to
influence events in Eastern Europe, which were seen as its decisive area of
interest. After the First World War, Poland became one of the buffer states
between the newly formed Soviet Union and Germany. This inter-war period
is the one period in which Poland has enjoyed a large degree of independence
in recent history. This will be examined in greater detail later.
Both Hungary and what was to become Czechoslovakia were part of
the Habsburg Empire for centuries. The Habsburg Empire was an empire of
diverse nationalities29 and diverse economic developments and thus:
"both historical and economic factors combined to make the internal unity of
the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy problematic."(Cipolla, 1973, p. 238)
Moreover, the territories which became Czechoslovakia and Hungary
had very different roles in the governing of the empire. While Hungary was
one of the kingdoms, which made up the core of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, Bohemia, Moravia30 and Slovakia were mere provinces of the empire.
Hungary was thus a much more powerful entity and the treatment of both of
these states was recognisably different after the First World War. Both
The Tsarist empire had effectively ceased to exist at this point in time as the internal developments
within Russia were gathering momentum after the February and October Revolutions in 1917.
At least eleven major nationalities including Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Slovaks, Romanians, Poles




countries had been part of the coalition of Austria-Hungary and Germany.
Having lost the war, Hungary was cut back in size, leaving large Hungarian
minorities in many parts of Eastern Europe, while Czechoslovakia, like
Poland, was created as a buffer state between Germany and the Soviet Union.
Hungary looks back on a long history, which is still seen with pride by
many Hungarians. Settled by Magyar tribes it became an independent
kingdom in the 11th century under King Stephen I. The Hungarians were
mainly Catholic but the reformation saw a strong Calvinist minority
developing31. It saw itself as bulwark against the Ottoman Empire and was
engaged in many battles with the Turkish forces. It was, however, conquered
in 1526 and remained occupied until the 17th century. When it became free of
Turkish rule, it became one of the component kingdoms of the Habsburg
Empire and remained in the dual monarchy until the FirstWorld War. It was:
"a kingdom that was hereditary in the Habsburg line and that included
Slovakia in modern Czechoslovakia and Croatia, Dalmatia and Savonia in
modern Yugoslavia"(Black ,1990, p. 361).
Hungary had always taken the second role in the empire and it became
increasingly resentful, not only against the Austrians but also against other
nationalities within the Empire:
"Their nationalism was not cosmopolitan, like that of the Poles, but extremely
chauvinistic. The Hungarian 'nation' was composed of Magyars alone, and
made no concessions to Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, or Romanians."(Gildea 1987,
p. 73)
After the Great War, Hungary became an independent republic albeit
with a drastically reduced territory and population. The instability created a
communist regime under Bela Kun in 1919, but in 1920 the monarchy was
restored. The reduced importance of Hungary, as well as the treatment of
Hungarian minorities in other Eastern European countries, made the inter-
30 The component areas of the Czech Republic.
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war period potentially unstable, which finally lead to the Hungarian alliance
with Nazi Germany, a process which will be analysed in more detail later.
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, only became an independent
country in the inter-war period. Even though there had been a Moravian
kingdom in the 9th century and an independent Bohemian-Moravian
kingdom which reached its peak in the 14th century, the kingdom became
incorporated into the Austrian empire in the 16th century. Bohemia, Moravia
and Slovakia were provinces within the Habsburg state. The Czech part of the
Austrian Empire was a stable part of the monarchy:
"The Bohemian nobility was German-speaking, imposed on the province
from the seventeenth century, and loyal to the dynasty"(Gildea, 1987, p. 73).
The Slovak people were less integrated and there was some movement for
independence. But until the First World War this did not become a reality,
partially because Slovak independence had no precedent:
"Clearly the previous existence of a separate state strengthened claims for
national autonomy or even independence. The Slovaks could prove nothing
here ... "(Gildea, 1987, p. 74)
Most Czechs and Slovaks are Catholic, but there are also substantial
minorities within this geographical area. This resulted mainly from the
strategic creation of the Czechoslovakian State. Czechoslovakia was created
by the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and served as a buffer in
the centre of Europe. The arbitrary connection of the Czechs and the Slovaks
did lead to the unravelling of the Czechoslovakian State 75 years later32 but
there were more immediate concerns for the young republic. The deliberate
inclusion of a mountain range (from the Erzgebirge33 in the North to the
Bohemian Forest in the West) as a geographical barrier to Germany, meant
J ' Present day religious affiliations are roughly 2/3 Roman Catholic and 1/5 Calvinist.
The Federal Republic of Czechoslovakia lasted from 1919-1993 with the exception of the Second
World War.
JJ This is the German name which literally means the Ore mountains.
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that a large number of ethnic Germans, the so-called Sudetendeutsche, lived
in the territory of Czechoslovakia. This created a potential source of conflict,
which resulted in the Czech army being built up in the inter-war period, as
well as numerous alliances with Western powers. Thus the inter-war period
was characterised by uncertainty and potential conflict, later detailed.
Slovenia in Group 2 has had a similar history to Czechoslovakia until
the First World War. Slovenia was settled by Slavic people who became
known as Slovenes and became, subsequently, a part of the Habsburg Empire.
Being the furthest Western of the Balkan states it was a stable part of the
empire for most of its modern history. During the Napoleonic occupation, the
Illyrian provinces in the area of Slovenia and Croatia were established,
creating a movement for independence within these territories. But, with the
Congress of Vienna, these kingdoms were dissolved and the Slovenes were
once more
"sliced up between the Austrian provinces of Carniola, Carinthia, and
Styria"(Gildea, 1987, p. 74).
But even though the Vienna Congress restored them to the Habsburg Empire
they achieved a high degree of independence within it.
The Balkan region has been characterised by instability for most of
modern history. The annexation of Bosnia by the Habsburg Empire in 1908
and the subsequent unrest provided the spark, which set the First World War
in motion. With the break-up of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire the area
became unified in a single monarchy, which was named the Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes until it was renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
in 1929. In the inter-war period, the differences between the component parts
of the kingdom became clear and this period was characterised by rising
hostilities and instability, creating a legacy, which can still be observed today.
Thus, Slovenia was unable to escape the Balkan conflict, detailed later.
The history of interchanging independence and occupation can also be
observed when we analyse the countries in Group 3. The Baltic States,
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Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, were occupied by Tsarist Russia. Lithuania was
in a joint kingdom with Poland as mentioned before, while Estonia and Latvia
formed part of this territory after having been independent principalities34.
Sweden and Russia, in the Great Northern War, contested these territories.
The Great Northern War was effectively decided when Peter the Great of
Russia defeated Charles XII of Sweden at Poltava in the Ukraine:
"Peter's crushing defeat of Charles at Poltova in the Ukraine in 1709 solved
both the Polish question and that of the Baltic provinces In the same year
(1710) Russian troops overran Sweden's Eastern Baltic provinces, bar Finland,
Russia's possession of which was not challenged seriously until the time of
Napoleon"(Black, 1990, p. 285).
Thus, Lithuania became part of Russia after Poland was occupied at
the end of the 18th century35while Estonia and Latvia had already been ceded
to Russia in 1721. They remained part of Tsarist Russia until the First World
War, even though various attempted revolutions, especially in Lithuania,
showed their resistance to "russification"36.
The Napoleonic era challenged Russian possession, but after
Napoleon's defeat, the Congress of Vienna recognised Russian hegemony in
most of Eastern Europe. The First World War brought military defeats for
Russia and ultimately resulted in the Bolshevik revolution. After Germany
was defeated on the Western front, the end of the First World War brought
the Baltic states their independence in 1918. This was, however, contested by
the newly emerging Soviet Union and their independence was short-lived.
Yet in the inter-war period these countries enjoyed an unprecedented period
of independence, later examined.
The countries in group 4, Romania and Bulgaria, also have an ancient
history to look back on, even though they have enjoyed far shorter periods of
nationhood than most countries in the modern era. They have been at the
Latvia was known as Livonia in the early Middle Ages.
35 Russia annexed most of Lithuania in the period 1773-1795.
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junction of the Ottoman Empire and the European states and their identity
largely derives from this situation. Both countries have substantial minorities
both in terms of ethnic groups and religious groups. Bulgaria still has a
substantial Muslim minority even though the main religion is Bulgarian
orthodox37, as well as a Greek minority. Romania has substantial Hungarian
and Gypsy minorities and a shrinking population of ethnic Germans.
The Bulgars settled Bulgaria in the 7th century when they crossed the
Danube. There was continuous conflict with the Byzantine Empire until the
Ottoman Empire conquered Bulgaria in the 14th century. The Turks then
administered Bulgaria until 1878 when they abandoned the country. Bulgaria
regained full independence with the establishment of a kingdom in 1908.
Bulgaria became increasingly dependent on the Habsburg Empire for its
protection and had to appeal to Austria when
"The enemies of Bulgaria- Serbia, Greece, Romania, and even Turkey - started
a war against her in June 1913"(Gildea, 1987, p. 417)
This threatened intervention stopped the war but it put Bulgaria firmly into
the alliance of Germany and Austria-Hungary when the First World War
started. Even though Bulgaria was allied with Germany in both World Wars,
it managed to retain its identity as an independent kingdom until the end of
the Second World War. It was, however, only ruled by the monarchy in name
and was frequently engulfed in internal struggles.
The Romanian kingdoms had seen themselves as the defenders of
Christendom38 but could not hold out against the superior Turkish forces.
Thus the Ottoman Empire also occupied Romania but with the disintegration
of the Ottoman Empire, it became an independent country in 1862 by uniting
Moldavia and Wallachia. In 1866 it became a kingdom and remained on the
36 Notable revolts took place in 1907 and 1917 but the Polish and Baltic independence movements
were active throughout the occupation.
37 There are about 85% Bulgarian orthodox and about 13% Muslims in terms of religious background.
38 Notably Vlad the Third (the Impaler) of Wallachia who provided the origins of the Dracula
mythology.
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sidelines in the First World War, despite having close economic ties with the
German Empire:
"That Rumania did not join the First World War on Germany's side was of
great consequence, as Germany considered Rumania - as was the case with
Turkey - an outpost of their economic commitment in the Balkans and the
Near East" (Koch, 1972, p. 147).
It could thus add Transylvania, Bessarabia and Bucovina to its territory after
the war. The inter-war period was characterised by increasing nationalism
and fascism which finally lead to an alliance with Nazi Germany which will
be examined in more detail in the next section of this analysis.
57
Chapter 2: Historical Development
c) Inter-war period and Second World War
During the inter-war period, the history of the applicant countries is
characterised by a high degree of instability and uncertainty. The intentional
design of buffer zones between major powers, especially to control Germany,
created a number of independent Eastern European countries:
"... the multiplicity of new states had created a regional system of
international relations that in theory could be brought into the larger
European Balance in order to help restrain any German threat that might
arise" (Newman, 1968, p. 14).
This did not prevent internal upheavals, nor did it create a lasting peace. The
balance of power, which was supposed to prevent major conflicts, did in the
end drag almost all European countries into the Second World War. The
differences between the applicant countries in this period are significant in
their later development, but one can also note that there are a number of
similarities. These similarities include a general reorganisation of Europe
caused by the momentous changes in the central European powers, creating
instability and uncertainty.
"The states of East Central Europe were weak and divided" (Davies, 1997, p.
976).
Furthermore, the economic upheavals towards the end of the 1920s
and the beginning of the 1930s made an impact throughout Europe. The
political division of Europe was foreshadowed by a number of uprisings and
revolutions; some were successful, some failed with bloody consequences:
"After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Communist parties sprung up in one
country after another. Commenting on the mass strikes of the first two years
of peace a French publisher lamented "We are reaching the end of our
civilisation and we are going to be destroyed not by the barbarians without
but by those within" (Merriman, 1996, p. 1144).
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It should, however, also be noted that this period was not entirely a negative
experience. The CEECs enjoyed unprecedented independence combined with
guarantees for their future existence by major European powers. There was
some economic development and a cosmopolitan middle class emerged:
"Although the post-war period was one of political instability and a rather
poor degree of international co-operation, the performance of the European
economies was not too bad in the 1920s" (Cipolla, 1976, p. 450).
But this rebirth of Europe was short-lived, as the unresolved issues of
the First World War started to dominate the political scene. This was
demonstrated by the political successes of fascism and totalitarianism in
many countries. In fact, with the sole exception of Czechoslovakia, all
applicant countries experienced some form of dictatorship in the inter-war
period. These issues contributed substantially to the Second World War and
the total destruction of the European political system of the post-war years.
This illustrates the extreme break with the past and the arrival of the new
Cold War system. These historical developments demonstrate the instability
and uncertainty in the history of the applicant countries. Furthermore, the
lack of democratic tradition and the influence of economic developments on
political events is noticeable throughout the history of the applicant states.
The countries in Group 1 were deeply affected by the end of World
War I. Poland was reconstituteci as an independent country while Hungary
and Czechoslovakia emerged from the break-up of the Habsburg Empire in
1918 and the settlement in the Treaty of Versaille and the other treaties
associated with it39. Czechoslovakia became one of the so-called 'successor
states' of the Habsburg Empire while Hungary was cut down to a much
smaller state. Hungary had lost 70% of its territory in the Treaty of Trianon
and it
J<9 The war officially ended in a series of treaties, each named after a suburb of Paris.
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"left more Hungarians living beyond the borders of Hungary than
within"(Merriman, 1996, p. 1152).
Czechoslovakia included substantial German and Hungarian minorities and
Slovaks were disenchanted with their minority role in the new state. Poland
was created including significant minorities, among them Germans, White
Russians and Ukrainian, leading to continual territorial struggle with its
neighbours.
Poland quickly became a dictatorship in the inter-war period. General
Joseph Piludski, who was a hero of the independence movement against the
Red Army, became head of state. The economy was in ruins and
hyperinflation was rampant. The parliamentary democracy was unstable and,
after resigning in 1922, Piludski overthrew the parliament in 1926 and became
a dictatorial leader until his death in 1935. The country remained in a state of
crisis. In 1939 Hitler demanded the hand-over of certain Polish territories40,
leading to the Polish government's readying of defences, as well as the
signing of a treaty with Great Britain. When Germany invaded on the 1st of
September 1939, it marked the start of the Second World War. Poland was
attacked by the Soviet Union in the East and the country was quickly divided
between Germany and the SU41 after Poland was defeated. When Germany
attacked the Soviet Union, Poland came completely under Germany's control.
Poland and her Jewish population suffered heavily in the following years and
it paid the most heavy toll in relation to its population of all European
countries. When the tide turned in Russia and the Red Army pushed back the
German forces, they reached what used to be the Eastern Polish border in
February 1944. The Soviet army liberated the country but it made sure that it
came under communist control. When Warsaw rose up against German
occupation, depending on support from the advancing Red Army, it was
crushed while the Soviet Union was content to wait within view of the city. A
In particular the port of Danzig as well as access to the Polish corridor.
4' The division had been previously decided by the secret part of the Molotov-Ribbentrop agreement.
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coalition government was established under Soviet domination and Poland
became another Soviet satellite in Eastern Europe.
Following the break-up of the Habsburg Empire, Hungary was
engulfed in internal struggle. In March 1919, Bela Kun, a communist
journalist, seized power with a Soviet agenda. He was overthrown with the
help of the Romanian army, which objected to Hungary's occupation of
Slovakia, and Nicholas Horthy came to power in 1920, who encouraged
attacks on the Jewish population as well as communists and workers. He
appointed a Fascist Prime Minister in 1932 but subsequently repressed right-
wing parties to maintain his own power. Hungary finally joined the axis in
1940, but continued to be an unreliable ally for Nazi Germany. It did,
however, remain within the axis until the Soviet Union swept through Eastern
Europe establishing a communist regime in the occupied countries. Hungary
faced the same fate as most CEECs after liberation and a Soviet dominated
coalition was installed.
Thomas Masaryk governed Czechoslovakia, formed in 1918. He was a
popular philosopher in both parts of the country and it remained a
democracy, the last Eastern European state to remain democratic, until being
carved up by Nazi Germany. Despite the ethnic differences within the state it
was a stable, parliamentary democracy which was based on a liberal tradition
and a strong middle-class, until being brought down by external forces when
Hitler carved-up the country in 1938. The pressure on Czechoslovakia to cede
the territories with a German majority population, as well as ceding parts of
Slovakia to Hungary and Teschen to Poland, became impossible to resist
when the Western powers attempted to appease the Nazi regime at the
Munich conference in 1938:
"In the circumstances Prague had no choice but to submit" (Bruegel, 1973, p.
298).
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Germany did, however, go further in 1939 and invaded the country. The
Czechoslovak army, standing alone, was outnumbered and surrendered
without a substantial fight thus removing a considerable military force on
Germany's Eastern side. The allies did not react in time:
"After the occupation of Prague, the British army undertook to prepare thirty-
two divisions - a force comparable in size to the Czechoslovak army which
had been surrendered to Germany without a fight" (Newman, 1968, p. 122).
Germany established the 'Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia' (directly
ruled by German governors), as well as an 'independent' Slovakia, and
Czechoslovakia ceased to exist until it was liberated by the advancing Red
Army. Slovakia gained independence, albeit orchestrated by Germany:
"Blackmailed by Hitler's threat to hand the Slovaks over to Hungary, Slovak
'independence' was declared ... " (Bruegel, 1973, p. 306).
As a fascist state, Slovakia continued to support the German dominance of the
region until the advancing Soviet forces finally drove out the German army.
Slovenia became part of the newly formed Yugoslavia42 after the Great
War. The conflict in Yugoslavia was determined by the vision of a 'Greater
Serbia' on the one hand and a federalist state on the other - this issue was
never resolved satisfactorily. Having become a parliamentary monarchy it
turned into a dictatorship in 1929, when King Alexander took absolute power.
A Croatian nationalist, closely associated with the Fascist Ustasca,
assassinated him. Hitler invaded and divided the Yugoslav State, and Serbia
ceased to exist. The brutal fascist regime of the Ustasca ruled the central part
of the country while Slovenia was divided up. Resistance against the fascist
regime and later against an invasion force of Germans and others was
particularly strong in Yugoslavia and it helped to defeat Germany, militarily,
at a great cost. Josip Broz, a communist activist, known as Tito, became the
42 it finally became known as Yugoslavia, being termed differently previously.
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dominant leader of the resistance and when the occupation was expelled he
became the leader of the reconstituted Yugoslavia.
Estonia, Lithuania and Latvia gained their independence from Russia
in the Treaty of Versaille. They asserted their independence from Russia in
the resulting Russian Civil War and established their own governments. The
Baltic States became formal members of the League of Nations in 1921, which
recognised their statehood. They enjoyed unprecedented independence in the
following years despite being squeezed between Germany, Poland and the
Soviet Union. The Baltic States shared a number of similarities in the inter-
war period. Being strongly anti-Communist, any communist activity was
forbidden in Latvia and Lithuania throughout this time and in 1924 a failed
Soviet coup led to a further ban in Estonia. Despite enjoying a successful
economic and cultural era, the political systems in this region were unstable.
Lithuania was ruled by a nationalist regime from 1926 onwards, after an army
coup d'etat established Antanas Smetana as the new head of state. Both
Estonia and Latvia followed down the same route to dictatorship in the 1930s,
following the disastrous downturn in the international economy. In Estonia a
new constitution in 1933 was followed by Konstantin Pats assuming
dictatorial powers in 1934. In Latvia, Karlis Ulmanis assumed dictatorial
powers in 1934. There was some political and economic co-operation between
the Baltic States but they came under increasing pressure in the 1930s from
the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany. Lithuania came under increasing
pressure from Nazi Germany in 1939 and had to give up the Baltic port of
Memel. The Baltic States were occupied by the Soviet Union in 1940, after
having to accede to previous Soviet ultimatums. They were occupied again by
the advancing Wehrmacht in 1941. In 1944 they were finally recaptured by the
Soviet Union and were integrated within the Soviet State despite resistance of
the population.
Bulgaria lost territories to Greece and Germany in the Treaty of Neuilly
for supporting Germany in the war. A monarchy in name only, it was first
ruled by Alexander Stamboliski who assumed dictatorial powers. He was
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deposed by the army and was slaughtered by Macedonian nationalists.
Political life was characterised by assassinations and coup d'etats were
followed by a dictatorship in 1935. It gained territories from Romania at the
beginning of the Second World War and formally joined the axis in 1941.
Bulgaria supported the German regime until military defeat started to become
a distinct possibility. It stopped the war against the allies unilaterally in 1944,
but the Soviet Union declared war anyway, and a popular uprising brought a
Soviet-controlled coalition government into power.
Romania, having been on the winning side of the war, gained
substantial territories. The monarchy survived the First World War but
became increasingly beleaguered by the Fascist movement within the country.
The king, Carol II, clamped down on the fascists in 1938, especially the
notoriously brutal 'Iron Guards', by establishing a dictatorship. But increasing
pressure by Germany led to the abdication of Carol II in favour of his son
Michael in 1940, after some territorial losses to other Eastern Europeans and
the Soviet Union. Germany occupied the country to secure its oil fields and
instated Ion Antonescu to run a fascist state, which soon joined the axis.
Romania abandoned the axis in March 1944, faced with the seemingly
unstoppable advance of the Red Army. King Michael ended Antonescu's
regime in August and declared war on Germany but in the same month the
Red Army occupied the country.
The CEECs were thus characterised by an increasing tide of
dictatorship and fascism in the inter-war period, culminating in the Second
World War. They all became part of the Soviet sphere of influence towards
the end of the Second World War, driven by the unstoppable advance of the
Red Army.
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Chapter 2: Historical Development
d) The Cold War
The immediate post war history of the applicant countries is
characterised by the consolidation of power by the Soviet Union. The Red
Army had occupied most of Central and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
used this presence, directly or indirectly, to install pro-Communist regimes.
The Cold War is particularly important for the transition and the subsequent
accession process. The 40 year dominance by the SU created political and
economic structures, which, in part, persist to the present day. The reforms of
the 1990s, and the firm wish to be integrated into Western Europe, can only be
understood by detailing the historical developments of the last 40 years. For a
comprehensive examination of the Cold War see Brogan (1990), a book used
throughout this section.
The Baltic States had been occupied in 1940 after surrendering to
Soviet ultimata. The Soviet Union, under Stalin, swiftly established puppet
regimes and many prominent citizens were deported. The dissolution of
independent parties and organisations and their replacement with worker
councils was the first step in preparation of an election. This election had only
Soviet-friendly candidates on the party lists and duly produced majorities of
over 90% for the communist parties. These newly constituted assemblies
immediately applied to the USSR to be admitted as member states. In August
of 1940, the Baltic States ceased to exist as independent states for almost 50
years. In July 1941, the German armies occupied the Baltic States and started
the deportation of the Jewish population of which about 90% perished in the
holocaust. When the Soviet Union recaptured the Baltic States in the summer
of 1944, Stalin swiftly re-established his authority. Mass deportations
followed and once again the Baltic States were incorporated into the USSR.
Despite the severity of the Soviet regime, anti-Communist guerrillas fought
on against the odds for 10 years but never seriously challenged the occupation
forces:
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"The partisans concentrated on maintaining their position, reducing local
communist control in the countryside, and punishing collaborators and
informers; in other words holding out for as long as possible in the hope of
outside intervention" (Lieven, 1993, p. 89).
This help never came.
Forced collectivisation was continued in 1949 and by 1950 the Baltic
States were completely integrated into the Soviet Union. Information about
the Baltic States was hard to come by during the Cold War as the Baltic States
were effectively functioning as part of the Soviet Union. The cracks in the
political system only started to show in the late 1980s and early 1990s,
heralding the beginning of the end of the Soviet Union.
The southern neighbours of the Baltic States did not escape the Soviet
Union's influence. Poland had already been partially occupied by the Red
Army under the secret Molotov-Ribbentrop Protocol that divided Poland
between Germany and the Soviet Union in 1939. The Soviet Union had
recaptured the territory lost earlier in the war and came to occupy Poland and
most of East Germany. Hungary and Slovakia, both under a Hitler friendly
regime, were captured and occupied by the Red Army on her advance to the
West. The protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia was liberated from German
occupation by a combined effort of Soviet and US troops as well as
communist-led resistance and the US troops pulled out to leave Prague to be
occupied by the Red Army. The Munich Agreement, which had partitioned
Czechoslovakia, was declared void and thus Czechoslovakia was
reconstituted. Despite having a free election, Stalin used his influence to
introduce a communist dominated government and from 1947 onwards the
government faithfully followed the Soviet Union until the revolutions in 1968
and 1989.
Poland had suffered proportionally more than any other country in the
Second World War. The liberation by the Red Army did not stop the suffering
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of the Polish people. The Soviet Union systematically purged those
"Bourgeois" elements of the population, thus quelling potential resistance to
the communist taking of power. Despite their numerical disadvantage, Polish
guerrilla forces continued to fight the Red Army for three years after the
official end of World War II. The territory of Poland was moved westwards
and former German populated areas became Polish, while Eastern Polish
parts were incorporated into the Soviet Union. The large scale displacement
of the German population followed. In the early years of the occupation, the
Soviet Union treated Poland like an integral part of the USSR. Formerly
German factories were looted and shipped to the East as reparations. The
government was set up including Soviet friendly appointments in key posts.
When the communist resistance leader, Gomulka, was replaced by a Stalinist,
Bierut, Poland had effectively become a Stalinist satellite. The Catholic
Church, which had been the one constancy in Poland, was banned and
ruthlessly surpressed.
After 1948, private enterprise in Poland was swiftly disbanded.
Collectivisation of agriculture was introduced and heavy industry became a
priority, especially the production of iron and steel. Mines and industry in the
former German territory of Silesia were further developed and the ship
building industry was built up around Gdansk. The Soviet Union did not,
however, have the tight grip on Poland that it developed in other satellite
states. The mass purges associated with Stalinist regimes were avoided and
collectivisation had to be abandoned after a slow start. The death of Stalin in
1953 sparked small-scale revolts around Eastern Europe, especially in East
Germany. In response, the communist regime intensified the persecution of
the Catholic Church and executed a number of dissidents. The situation did,
however, improve later on and in 1954, Gomulka was released from prison.
After Krushchev delivered his speech on Stalin's crimes, Bierut died and the
old Stalinist cadre was purged. These upheavals culminated in some worker
demonstrations in 1956, which were ruthlessly crushed. But when Gomulka
took power again, the Soviet Union ordered in troops from neighbouring
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countries. Krushchev was convinced not to use force by an assurance of
loyalty by Gomulka. This defiance set off the Hungarian revolution, which
resulted in the invasion of Hungary by Warsaw Pact troops. Gomulka held on
to his position until the late 1970s albeit by using anti-Semitic tactics, when
threatened by an anti-Semitic 'Partisan' group, and by supporting the
invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Germany's attempt at reconciliation with
its Eastern neighbours under the social-democratic chancellorWilly Brandt (a
policy dubbed 'Ostpolitik') resulted in the final recognition of the Polish-
German border in 1970.
The increase in food prices in the same year sparked strikes in the
shipyards of Gdansk, which were met with force. But the whole area on the
Baltic came out in support and, as a consequence, Gomulka was replaced by
Gierek. Gierek negotiated with the workers and ultimately the price rises
were revoked. But the workers in the shipyards, and elsewhere in Poland, had
their first taste of victory, a development that was crucial for their later
actions in the 1980s. The disastrous economic policies in the 1970s, together
with the oil shocks, caused further disruption. Furthermore, Cardinal Wojtyla
was elected pope in 1978, re-emphasising the role of the Catholic Church,
challenging the communist anti-clerical stance. The economic crisis came to a
head in 1980. Food prices were set to rise again and the workers in the
Gdansk shipyard went on strike, occupying the shipyard itself. The
government held a round table talk with the strikers and supporting
organisations, which was televised. The government was too weak to resist
their demands and all of their demands were ceded including the right to
form free trade unions and to strike. These trade unions across the country
became known as "Solidarity" groups, or Solidarnosc. The communist
government had suffered an embarrassing defeat and, by extension, so had
the Soviet Union. The Warsaw pact reacted to the apparent weakness of the
Polish Communist Party and troops were concentrating on the borders of
Poland ready to invade the country if need be. But the moderation of
Solidarnosc and continued negotiations averted the threat of invasion.
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Solidarnosc continued to gain strength and in 1981 the Communist Party,
after prompting from Moscow, reacted. The reformers were removed from
public office and Jaruzelski became Secretary General. After the Solidarnosc
movement directly criticised the economic regime, a state of emergency was
declared and Solidarnosc was banned and its leaders arrested. Workers'
revolts were crushed by force. But the grip on power of the Communist Party
was becoming increasingly tenuous. Throughout the 1980s they tried to
accommodate Solidarnosc's demands and thus attempted price rises were
abandoned in 1985. In 1987, a referendum for reforms was held, but the
government lost - unheard of in the communist bloc - and reforms were also
abandoned. By 1988, the economic situation had become untenable. Inflation
was spiralling out of control and in May the workers in Gdansk went on
strike once more. The Soviet Union, with the new Secretary General
Gorbachev, did not seem willing to become involved in domestic struggles
any longer. After further strikes throughout the year, Solidarnosc was
legalised and round table talks commenced. The final revolution against the
communist regime had begun.
Hungary had already attempted to throw off the Soviet domination in
1956 but had been crushed by Warsaw Pact tanks. The communist era had
begun in Hungary when Soviet troops occupied the country at the end of
World War II. After the atrocities of the war, the Red Army was welcomed
but soon the deportation of anti-Communists began. The communists were a
small party, but they were backed by the might of the Red Army. They
returned from exile in Moscow, being staunchly supportive of Stalin. In an
emerging pattern, the Soviet Union established a government with key
positions being handed to the communists. In a free election in December
1945, the communists only received 16.9% of the votes. But by 1946, the
coalition government was in serious trouble. Inflation was completely out of
control and
"Hungary attained the world record in inflation: the 1931 gold pengo was
valued at 1.3 quintillion paper pengos" (P. Brogan, 1990, p. 119).
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Marshall Aid was turned down after instructions by Stalin, but the people
were starving as farmers refused to sell their produce for the worthless
currency. Despite losing another election, the communists under Rakosi took
power by 1948. A purge, prompted by developments in Yugoslavia,
followed, which included another prominent Stalinist, Rajk. This was
followed by another purge in 1951. These purges were the most violent in
Eastern Europe and they only ended with Stalin's death in 1953. In that year,
the new Soviet leadership decided to replace Rakosi with Imre Nagy. He
suspended collectivisation and even redistributed land back to the farmers.
Economic reforms were introduced but in 1955 Moscow replaced Nagy with
his main rival Rakosi. This was the spark, which set off the Hungarian
uprising. After Khruchev's secret speech and the developments in Poland,
Gero replaced Rakosi. The Polish crisis, described earlier, provided the
backdrop to the Hungarian uprising. After Khruchev had backed down in
Poland, students in Hungary started to protest to attain reforms. A mass
demonstration was called and went ahead despite Gero's attempt to ban the
meeting. When Gero gave a speech to the masses, the situation turned violent
and several students were killed. But the students, being joined by police,
army and party militia, stormed the building. Battles with the secret police
ensued and the secret police was defeated. Nagy was persuaded to head a
new government and to broadcast to the protesters to restore calm in the city.
But the protesters did not retreat and the Soviet Union decided to intervene.
On The 24th of October, Soviet tanks invaded Budapest. The fighting was
ferocious. Nagy persuaded Krushchev to pull out the tanks and once this
announcement was made, the revolution gathered momentum. The hated
secret police were hunted down and workers and peasants took control of
factories and farms. Within a few days, the Soviet friendly regime had been
swept from power.
But the Soviet Union was not yet defeated. Nagy demanded the retreat
of Soviet troops from Hungary and decided to pull out of the Warsaw Pact.
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The Soviet Union prepared for attack. By the 1st of November an invasion
was under way and the Nagy government reacted by issuing the formal
withdrawal of Hungary from the Warsaw Pact. Talks resulted but ultimately
the decision was already made. On the 4th of November, Soviet tanks entered
Budapest by force. Resistance to the invasion was swiftly exterminated and
Kadar was installed as the new head of government. Nagy had taken refuge
in the Yugoslav embassy but was lured out and arrested. After a trial in
Romania, the Red Army executed him and some of his closest advisers.
Purges followed in which Hungary was brought back into line with Moscow.
The Hungarian uprising was over and despite promises by the new
government, Hungary was to remain firmly in the Soviet fold for more than
30 years. But Kadar had to introduce some reforms in the 1960s as the
economy took a long time to recover from the uprising. Hungary thus got
some free enterprise, which made it more prosperous than many of its Eastern
European counterparts. But collectivisation meant poor productivity in
farming and the oil crisis aggravated Hungary's foreign debt problem. By the
mid-1980s the economy was in serious trouble. An attempt at reform and a
new government in 1988 failed to address the problems and the communist
regime started to disintegrate. The radical reformers took power in 1989 and
Nyers became Prime Minister. These radical reformers started to dismantle
the communist state and by 1989 the Communist Party in Hungary was on its
way out.
Czechoslovakia also experienced an abortive revolution in 1968. But it
started from very different premises. The Communist Party in
Czechoslovakia was very strong after the end of the Second World War.
Gottwald was installed as head of government and by 1948, the Communist
Party had established dominance by instigating a worker's coup. The
Communist Party remained loyal to the Soviet Union and inevitably purges
and show-trials followed, under the direction of Soviet agents. The death of
Stalin, and the death of Gottwald in the following week, did not end the overt
persecution. Even the execution of Beria, the notorious head of the KGB, did
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not end the purges. The last victims of the purges were only released in the
late 1950s and the final rehabilitation only occurred in 1963. Despite similar
economic problems, the Hungarian uprising in 1956 did not trigger any large-
scale protest. Czechoslovakia remained in the grip of the Communist Party
for over 40 years with one memorable exception. In Slovakia, which partially
resented the continuation of the Czechoslovak nation, the Communist Party
did not provide the same stability as in the Czech Republic. The party
appointed Dubcek as Slovakian party secretary. Dubcek managed to establish
a power base and after an abortive attempt to introduce a new price system in
1967, he challenged Novotny for the party leadership. After the Soviet Union
refused to back Novotny's leadership by force, he resigned and Dubcek
became party secretary.
His reforms, which were introduced in an "Action Programme" in
1968, inspired hope in Eastern and Western Europe. He proposed to
rehabilitate all the victims of the Stalinist purges and to reintegrate the
Slovaks into the Czechoslovakian system. The role of the party in government
was to be re-evaluated and, crucially, press censorship was abandoned. The
press heavily attacked the excesses of the Novotny regime, helped by the
defection of a hard-line security officer to the West who revealed details of the
attempted Stalinist coup of Novotny. The Warsaw Pact was becoming
nervous and convened in Dresden to discuss the situation. Dubcek was
criticised and he subsequently promised to control the press, but he did not
impose censorship when he returned to Prague. The period, which followed,
became known as the Prague Spring. The Action Programme was soon
surpassed by press demands with the placid support of the reformers in
government. The leading role of the Communist Party in government and
public life was under threat and scheduled party elections were sure to return
reformers to power. In a show of strength, the Warsaw Pact held large-scale
military manoeuvres in Czechoslovakia and the troops remained after the
exercise was ended. A manifesto was published in Prague by leading
intellectuals calling for a continuation of reforms despite the threat of foreign
72
intervention. On the 15th of July 1968, Dubcek was summoned to Warsaw to
defend his actions but he refused to attend. A subsequent invitation to the
party committee to meet Breshnev in Moscow led to a meeting in
Czechoslovakia. Dubcek was heavily criticised by Breshnev and the issues
were not resolved.
Once again Soviet tanks were used to stop a reform movement. On the
night of the 20th of August 1968, Soviet and Warsaw Pact troops invaded
Czechoslovakia in force. The resistance was quickly overcome and the
communist Presidium was arrested and flown to Warsaw and onwards to
Moscow. Despite having established military superiority, the Soviets could
not find a new government as even the hard-line communists refused to co¬
operate, in the face of overwhelming public opinion against the invasion.
Dubcek was returned to Prague after making vital concessions to the Soviet
Union. But the public continued a small-scale resistance against the invasion,
including pirate radio stations, sabotage of food supplies and railways and
the removal of all street signs and house numbers. But Dubcek could not
resist the Soviet domination and progressively the resistance was stamped
out. The suicide of Jan Palach, a student who set himself on fire in the centre
of Prague, and a riot after the Czechoslovakian team beat the Soviet Union at
ice hockey, resulted in the removal of Dubcek to a ceremonial post and Husak
came to power. The Prague Spring was finally over and after demonstrations
on the first anniversary, emergency laws were passed which suspended all
civil liberties. Dubcek, who continued to resist the changes, was first removed
from the Presidium and then from the parliamentary chairmanship. After a
brief stay as ambassador in Turkey (from which he returned, despite the
obvious hope that he would defect), he was expelled from the party and
became a worker in Bratislava where he remained for almost 20 years.
The invasion had established what became known as the Breshnev
Doctrine. It stated that the Soviet Union would use force when it felt
threatened by internal political processes in an allied country. In particular,
the doctrine made it clear that the states of Central and Eastern Europe would
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remain under Soviet control under any circumstances. This doctrine remained
in force until Gorbachev revoked it 20 years later. In Czechoslovakia, the
results of the invasion were further purges concerning all aspects of public life
and the hard-line communists established a stranglehold on the country. The
only resistance came from intellectuals and, the economy - once among the
most advanced in Europe - began a decline characterised by lack of
investment. The intellectuals published "Charter 77" in 1977, which
demanded democratic rights. Writer Vaclac Havel was their most prominent
voice. But these protests were surpressed and the dissidents were harassed
and prosecuted. Only after the retirement of Husak and the rise to power of
Gorbachev could the democratic forces once again become prominent. After
protests in 1988, the 20th anniversary of the Prague Spring, in 1989, inspired
by other Central and Eastern Europeans, saw the communist regime swept
from power in the so-called Velvet Revolution.
In South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans, the transition of power
did not happen as suddenly. Bulgaria, the staunch ally of the Soviet Union,
did not reform decisively until long after the other countries in the region had
risen against communism and the Communist Party remained in power.
Romania suffered the bloodiest of all revolutions after being ruled by a
megalomaniac dictator and Slovenia's reform and independence was soon
marred by ethnic conflict, which persists in the region until the present day.
In Bulgaria, the communists came to power after the Red Army
occupied the country. The Communist Party had no significant power base
within the country but it used the Soviet allies to intimidate any opponents.
Bloody purges were carried out in 1944 and 1945 and prison camps were set
up resembling the gulags in the Soviet Union. Most of the previous elite was
killed or removed from public life and Bulgaria's communists held on to
power until the 1990s. After the Second World War, democratic parties
withdrew from the government and refused to participate in rigged elections.
From then on, the Communist Party ruled absolutely. Dimitrov, the first
party leader, died in Moscow in 1949, but Bulgaria remained the Soviet
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Union's faithful ally and Moscow even used the Bulgarian secret service to
conduct difficult and controversial operations. After a short interlude by
Kolarov, Chervenkov became general secretary. The death of Stalin resulted
in a changed course in Bulgaria and in 1954, Zhivkov became general
secretary. Under Zhivkov, Bulgaria became an extension of Soviet policy,
including economic policy, which lead to a long-term deterioration of the
Bulgarian economy. Apart from an abortive coup in 1965, and some ethnic
disputes with the Turkish minority, the grip of the Communist Party on
power never wavered. Zhivkov remained in power and did not follow the
reforms introduced by Gorbachev in the late 1980s. But the events in the rest
of Eastern Europe, and some small-scale protests in Bulgaria itself, convinced
the party leadership of the need for reform. Zhivkov was removed from
power and democratic reforms were introduced. Bulgaria conducted the
quietest revolution but as a result the reforms were instigated half-heartedly
and Bulgaria continued to lag behind the other countries in the region.
Romania, on the other hand, continued to suffer from violence. Having
been an ally of Hitler in the Second World War, Romania lost large amounts
of territory. After the king had removed the dictator Antonescu in 1944, the
Red Army liberated and occupied the country. The communists which had
escaped to Moscow were supported by the Soviet Union, as elsewhere in
Eastern Europe and they demanded key posts in the government appointed
by King Michael. The Soviet Union supported their claim by surrounding the
Royal palace with troops and tanks. King Michael appointed Petru Groza but
attempted to resist the gradual encroachment of the communists. Yet he was
powerless to halt the communist seizure of power. When public
demonstrations forced the acceptance of some non-communists ministers, the
communists instigated a fraudulent election in 1946, in which, predictably,
they gained a huge overall majority. Opposition was swiftly oppressed and in
December 1947, the last major opponent of the communist regime, King
Michael, was forced to abdicate and flee the country. In accordance with the
Soviet Union, the communists forced collectivisation and encouraged heavy
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industry. Gheorghiu-Dej, who spent most of the war in prison, became the
general-secretary of the party but it was still dominated by the communist
faction from Moscow. Only in 1951 did he truly become the central figure and
duly, he purged the party of opponents in the following year. The death of
Stalin enabled a small-scale reconsideration of the disastrous economic
policies, which had brought agriculture, the dominant economic force in
Romania, to a stand still. But the general economic policies remained and over
subsequent years, Romania was to become one of the poorest countries in
Europe. It was also plagued by nationality disputes with ethnic Hungarians,
Germans, Tartars, Turks and Serbs, who were persecuted to varying degrees.
Romania managed to attain some independence from Moscow in the
following years. Despite issuing a formal declaration of independence in 1964,
retribution did not follow. Romania had achieved some degree of autonomy
but it did not manage to reform itself. On the contrary when Gheorghiu-Dej
died suddenly in 1965, Nicolae Ceaucescu succeeded him. Ceaucescu, who
had been undistinguished previously, quickly consolidated power. In 1967, he
made himself President and his wife, Elena, also started to become prominent
in the party hierarchy. Despite the continued independence from Moscow, the
situation within the country deteriorated. Ceaucescu and his family were
becoming increasingly megalomaniac and a personality cult developed. He
enriched himself by taking whatever he wanted from the state and no
opposition was tolerated. In a number of increasingly ludicrous projects, the
state wasted billions of dollars and a large part of Romania's heritage was
destroyed. The secret police, the Securitate, became increasingly oppressive,
and the country became more and more isolated. Birth control was banned to
increase the population and the economy deteriorated. In 1980, Ceaucescu
decided to eliminate foreign debt. Exports, especially of agricultural goods,
were accelerated and imports were banned. In consequence most Romanians
lacked the most basic essentials, including food and medical supplies, while
the Ceaucescus lived in a surreal world of luxury. He also demanded
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complete obedience from all surrounding him. Despite periodic protest,
ruthlessly surpressed, Ceaucescu remained in absolute power.
Only in 1989, after protests of prominent communists and the
developments in the rest of Eastern Europe, did the wind of change reach
Romania. In Timisoara, the Securitate crushed protests and a large number of
people were massacred. But the demonstrations continued. When Ceaucescu
returned from a state visit to Iran, he and his wife were arrested and
subsequently tried and executed. Battles continued between the Securitate on
one side and the army and demonstrators on the other and small-scale civil
war erupted. In the end, the Securitate was overwhelmed and the Romanians
could finally rebuild their state. But the suspicion has persisted that the revolt
was a palace revolution rather than a real democratic process and "reformed"
communists took power in following years.
Slovenia attained independence as a result of the upheavals in the late
1980s. But like all of the component parts of Yugoslavia, these changes did not
occur peacefully, albeit Slovenia did manage the cleanest break from the Serb-
dominated federation. Yugoslavia was only created in 1918 and, in reality, no
longer exists. But after the Second World War it was seen as the best hope for
peace in the Balkans. After the invasion of Yugoslavia by Hitler in 1941,
violent and brutal resistance and oppression dominated Yugoslavia. The
partisans tied up a large number of divisions, which Hitler could not utilise in
other battles of the Second World War. Yugoslavia was divided up between
Germany, Italy and an independent, fascist Greater Croatia, which
distinguished itself by being one of the most brutal regimes in modern
history. Slovenia itself was divided between Italy and Germany and ceased to
exist. Mihajlovic, an army general, lead the officially recognised resistance,
forming the Cetniks. But the main resistance was quickly drawn to Josip Broz,
known as Tito. Tito, a communist, set up the Partisans in 1941 and after initial
successes retreated into guerrilla warfare with the German occupiers who
turned increasingly savage to control the resistance. Tito was increasingly
successful and Mihajlovic soon linked with the Germans to fight the Partisans.
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But Tito prevailed and managed to liberate almost all of the country from the
German occupation with some help from the Red Army, which then
retreated. Tito was now in control of the country and in fierce reprisals many
loyal to the former regime were executed.
Tito had achieved what most other Eastern Europeans did not -
independence from the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia had suffered terribly in the
war. A large proportion of the population was killed and infrastructure and
industry was destroyed. Tito imposed a communist regime along the lines of
Stalinism and collectivised industry and agriculture. But Tito defied Stalin
only a few years later. In 1948, a dispute erupted over Yugoslavia's foreign
policy. Initially Tito wanted to expand Yugoslavia by unifying with Albania
and Bulgaria, but Stalin at first rejected the idea. When Stalin changed his
mind so had Tito. The Soviets had infiltrated many Yugoslav institutions but
unlike the rest of Europe they were dealing with an experienced political and
military leadership. When Tito was summoned to Moscow he declined. Stalin
attacked his representatives and by March, Stalin had ordered the withdrawal
of Soviet personnel. When Tito was summoned to a meeting in Poland, he
declined again and was subsequently denounced in the strongest terms. But
the Yugoslav party did not rise against Tito. Instead those loyal to Stalin were
removed from party ranks. Yugoslavia now stood alone, but soon began to
develop closer relations with the Western powers who supplied assistance. By
the early 1950s, the economic consequences of Stalinist policies were
becoming apparent and "self-management" was introduced, raising the
standard of living by allowing some limited ownership. In political terms,
Tito remained an absolute ruler and continued to surpress the ethnic disputes
in Yugoslavia, albeit less brutally than some Eastern counterparts. Tito's
Yugoslavia became a member of the non-alignment movement and, especially
after Stalin died, continued relations with both the West and the East. Even
though Yugoslavia suffered some economic setbacks in the 1970s, the country
was stable until the 1980s.
78
In 1980, Tito died and soon the ethnic conflicts were flaring up again.
In 1981 a massacre committed by ethnic Albanians in Kosovo left many Serbs
dead. The Albanian majority in Kosovo continued to protest against
perceived discrimination. The collective central government in Belgrade was
weak and continued to lose control in the 1980s. By 1988 the Serb communist
leader, Slobodan Milosevic, started to agitate publicly against the ethnic
minorities within Serbia while inflation spiralled out of control. Democratic
elections further divided the country into ethnic groups and the
disintegration of Yugoslavia began. Croats in the Knin area rebelled against
the Serbs in 1990. When Slovenia declared independence in spring 1991, the
Yugoslav army was quickly expelled. The underlying reason for this
relatively painless exit can probably be explained, as Slovenia had no
substantial Serb minorities within her territories. But first Croatia, then
Bosnia-Herzegovina and finally Kosovo all became ethnic flash points
escalating into civil war and ethnic cleansing. But Slovenia, the richest of the
Yugoslav republic, was spared this fate.
It is thus clear that all the applicant countries, to a degree, share a
common history. The rise of communists to power after the Second World
War held fast for over 40 years. Their economic policies had led to
deterioration in living conditions and by the second half of the 1980s they
were ready to revolt. But up to that point the dominant power, the Soviet
Union, had shown repeatedly that Moscow was ready to use force when their
hegemony was threatened. But the political landscape changed dramatically
when Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. All of the CEECs suffered
from economically disastrous policies, albeit some more than others.
Furthermore, internal conflicts were kept under control through ruthless
authoritarian measures until the revolutions of the late 1980s and the early
1990s.
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Chapter 2: Historical Development
e) The Revolutions
The revolutions of the late 1980s and early 1990s are particularly
important for the applicant countries. They have enabled the orientation of
these countries to the West. Furthermore, the applicant countries were swept
away in a wave of reforms, without a clear idea of the endpoint of this
revolution. At the conclusion of the unfolding events, there stood a number of
free countries with a desperate need to reform their entire political and
economic structures. The revolutions in Central and Eastern Europe can be
understood best when following a timeline. This timeline starts with the
election of Gorbachev. He was a different breed of leader than previous party
secretaries, especially after the ancient men incapable of governance in the
early 1980s. After consolidating his power within the Soviet Union, he made
his first move in 1987. At the summit of Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik,
he proposed a radical cut in nuclear weapons by 50%. Even though Reagan
did not follow this lead, the treaty on Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces was
signed, signalling the end of the Cold War. The reforms proposed by
Gorbachev in the Soviet Union became known as "Perestroika" and
"Glasnost". These entailed a liberalisation of press censorship and substantial
economic reform. More importantly for the satellite states of Central and
Eastern Europe, the Breshnev Doctrine was no longer upheld.
The first developments towards democratisation started in Poland in
1988. After Gorbachev had announced the withdrawal of the Soviet Union
from Afghanistan, the Polish opposition, under the still banned Solidarnosc
banner, started a number of strikes. The communist government was facing
economic ruin and conceded in a televised speech by Jaruzelski that a change
had to occur. Solidarnosc was invited to join round table talks to discuss the
future of the country. Solidarnosc won the crucial concession that the
legalisation of Solidarnosc would be discussed and the strikes were ended.
Negotiations between the government and Solidarnosc commenced and
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Walesa was even involved in a televised debate with the official union
representative. Walesa demonstrated his skills as a politician and was now
firmly embedded in the Polish public's consciousness as the leader of the
opposition.
1989 started with the resignation of the Yugoslav government, which
had come under increasing pressure through nationalistic mass
demonstrations organised by Slobodan Milosevic. Protests in Czechoslovakia,
commemorating the death of Jan Palach 20 years earlier, were followed by
mass arrests of dissidents. Among the dissidents was Vaclac Havel who was
given a jail sentence shortly afterwards. Hungary's communists had seen the
signs of the time and allowed the creation of independent political parties in
February. But the real development continued in Poland. After the round
table talks had commenced officially in February, the government was
rapidly losing ground. The communists had to concede the legalisation of
Solidarnosc and associated groups, in effect, created a legal, non-communist
opposition. Crucially, they agreed to hold free parliamentary elections at least
for a limited number of seats. These elections were to be held in June but only
35% of the seats in the lower, and crucial chamber of parliament, the Sejm,
would be contested freely. But the Senate of 100 members would be freely
elected for the first time. Meanwhile the disintegration of the communist
system was spreading.
In March, six retired Romanian party notables published a letter of
protest, criticising the Ceaucescu Regime. Hungary decided to dismantle their
border controls in May of 1989, creating the first decisive break in the iron
curtain and Kadar retired as party president. As the Warsaw Pact countries
had a limited freedom of movement between the member states, the break in
the iron curtain was used by many East Germans to cross into Austria in the
summer vacations. Many more started camping out in the grounds of the
West German embassy demanding free passage to the West. In a symbolic
gesture of appeasement, Imre Nagy was reburieci in Budapest attended by the
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reform communist government and accompanied by a huge anti-Communist
rally in June.
But the main development was still gaining pace in Poland. The
election on the 4th of June 1989 produced an unprecedented landslide for
Solidarnosc. After the final run-offs, Solidarnosc had won 99 seats in the
Senate and the remaining one went to an independent candidate. Of the 161
freely contested seats, Solidarnosc won 160 in the first round of voting and
the last one in a run-off. Furthermore, most of the uncontested seats of the
communist candidates had such low support that they did not manage to pick
up the required absolute majority in the first round. In fact, only 3 out of 173
seats produced the necessary majority and on a separate list of party notables
only 2 out of 35 unopposed communists were elected outright. The remainder
was only elected after Solidarnosc requested their members to vote for these
candidates, to prevent further unrest. The new Sejm elected Jaruzelski as
President with a slim majority after the Peasant and Democratic parties
deserted the communist bloc. His proposed Prime Minister, Kiszczak, needed
the support of minority parties to govern. But Solidarnosc was pushing for
power. After Gorbachev reaffirmed his commitment that no interference by
the Soviet Union would take place, the way for a Solidarnosc government was
open. After the Sejm rejected the communist government, Jaruzelski bowed to
the inevitable and appointed Tadeus Mazowiecki as the first non-communist
prime minister in Eastern Europe for over 40 years. The monopoly of power
of the Communist Party had been broken and the news spread throughout
Eastern Europe and even into the Soviet Union.
In Czechoslovakia and the Baltic States, protests were starting to
become stronger, marking the anniversaries of the 1968 invasion and the
Hitler-Stalin Pact. But the governments there made no movement to reform
and the police broke up the protest in Czechoslovakia. But Hungary's
government moved even further. After allowing East Germans to leave, a
mass exodus started towards the West. Thousands were crossing the border
to Austria and even more were coming into Hungary from across the border
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from Czechoslovakia. The Hungarian government agreed to hold free
elections in 1990 and in October, the Communist Party was reformed as a
Socialist party. One more former satellite had a non-communist government
in power.
In East Germany the exodus of citizens combined with the 40th
anniversary of the formation of the GDR. Growing demonstrations ensued
and, finally, the regime ordered the police to fire on the demonstrators. The
order was cancelled in the last minute and shortly afterwards, Honecker
resigned in favour of Krenz. On the 7th of November, 1990, the government
resigned, followed a day later by the Politburo. On the 9th, in a surprise
announcement, the new communist government declared the removal of
border controls on the West German border. East Germans started moving
towards the wall and the border guards, overwhelmed by numbers and
without clear orders, opened the border check points. The pictures of the
celebrations were transmitted all over the world as East and West Germans
met on the divisive wall to celebrate the new freedom; pictures which further
fuelled the transition process in the other CEECs. The communist government
was powerless and it was clear that East Germany, once the most stalwart of
the Soviet Union's supporters, had also fallen to the West.
In Bulgaria the reform movement was also gaining pace. After
demonstrations in Sofia, Zhivkov was replaced by Mladenov as Communist
Party leader. However, protests continued with a demonstration on the 18th
November, demanding free elections. But the next country to attain
democracy was Czechoslovakia. A demonstration on the 17th of November,
1990, was broken up by the police. Two days later tens of thousand gathered
to protest against police brutality. The Open Forum (OF) formed an umbrella
organisation for the emerging opposition. The demonstrations continued
daily and every day the size of the crowd was increasing. Dubcek addressed
the crowd on the 24th and the whole government resigned. After a 2 hour
strike, directed by the Open Forum, on the 27th, the government promised free
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elections on the 28th. The 'velvet revolution' had succeeded in removing
another communist government from power.
The resignation of the governments of both East Germany and
Czechoslovakia in December, 1990, only reaffirmed that power had passed to
the democratic opposition. This was followed by the formation of a non-
communist government in Czechoslovakia. In Lithuania delegates of the
regional parliament also voted to reassess the role of the Communist Party, a
courageous move in a country still technically part of the Soviet Union. The
Communist Party declared itself independent of the Soviet Union shortly
afterwards. Croatia also moved to change the federation by announcing free
elections in 1990, followed by Slovenia less than a week later. But the next
major development occurred in Romania. After massacres on anti-
government protesters in Timisoara, Ceaucescu returned to Bucharest. He
addressed a communist rally on the 21st of December, 1990. But the formerly
loyal crowd turned against him and he was shouted down. The whole
address was televised and it became clear to the country that Ceaucescu has
lost his grip on power. The pictures of his incomprehension of the protest,
before the state television managed to switch off the cameras, have remained
vivid in many peoples' memories. The following day Bucharest and other
cities erupted into mass demonstrations against Ceaucescu and the army
sided with the demonstrators. Ceaucescu and his wife fled Bucharest by
helicopter but were later arrested on an army base, and subsequently
executed. The Securitate, which was well armed, attempted to retake power
and street battles occurred throughout Romania. But the Securitate was
defeated and one of the most reprehensible regimes was removed from power
in less than two weeks.
At the beginning of 1990 the political landscape of Europe had changed
fundamentally. Havel had been elected President in Czechoslovakia with
Dubcek becoming, once again, the chairman of the parliament. Poland started
to introduce wide scale economic reform at the beginning of 1990. Bulgaria,
forced by the changes occurring around it, revoked the leading role of the
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Communist Party in the middle of January. Two weeks later, Zhivkov was
arrested, followed by the resignation of the government. In East Germany,
Honecker was also arrested and Gorbachev admitted that unification with
West Germany was inevitable. The winds of change finally reached the Soviet
Union with a mass demonstration against the communists in Moscow, on the
4th of February.
But 1990 was mainly the year of elections. Communists were defeated
in Lithuania on the 24th of February and on the 11th of March, Lithuania
declared independence. On the 18th of March regional elections in the Soviet
Union signified gains for the reformers. On the same day, the first free
election was held in East Germany, giving the western-dominated Christian
Democrats almost half of the vote. This was a mandate for unification and
after German Economic and Monetary Union on the 1st of July, Germany was
reunited on the 3rd of October 1990. Latvia and Estonia voted on the 18th of
March for pro-independence parties in their first round of elections. This was
followed by a declaration by Estonia on the 30th, stating that the annexation
by the Soviet Union was illegal. This was followed by a declaration of
independence, by Latvia on the 4th of May. In Hungary, an election on the
25th of March produced a democratic government excluding the communists.
In Slovenia the election in early April produced a large non-communist
majority followed by the formation of a non-communist government - a
development replicated by Croatia immediately afterwards. Romania elected
a new president, Iliescu, and a new government on May the 20th and in
Poland local elections, a week later, removed communists from local
authority.
But the transformation had not yet finished. Lithuania was subjected to
an economic embargo by the Soviet Union, which cut off crucial oil supplies.
In Bulgaria the renamed communists, now the Socialist Party, actually won
the election in June. In Albania the reformist movement was just stirring. But
the centre stage of development moved East to the Soviet Union and the Baltic
States as well as south to the Balkans. The Baltic Republics were pressurised
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by Moscow to sign the new Soviet Union Treaty, turning the Soviet Union
into a confederation. But the Baltic States were looking for independence. In
December 1990, Gorbachev set a deadline for signature for the following
summer but the Baltic States refused. In January, matters became critical in
the Baltic States. Price rises by the governments led to protest by the Slavic
minority. Groups loyal to the Soviet Regime declared themselves independent
of the governments. But most noticeable of all, was the arrival of a large
number of Soviet troops, mainly drawn from the Ministry of Interiors Special
Forces, OMON. These started to occupy key buildings in the capitals and in
Vilnius, 14 people were killed when a peaceful protest against the occupation
of the television station was dispersed. This was followed by a similar
incident in Riga, where a week later six protesters were killed. But Moscow
itself was reforming. Boris Yeltsin, the president of the Russian parliament,
denounced the crackdown and Gorbachev had to admit that the use of force
was not legitimate.
Subsequent referenda in February and March, 1991, returned a
resounding vote for independence. Boris Yeltsin remained the most vocal of
supporters and the Baltic cause was further helped when in June, 1991 Russia
itself declared the intention to leave the Soviet Union. A solution was found
by devolving more powers to the republics but before the treaty could be
signed, a coup was attempted in Moscow on the 20th of August, 1991. The
coup was a badly organised affair and quickly crumbled in the face of
resistance. The Baltic republics immediately declared their full independence
on the 20th and 21st of August. Gorbachev lost the internal power struggle to
Boris Yeltsin. By September, the new government recognised the Baltic States
and the republics were admitted to the UN. By December, the Soviet Union
had dissolved.
In the space of little more than two years, one of the global
superpowers had disintegrated and the satellite states had found their
independence. The lid which had kept tension and dissent firmly under
control had been lifted and the forces for change were too strong to be
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stopped. But notably in one area, as well as in some territories of the former
Soviet Union, these changes also brought about the re-emergence of
nationalism and ethnic conflict. In Yugoslavia, reform was accompanied by a
rise in nationalistic forces. Some of the republics were striving for
independence while the Serb centre was becoming more nationalistic under
the leadership of Slobodan Milosevic, in power since 1989. After the assembly
of Slovenia introduced constitutional changes to include the right to secede in
1989, the real turning point were the free elections of 1990 in Croatia and
Slovenia. In April, Slovenia voted for a centre-right government and Milan
Kucek became President. This was followed by free elections in Croatia later
in the same month, which were won by the nationalists under Franjo
Tudjman. On the 2nd of July, the Slovene parliament formally proclaimed
sovereignty. In relatively free elections in the rest of Yugoslavia former
communists were elected under the nationalist banner, including Milosevic's
re-election in Serbia. After a proclamation, declaring the right to secede of
Croatia in December, and a referendum for independence in Slovenia, the
Yugoslav forces were put on alert in early January. The Slovene and Croat
territorial forces were ordered to surrender their arms within ten days but the
military confrontation was avoided when the federal presidency of
Yugoslavia countermanded the orders. But the conflict was only postponed.
On the 1st of March, skirmishes were recorded in Croatia and Milosevic seized
power by declaring the end of Yugoslavia. After a referendum in Croatia in
May was resoundingly supportive of independence, both Slovenia and
Croatia declared themselves independent on the 25th of June, 1991. After the
Yugoslav forces tried to take control in Slovenia, the territorial defence fought
back and managed to gain the upper hand. After a cease-fire on the 4th of
July, the federal presidency was persuaded by a troika of EU foreign ministers
to accept a postponement of Slovenia's independence for three months, in
effect recognising Slovene secession. For Slovenia the war was over. But for
the rest of Yugoslavia the war had just begun. War broke out in Croatia,
followed by the multi-ethnic republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serb security
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forces, with the Yugoslav federal army and Serb irregulars, waged a territorial
war to create a Greater Serbia and resorted to terror and ethnic cleansing.
After Croatia gained the upper hand and a patchwork peace was put into
place in Bosnia, the conflict shifted to the East. In the Kosovo region the
majority Albanian population rose against Serb domination. This followed the
same pattern as in the other republics with the exception that, this time,
NATO took an active hand and bombed the Serb forces into submission. But
the region is far from peaceful and the rebuilding of these countries will take
a long time. Fortunately for Slovenia, the conflict did not affect the Slovene
territory any further. After Slovenia and Croatia, were recognised by the EU
on the 15th of January, 1992 Slovenia became firmly oriented towards the
Western alliance.
The revolutions swept Eastern Europe with astonishing speed and the
development was surprisingly similar in all the applicant countries, where the
removal of the external threat brought democratic forces to the fore. It is clear
that the differences between the applicant countries are numerous. There are
differences in initial resource endowment, as well as their subsequent history.
In particular, some of the CEECs have some limited historical background of
democracy and independence, while others have almost no democratic
legacy. The same differences are apparent when regarding different
experiences of state control of the economy. Finally, the transition started very
differently with violent battles in some countries, while other countries
experienced almost no open conflict.
Yet it is also obvious that there is a large ciegree of similarity in the
applicants' situation. All the applicants share, to some degree, a similar
history, culminating in the Cold War and subsequent revolutions.
Furthermore, all of the applicant countries have been subjected to domination
and ideology of the larger countries of Europe and have often been caught up
in the larger European conflicts. The experience during the Soviet era is
particularly formative. This becomes especially clear when regarding the
economic deterioration under the communist regimes and the aspirations of
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their people to become a democratic and prosperous society. Once the
external control was lifted by the Soviet Union these aspirations led to the
revolutions, which swept the communists from power.
Thus, by the beginning of 1992, all Central and Eastern European
Countries had effectively attained independence, with the exception of
Slovakia, which split peacefully from the Czech Republic a year later. These
countries subsequently applied to the European Union for membership.
Reforms were starting to introduce stable democratic institutions but the
economic legacy of communist mismanagement needed to be addressed as
well. The predominant wish of these countries, after escaping from Soviet and
communist dominance, was to become a member of the Western alliances.
The recent democratisation, as well as economic reforms, is discussed in the
next chapter with a special emphasis on the relationship between these
countries and the European Union.
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Chapter 3: Reforms and the West
a) Economic reforms and political change
The revolutions in CEE created the opportunity for a new stage in
European integration. The applicant countries made it clear that they wanted
to be considered as prospective members of NATO and the EU as soon as
possible. Yet many problems remained after the successful revolutions. This
chapter examines the transition in the applicant countries and their
relationship with the EU up to the present day.
The applicants faced a momentous challenge after the revolutions. The
problems they faced were far-reaching and far from easy to solve. The
political framework had to be completely remodelled, including new legal
and administrative structures. The reforms necessary for the economic
restructuring were even more fundamental. All applicant countries had some
variant of a planned economy, with the associated distortions of incentives.
As a result even the formerly prosperous economies had fallen far behind the
memberstates of the European Union. Daniel Daianu notes that the
seriousness of the task faced by the CEECs cannot be overemphasised:
"Because frequently one sees allegedly knowledgeable professionals making
judgements on the transformation process while seeming oblivious to the
heavy legacy of backwardness of these societies, a state of affairs which goes
back deeply into history" (inTeichova, 1997, p. 84).
The following tables summarise the situation of the applicant countries
early on in the transition. The tables illustrate whether the countries are
similar in population (P) and territory (T) to the larger member states, such as
Germany, France, Italy, the UK or Spain, or whether they are closer to the
small member states such as Luxembourg, Ireland or Denmark. In terms of
aggregate GDP (Y) all of the applicants are closer to the low aggregate income
member states, such as Luxembourg43, Ireland or Greece, or even at a fraction
43 Luxembourg is very rich in per capita terms, yet due to its small size Luxembourg has a low
aggregate GDP.
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of these countries GDP. The first table examines the situation in the Visegrad
countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
Table 3.a.1: Showing the applicant countries in Group 144 in relation to
comparable EU memberstates according to population, territory and
GDP (1992 data).45
{P46, Population Territory GDP (Y) Combined Combined
T47, (P) (T) equivalent population GDP (Y)
Y48) equivalent equivalent (P)
Poland Spain Italy Greece
(P 38.365, (P 34.085) (T 116,303) (Y 79.2)
T 120, 725,
Y 75.3)
Hungary Greece Portugal 1/3 Group 1: Group 1:
(P 10.202, (P 10.3) (T 35,553) Portugal UK + Denmark
T 35,969, (Y 83.9) Denmark
Y 30.7)
Czech Greece Austria V2 Ireland (P 57.848 + (Y 142.1-
Rep. (P 10.3) (T 32,374) (Y 48.8) P 5.17- Y1 = 141.5)
(P 10.383, PI =
T 30,343, 64.296)
Y 25.3)
Slovakia Denmark Denmark Luxem¬
(P 5.346, (P 5.17) (T 16,629) bourg
T18,917, (Y 10.4)
Y 10.2)
The table shows that the more prosperous of the applicant countries were far
behind the comparable GDP of current EU member states. The combined
population of the Visegrad countries is similar to the combined population of
the UK and Denmark; yet the combined GDP was only the equivalent of
Denmark's. The following table summarises the situation for the smaller
applicant countries.
44 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
45 Data adapted from N. Davics "EUROPE", p. 1332 (Davies, 1997).
46 P- Population in million
47 T- Territory in sq. miles
48 Y- GDP in billion $
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Table 3.a.2: Showing the applicant countries in Group 249 in relation to
comparable EU memberstates according to population, territory and GDP
(1992 data).50
{P, T, Y) Population Territory GDP (Y) combined combined
(P) (T) equivalent population GDP (Y)
equivalent equivalent (P)
Slovenia 1/4 1/2 1/10
(P 2.017, Sweden Denmark Denmark Group 2: Group 2:
T 7,187, (P 8.678) (T 16,629) (Y 142.1) Greece 1/2
Y 14.4) Greece
Estonia 1/2 Denmark 1/2 (P 10.3- (1/2 Y
(P 1.554, Ireland (T 16,629) Luxem¬ P2 = 9.942) 79.2-
T 17,413, (P 3.547) bourg Y2 = 39.3)
Y 5.9) (Y 10.4)
Latvia 1/2 Ireland Luxem¬
(P 2.617, Finland (T 27,136) bourg
T 24,500, (P 5.042) (Y 10.4)
Y 8.9)
Lithuania Ireland Ireland Luxem¬
(P 3.754, (P 3.547) (T 27,136) bourg
T 25,174, (Y 10.4)
Y 10.1)
The combined size of the small applicant countries is the equivalent of Greece,
but with only half the GDP. Yet from this table it is clear that the EU could
absorb these countries from an economic perspective. Their relative small size
means that while they would require a relatively large amount of EU funding
the problem would be manageable from an economic perspective.
Institutionally the small size of these countries would create far-reaching
problems, an issue later discussed.
However, for the Balkan applicants the situation is very different. They
are relatively large, yet they are the poorest of the applicants. Their position is
summarised in the following table.
49 Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.
50 Data adapted from N. Davies "EUROPE", p. 1332 (Davies, 1997).
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Table 3.a.3: Showing the applicant countries in Group 351 in relation to
comparable EU memberstates according to population, territory and
GDP (1992 data).52
{P, T, Y) Population Territory GDP (Y) combined combined
(P) (T) equivalent population GDP (Y)
equivalent equivalent (P)
Bulgaria Sweden UK Luxem¬
(P 8.952, (P 8.678) (T 94,226) bourg Group 3: Group3:
T 42,823, (Y 10.4) Spain 1/2
Y 11.9) Greece
Romania 2 Greece Portugal 1/2 (P 34.085- (1/2 Y
(P 22.865, (P 10.3) Ireland P3 = 79.2-
T 91,699, (Y 48.8) 31.817) Y3 = 36.8)
Y 24.9)
These countries have a combined population close to that of Spain. Yet their
combined GDP was only half that of Greece - the lowest per Capita GDP in
the EU. They have serious problems even when trying to catch up with the
lowest GDP of the EU, not withstanding attempting to reach the average.
The following table shows the size of the problem when considering all
the applicants together.
5 I Bulgaria and Romania.
52 Data adapted from N. Davies "EUROPE", p. 1332 (Davies, I997).
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Table 3.a.4: Showing all applicant countries in relation to comparable EU
memberstates according to population, territory and GDP (1992 data).53






All France + France + Belgium
Applicant Spain + Spain + (Y 218.7)
Countries Belgium Belgium
(P 106.055, (P 57.372 + (T 211,207 +
T 415,380, P 34.085 + T 194,884
Y 217.6) P 10.025) T 11.781)
The combined picture is stunning. Admitting all the applicants would
be equivalent to admitting another France, Spain and Belgium in terms of
population and territory. Yet the combined GDP is only equivalent to that of
Belgium.
The situation has not improved substantially since the beginning of
transition. All applicant countries faced a collapse in industrial output after
the revolutions. This was reflected in a large fall in GDP. The causes for this
output fall are still disputed, as described in the literature review in Chapter
1. Yet it is clear that most countries struggled to make up the lost ground of
the early 1990s. The relative position of the applicant countries' GDP to the
EU has, thus, not improved on average. Convergence is still some way off and
the average growth differential to the EU makes catching up to the average
EU GDP a decade-long process. The relative poverty of the CEECs makes
accession very difficult due to issues such as migration, as well as low wage
competition. Yet the situation varies widely within the applicant countries.
The best performing applicant country, Slovenia, still has only 68% of
EU average GDP, followed by the Czech Republic with 60%. Hungary with
49%, Slovakia with 46%, Poland with 39% and Estonia with 36% form the
mid-field. At the lower end of the scale Lithuania only reaches 31%, while
Latvia and Romania only reach 27%. The lowest GDP is still recorded by
Bulgaria, which only reaches 23%. When comparing 1998 industrial
53 Data adapted from N. Davies "EUROPE", p. 1332 (Davies, 1997).
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production with 1995 figures most countries record an increase. These
increases range from 29.4% in Hungary to 8.3% in the Czech Republic.
However, both Bulgaria and Romania, have lower industrial production than
in 1995 with 82.6% and 85.8% respectively. Furthermore, they are still
recording a decreasing rate with -12.7% and -17.0% respectively. This has to
be contrasted to the fall in output in all applicant countries at the beginning of
the transition process. The combined effect suggests that the best performing
applicant countries have just recovered their situation at the beginning of the
transition process, while the worst performing countries, in particular
Bulgaria and Romania, have fallen even further behind.
This is supported by evidence collected in the United Nations'
Economic Survey of Europe, which states:
"By 1999 the central European transition economies had either regained
(Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) or were close to their pre-transition GDP levels
(Czech Republic, Hungary)" (26.4.2000).
However, the same report shows that the Baltic States had only reached
between 60 and 80 % of their pre-transition GDP levels, with Bulgaria and
Romania falling into the same range. The report concludes:
"In general the transition to a market economy has brought about turbulent
changes and growing evidence of economic heterogeneity and divergence in
per capita income levels in the former CPEs. At the same time there emerged
subgroups of transition economies in which per capita incomes were more
homogeneous. Some of them (notably central Europe during the second half
of the 1990s) were also beginning to catch up on west European levels, but
most of the transition economies continued to diverge from one another and
to fall further behind the income levels of western Europe" (26.4.2000).
Agriculture remains an important sector for all applicant countries.
Agricultural employment as a percentage of total employment is above EU
average of 5.2% in all candidate countries, where the Czech Republic with
5.5%, Hungary with 7.5% and Slovakia with 8.2% record the lowest rates.
Estonia records a rate just below 10% while Slovenia is just above at 11.5%.
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Poland and Latvia record 19.1% and 18.8% respectively, while the Lithuanian
rate reaches 21%. The Bulgarian rate reaches 25.7% and in Romania 40% are
still employed in agriculture.
Unemployment continues to be a major problem in some of the
candidate countries. In 1998, Latvia and Lithuania had unemployment rates
above 13% while Bulgaria had the worst recorded rate at 16% (Eurostat, 1998).
This is partially explained by the range of the economic activity rate, which is
highest in Romania at 63.6% and lowest in Bulgaria at 50.4%. However, the
rate in all applicant countries is still below the average rate in the EU at 67.5%
(frontier-free Europe, 2000).
Inflation continues to be above Euroland average with the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland having a rate above 10%54. The accession
countries furthest from membership fair worst with Bulgaria recording an
inflation rate of 22.3% while Romania tops the list with 59.1% (Eurostat, 1999).
In trade, the accession countries continue to have deficits. In 1998, the
trade balance ranges from 56.7% in Latvia to 91.4% in the Czech Republic55.
The candidate countries continue to expand their trade links with the EU but
the negative balance of trade with the EU perseveres. The net inflow of
Foreign Direct Investment is positive in all accession countries, yet it varies
widely. Slovenia only recorded FDI of 0.8% of GDP in 1998 while Estonia had
the highest rate at 10.8% (Eurostat, 1999).
Further statistics indicate a long term problem in terms of social
development. As an indicative statistic, the fertility rate has collapsed in
Central and Eastern Europe. A report by the UN's Economic Commission for
Europe notes that:
" The start of the transition process was everywhere accompanied by large
declines in output, employment and real wages, which combined to produce
a reduction in total real income from employment accruing to the household
sector, a major determinant the living standards of, among others, individuals
and couples in their childbearing years ... The real cost of children [therefore]
54 Czech Rep. 10.7%, Hungary 14.3%, Poland 11.8%.
55 Trade balance defined as exports/imports as a %.
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increased as the as the real incomes of parents fell. As a result, individuals
and couples postponed, or abandoned altogether, having children, thus
preventing their living standards from falling even lower" (26.4.2000).
The general problems of the transition countries are aggravated by the
difficulties inherent in the process of catching up in a transition environment.
For the case of China it has been noted that:
" this poverty gap between regions became more and more acute, leading to a
third-world division within China itself, to a theoretical debate between
proponents and opponents of the 'staggered' reform theory, and to increasing
concern about the importance of importance of economic development in
backward regions" (Xiaoqiang & Nanfeng, 1991, p. 1).
To illustrate some of the key differences and similarities between the
applicant countries, tables focusing on different subject areas have been
constructed. The following tables indicate some key similarities while
highlighting the differences between countries, illustrating that common
trends are noticeable in all of the applicant countries. This conclusion will be
reinforced in the remainder of this chapter. The first table focuses on political
and historical similarities and differences.
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Table 3.a.5: Similarities and Differences of the Applicant Countries in the

























Immigration Outflow of qualified labour
('brain drain')56.





Some degree of reform, but








Some shared history of the




Population All countries are relatively
small in global terms57.
Large degree of variance
between countries.
Territory All countries are
geographically close to EU
member states58 and have
access to major waterways.
Size varies widely as well
as situation within Europe
and natural resources.
The situation of the applicant countries varies, yet some key similarities can
be identified in the political background and current situation. In particular
the scale of unprecedented political changes and the associated aggregate
uncertainty are noticeably similar in the applicants' situation. This rise in
uncertainty also led to changes in government in most applicant countries,
56 Brain drain can also be understood to mean that high quality professionals in research will focus on
subjects relevant for the more affluent region. Furthermore, brain drain also implies that it will be
difficult to attract high quality professionals to the region in question (see for example Xiaoqiang &
Nanfeng, 1991, p. 179).
57 With the possible exception of Poland.
58 With the exception of Romania, which needs another CEEC to join (Hungary or Bulgaria) to
achieve direct access to the EU.
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where the disillusioned public re-elected the communist parties which had re¬
formed as social democratic parties.
In the economic field, the situation is similar. As discussed previously,
in the initial years of transition, all countries in the East experienced large
scale falls in industrial output, high rates of inflation and significant increases
in unemployment, as well as social problems such as rising crime and
migration. This led to an increase in individual insecurity, especially since
previously these phenomena were practically unknown in the planned
economies59. This also influenced public attitudes towards the transformation
process, which after an initial favouring of "big bang" strategies, slowed
down to a more gradual path. The uncertainty of the situation and, in
particular, the long time period which was estimated for these countries to
catch up with Western Europe, in terms of economic development60, also
made the EU more reluctant to accept swift accession. Fast privatisation,
which was initially seen as the only feasible path to reform the economy, also
proved more difficult than initially envisaged. Initially large-scale give-away
schemes were planned, but these soon became politically infeasible in most
countries. Instead, privatisation became more gradual with most activity
focusing on small and medium sized enterprises, while most large-scale
enterprises remained in public ownership. The following table summarises
the economic similarities and differences.
59 Even though most of these did exist under communist regimes, usually these problems were hidden
by state intervention. Hidden unemployment and inflation are disastrous for a country's economy in the
long run but in the short run individuals of these systems had less to fear. Additionally phenomena like
crime and migration increased many times in the beginning of the transition period.
60 Using for example the estimates of Fischer, Sahay and Veigh in Table 10 of their paper which
estimates an average of 30-62 years until GDP converges to EU levels.
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Table 3.a.6: Similarities and Differences of the Applicant Countries in
their economic position.
Area Similarities Differences
GDP All countries have a low
aggregate GDP. Large fall in
GDP after transition.





All countries have a lower
GDP/capita than any other EU
member state.









of agriculture varies widely.
Industry Large, often uncompetitive
heavy industry. Relatively
undiversified economies.
Large decline in industrial
output after transition.
Different outcomes of
efficiency drives and creating
new, private industries.





developing a service industry















privatisation and progress in
developing an adequate
financial system
Trade EU largest trading partner,
some restrictions on trade.











Varying degrees of success in
controlling macroeconomic
conditions.
The most extensive changes taking place within the CEECs involved
the macroeconomic structure of the transition countries. The desire to create a
market economy required a large degree of reform. The most important areas
of reform for all of the applicant countries included:
• Price liberalisation
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• Privatisation and the introduction of hard budget constraints for
the remaining state owned enterprises
• Trade liberalisation and encouraging exports without a large
increase in imports
• Creation of credit markets and reform of the financial sector
• Reduction of the state sector and the introduction of budget and
national debt control
• Introducing environmental reforms
• Increasing private consumption and the standard of living while
increasing savings
• Increasing GDP and the long term growth rate
• Creating conditions to encourage investment, both internally and
FDI
• Labour market reform, including managing unemployment
• Macroeconomic stabilisation, including inflation and exchange rate
control
• Reducing the dependence on heavy industry and agriculture
• Reform of the tax and the social security system
• Reform of the legal and administrative system, including
competition laws
These reforms were not only far-reaching; they were often pursuing
contradictory objectives. Furthermore, there was no agreed way forward. The
sheer scale of reforms created a situation, which was qualitatively different
from anything attempted before. The scope of this thesis makes it impossible
to discuss these reforms in detail. It is sufficient to give a general picture of
which countries chose the 'Big Bang' reform path and which decided to
pursue a more gradual strategy. The discussion will commence with the
Visegraci countries, followed by Slovenia and the Baltic States and concluding
with the Balkan countries. The discussion will not only explore the economic
reform process, but also political developments. It will be demonstrated that
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the economic development is inextricably linked to political developments in
the accession countries. The following discussion draws on "Eastern Europe
and the Commonwealth of Independent States", published by Europa
Publications (1999), as well as contemporary media sources.
The Czech Republic and Slovakia started the transition process within
the Czechoslovak Federation61. They were initially seen as the model
transition economy with the best chance to join the EU quickly.
Czechoslovakia had inherited one of the most rigid planned economies and a
restrictive system imposed after the Prague Spring. However, Czechoslovakia
started the transition process with some key advantages. Firstly, the state
inherited a relatively low national debt from the communist period. The
economy of Czechoslovakia was also developed by Eastern bloc standards.
Czechoslovakia had been one of the manufacturing centres of the East and the
percentage of agricultural employment was below Eastern average. Finally,
the leadership in the post-transition period was strong and consensus
oriented towards Western integration.
The main political influence after transition was the Open Forum,
formed as an opposition to the Communist Party. The Open Forum, which
took power after the 1989 revolution, split in 1991. The centre-right wing
became the Civic Democratic Party (CDP), which won the 1992 and 1996
elections under Vaclav Klaus. In the 1996 election, Klaus was obliged to form
a minority government with the support of the Czech Social Democratic Party
(CSDP). The situation was reversed in 1998, when the CSDP formed a
minority government under the influence of corruption scandals and
problems of the currency.
The transition period started on a positive note. Klaus introduced a
large-scale privatisation programme early on. The programme included
large-scale restitution of assets confiscated by the Communists after the
Second World War. Furthermore, leases on small shops were auctioned to
open up opportunities for small-scale entrepreneurship. Another change was
61 The Czechoslovak Federation split into the Czech Republic and Slovakia on 1.1.1993.
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the removal of restrictions, leading to the creation of a self-employed sector.
Finally, the most visible and significant part of the privatisation programme
was the privatisation of the large state-owned enterprises. The Czechoslovak
State (soon to become the Czech State after the 1993 split of the Federation)
chose a programme of voucher privatisation. Under the scheme, each citizen
was issued with vouchers, which could be used to bid for shares in
companies. The depositories for these vouchers were 220 investment funds,
which acted as major shareholders in the privatised enterprises, yet they were
not allowed to hold more than 20% in each firm. The method, which was
chosen, was gradual. Privatisation occurred in 2 main phases lasting until
1995, with over 70% of firms being privatised. Despite having a slow start in
FDI, the Czech Republic soon attracted major investments, particularly from
Germany. The privatisation and inflow of FDI was accompanied by the
development of a commercial banking sector, attracting significant foreign
ownership. The foreign-owned banks started to outperform the domestic
banks, mainly due to under-performing loans. But, in general, the
privatisation programme and the economic reforms introduced were a
political and an economic success. This was coupled with a successful
programme of opening up the economy to foreign trade, including the
signature of the Central European Free Trade Association (CEFTA). This so-
called Visegrad agreement was concluded by Czechoslovakia, Hungary and
Poland, with Slovakia becoming a member in its own right after the
dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Yet in 1997 and 1998 crisis hit the Czech
Republic, moving the prospective first accession country to the last place in
the first wave. The crisis will be discussed later, when the constraints of the
accession process are discussed in the final chapter of this thesis.
Slovakia did not share the same history, despite having the same
notional starting point. From early 1990 onwards, Slovakian independence
started asserting itself. Vladimir Meciar, leading the transition period in the
Slovak part of the federation, became the focal point of this movement. He
was elected in 1992 with the party he formed, the Movement for Democratic
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Slovakia (MDS). He was the main driving force of separation, leading to the
peaceful dissolution of the Czech and Slovak Federation on the 1st of January
1993. The new Slovak state faced political upheaval early on. Splits in the
ruling party led to elections in 1994, but Meciar emerged again as the main
political actor. From the period 1994 till the end of 1998, Meciar and his ruling
party became increasingly autocratic, leading to internal conflicts as well as a
distinct alienation from the West. Slovakia became the only country to fail the
political criterion of the EU and, internally, the MDS managed to block the
election of a new president. Meciar assumed the powers of the presidency, in
addition to his Prime Minister's powers. Despite becoming the largest party
in the 1998 election, a broad coalition replaced the MDS government and
finally brought Slovakia back on track for EU membership.
The independent Slovakia inherited a very different situation than the
Czech Republic. Slovakia traditionally had a lower standard of living and
most of the Czechoslovakian heavy industry was concentrated in Slovakia
with the associated environmental problems. Yet the Meciar regime also
inherited the low level of debt and privatisation under the voucher scheme,
which had already completed the first phase. The second phase was
scheduled soon after independence but Meciar first suspended and then
scrapped the second phase. The already purchased vouchers were converted
into a form of government bonds and privatisation was mainly pursued by
selling shares directly to management and employees. The state also retained
control over a number of major firms, including utilities and steelworks. As a
consequence, the privatisation programme was deeply unpopular and was
even ruled unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
The uncertainty and unpredictability of government behaviour also
meant that foreign investors were reluctant to invest in Slovakia, with the
consequence of a low relative level of FDI being channelled into the economy.
Yet the Slovakian economy surprised onlookers. After an initial slump, FDI
picked up and the economy started to stabilise. Remarkably, inflation was
kept under control, GDP continued to grow and unemployment stabilised.
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Yet the internal problems also meant that Slovakia was further behind the
other Visegrad countries in their orientation towards the West. Slovakia failed
to join the OECD and was delegated to the second wave in the accession
process. Only the removal of the Meciar government has re-opened prospects
for Slovakia and the subsequent arrest of Meciar for corruption might be the
final line being drawn under this period of Slovakian history.
Hungary, on the other hand, began the transition process from a
favourable starting point. Hungary had been introducing reforms for a
number of years and the political elite was instrumental in the change from a
communist regime to a democracy. Hungary had opened the border to
Austria in 1989, introducing the first break into the iron curtain. The
relationship with the USSR was swiftly dissolved and the free elections of
1990 produced a majority coalition of the main opposition party, the
Hungarian Democratic Forum (HDF) in coalition with the Independent
Smallholders Party and the Christian Democratic People's Party. Yet, in the
May 1994 elections, the former communists, the Hungarian Socialist Party
(HSP), staged a comeback, winning a clear majority. In 1998, elections
produced yet another government under the Federation of Young Democrats-
Hungarian Civic Party (FYD-HCP). Interestingly, economic policies remained
remarkably consistent throughout the political changes with steady
orientation towards NATO and the European Union.
However, the method of introducing reforms varied between the
different governments. Hungary chose initially not to pursue a course of
'shock therapy' and went along a gradual reform path, which was criticised
widely. Additionally, Hungary had inherited an antiquated industrial
structure and high government debt. In response, the HDF government
introduced a four-year plan, which included plans for the acceleration of
privatisation, inflation control and the free convertibility of the Hungarian
currency, the Forint. The initial effect of the programme was a fall of real GDP
and an associated rise in unemployment. Inflation stayed close to or above
20% until 1994 and the budget deficit was far in excess of the level set by the
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EU. As a consequence Hungary, which was seen as one of the first accession
countries, fell behind the other first wave applicants.
The new socialist government, elected in 1994, was forced to introduce
an austerity programme to control the spiralling trade deficit and the large
budget deficit. The austerity programme stabilised the economy but at the
cost of a further fall in GDP. Yet privatisation was a success. The Hungarian
government had decided to sell firms' assets directly and the resulting
revenues contributed significantly to the control of the budget deficit and the
reduction of public debt. But the electoral backlash of not increasing the
standard of living sufficiently resulted in yet another change of government
in 1998.
The new Hungarian government was not uncontroversial, yet was able
to reap the benefits of previous economic policies. GDP growth improved and
unemployment remained stable. As a consequence Hungary could pursue a
close relationship with the EU and by the early 21st century Hungary has
established itself once again, as one of the front-runners for accession, having
already joined NATO in 1999.
The final country, which was part of the initial three Visegrad
countries, was Poland. As the largest of the applicant countries, Poland faced
numerous problems in the transition period. It started the transition period as
an undisputed champion of change. Solidarnosc, the former trade union, had
become a democratic party and swept the board in the initial elections. Poland
opted for a presidential democracy and Lech Walesa was duly elected as
president in December 1990. Yet the first post-communist government
resigned, as the premier Mazowiecki was beaten into third place by a
maverick candidate in the presidential race. The government was replaced by
a coalition under Bielecki and the broad Solidarnosc group began to
disintegrate with the formation of the Democratic Union (UD). The political
uncertainty was not resolved by the Senate elections in 1991, where the UD
became the largest party with just over 12% of votes and a low electoral
turnout. In 1992, the Bielecki government was forced to resign after a vote of
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no confidence and the former communists, represented by the Democratic
Left Alliance (SDL) and the Polish Peasant Party (PL) won the majority of
seats. This heralded a period of confrontation between the parliament, the
Sejm, and President Walesa. This confrontation was only resolved by
Walesa's defeat in the 1995 election and Kwasniewski became the new
President. In 1997, a broad coalition called the Solidarity Election Action
(AWS) became the strongest party and formed a coalition government with
the Freedom Union.
Yet the present government has also not had a smooth governing
period. A part of the AWS split to form the Social Movement of Solidarity
Election Action and a number of Sejm delegates left the party in protest of,
firstly, the sale of the Gdansk shipyard (the birthplace of the Solidarnosc
movement) and later, the hardships caused by economic reform. The
government finally split in 2000 with new coalition talks being conducted
currently.
Poland pursued a 'Big Bang' strategy from early on and despite the
changes in government the successive governments remained committed to
this strategy, albeit with varying degrees of enthusiasm. Poland started early
on with a radical reform package, sanctioned by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF). The programme involved liberalisation of trade, encouragement
of the private sector, reductions of subsidies and defence spending, a
balanced budget policy and the maintenance of strict monetary policy goals.
The Polish currency, the Zloty, was partially liberalised and pegged against
the dollar. Initially, these measures led to a deep recession, yet from 1992 the
economy started to recover.
Privatisation was an important element of restructuring, though
Poland's privatisation was essentially different to the large-scale sell-off
programmes pursued in the other Visegrad countries. The main impetus of
reform came initially from the growth of small and medium sized private
businesses, the so-called 'de novo' enterprises. Poland also chose to pursue
privatisation by a voucher scheme, akin to Czechoslovakia. But in contrast, it
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took until 1995 to initiate the mass scale voucher programme and the large
industrial, financial and infrastructure companies were only broken up under
the centre right regime, elected in 1997. Poland's development changed
substantially with this election. While initially FDI was relatively low and
trade was mainly with the other CEFTA countries, after 1998 investor
confidence and the opening of trade made Poland an attractive place for
Western businesses. The banking sector remains underdeveloped but there
are already Western banks moving in and buying up substantial share¬
holdings. The prospects for Poland are good at the moment. Domestic and
international confidence is high and EU membership is expected soon. Yet
major problems remain, including the large agricultural sector and a
substantial part of the workforce able and willing to move West, for better
paid employment.
Slovenia has been another success story of transition. After the brief
conflict with Serbia, following the declaration of independence in 1991,
Slovenia established itself as an independent entity with the help of the EU.
First free elections were held in 1992 resulting in a broad coalition led by
Janez Drnovsek and his Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). The main problem of
Slovenia in her relations with the EU centred on the issue of compensation to
Italians, whose property was confiscated in 1947 after some Italian territory
became part of Slovenia. This issue was not resolved until 1996, when a
compromise was found. The LDP had managed to consolidate power in the
intervening years and in November 1996 was re-elected with a larger
majority. Yet the coalition gained only 45 seats, opposed by a broad
opposition alliance which gained the same number of seats. Only in 1997 did
Drnovsek gain a sufficient majority with one deputy of the opposition
becoming an independent. Yet the government has remained stable since
then, not least because of the influence of the President, Kucan. Despite his
relatively ceremonial role he has had great influence and after his initial term
from 1992 to 1997, he was re-elected in 1997.
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Slovenia's economy initially suffered not only from the rapid
separation from Yugoslavia but also from the fall-out of the ethnic conflicts
engulfing the other states in the former federation. The introduction of a new
currency, the Tolar, was initially accompanied by high inflation. Yet Slovenia
had also inherited a relatively developed economy with a large
manufacturing industry and potential as a tourist destination. One of the
major early challenges was the reform of the banking system, then dominated
by political appointments. The restructuring and recapitalisation was not
completed until 1997 and the banks are due to be fully privatised in the near
future. Privatisation of the rest of the state owned enterprises commenced in
1992. The privatisation in Slovenia was a mixture of voucher and direct sales
with a substantial component retained for compensation issues. The process
only started to pick up speed in 1994 when large enterprises were being
restructured and by 1997 the process was mostly complete. Slovenia has been
successful in separating from the conflict, which engulfed the rest of
Yugoslavia after the transformation. Even though the initial years of
independence meant a reduction in GDP and conflict with the EU over
property restitution, Slovenia managed to become one of the successes and a
front-runner for EU membership.
The Baltic States faced a similar situation as part of a larger union.
They were part of the Soviet Union and after the secession they needed to
completely reform their political and economic system. But their experience in
relation to the EU varied. While Estonia became one of the first wave
countries, Latvia and Lithuania fell behind. Even though Latvia has caught up
it is still behind the first wave, while many of Lithuania's economic challenges
still need to be addressed.
Estonia started movements towards independence in 1988, when the
domestic pressures lead to a declaration of sovereignty by the Estonian
Supreme Soviet. Elections in 1990 produced a large majority for independence
and a transition arrangement to independence was pursued. After brief
conflict following the putsch in Russia, which crumbled due to public
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resistance, Estonia declared full independence in 1991. Vahi replaced the
Prime Minister Savisaar in 1992 after the country experienced economic
difficulties. Later in the same year the first free elections were held and the
Pro Partia party gained the largest number of seats. The coalition government
was formed under the leadership of Mart Laar, representing a decisive break
with the Soviet past. After a period of radical economic reform the second free
elections were held in 1995. The political scene consolidated and produced a
majority for the Estonian Coalition Party (ECP) and the Rural Union. The
former communists failed to gain a single seat, although the Russian minority
was represented. Vahi formed a coalition government, which was more left
oriented, yet continued with the economic reforms started after the transition.
However, political life had not settled down. The re-election of Meri as
president was a long and divisive process and Vahi resigned after being
accused of abusing his office. Mart Siimann replaced him but recently Estonia
was shaken by allegations of child abuse by leading members of the
government, an issue that has not yet been resolved.
Despite political uncertainty, Estonia was one of the most radical and
consistent reformers from the applicant countries. Initially GDP collapsed
after separation from the SU. In 1992 Estonia introduced its own currency, the
Kroon, which was pegged to the Deutsche Mark. The sale of state assets was
swift and while early years produced strong inflationary pressure, strict
monetary policy brought this problem under control. Growth picked up and
so did FDI, particularly from the Scandinavian countries, which have taken
on the role of guardians for the interests of the Baltic States within the EU.
Estonia has been successful in transition, with the sole problem of a large
dependence on foreign trade, with a large trade deficit.
Latvia was less successful in the transition period, partially because the
country started the transformation process from a more difficult starting
point. Latvia had a high degree of ethnic Russians, especially from the armed
forces. Latvia's cautious approach to independence was greeted by an
attempted coup supported by SU troops in 1991, which did not create a
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decisive outcome, even though the SU-oriented communists gained control of
most institutions. The coup in Moscow lead to the declaration of
independence in 1991 after a referendum overwhelmingly supported this
move. The Latvian coup collapsed and the independent Latvia was born
under the leadership of Godmanis. In 1992, the Godmanis government
survived a vote of no confidence but was shaken to its core. The resignation of
a number of ministers led to the establishment of the Latvian Way, a broad
opposition movement. In the first free elections in 1993, the Latvian Way
became the biggest party, forming a coalition with the Latvian Farmers Union
(LFU) under the Prime Minister, Birkavs. The president, elected in the same
year, was elected from the deputies in parliament and Guntis Ulmanis of the
LFU gained the required majority. The LFU withdrew from government in
1994 but the new government was still dominated by the Latvian Way.
However, after a banking crisis in 1995 the Latvian Way's share of seats more
than halved in legislative elections. The resulting legislature was fragmented
with several parties gaining similar shares of seats. This lead to an extremely
broad coalition under the independent Prime Minister, Skeles, which only
excluded a party of the far right. Ulmanis was re-elected as president in 1996.
Yet political uncertainty persisted, with the largest party in the government
coalition, the Democratic Party Saimnieks - The Master (DPS) exerting power.
Skeles resigned in 1997, only to be reinstated 9 days later. But throughout
1997 crisis persisted and various defections and new parties destabilised the
political system. Krasts lead the government for a while but after the
withdrawal of the DPS, the government was seriously weakened. In the 1998
general elections, Skele re-emerged, when the party he had formed only half a
year earlier became the largest party. Vilis Kristopans of the Latvian Way was
nominated to form a new government and, again, a broad coalition was
required.
Latvia's economy was negatively affected by the collapse of the SU,
similar to the other Baltic States. GDP collapsed and only started to recover
from the mid-1990s onwards. Latvia had inherited large-scale industries from
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the Soviet era, which depended heavily on Soviet imports of minerals and
energy. Consequently the Latvian government needed to break up these
industries for liquidation or privatisation. But the process dragged on,
partially because their dissolution threatened the stability of the economy and
partially because of the lack of political will. The largest enterprises were still
not privatised by 1998, even though progress had been made for the small to
medium sized businesses. The banking sector presented another challenge. A
banking crisis hit the country in 1994-95 when it was revealed that most
commercial banks were hiding losses with insufficient capital to cover these
losses. This lead to the closure of a large number of banks and the situation
only stabilised in 1996. Latvia, after introducing the Latvian rouble (which
later became the Lat) also suffered from high inflation, even though in recent
years a notable downward trend has been recorded. This positive trend is also
notable for GDP and FDI, which have picked up considerably. Latvia has thus
been catching up with the first wave accession countries and consequently the
Latvian economy is considered to be close to joining the first wave countries.
This development is still some way off for Lithuania. Lithuania, the
largest of the Baltic States, became independent after a referendum declaring
independence in 1990, following moves for independence throughout the
early 1990s. The coup in Moscow led to the complete severance of ties with
the SU after the leaders of the putsch had ordered tanks onto the streets of
Vilnius. Landsbergis, who had been instrumental in Lithuania's move to
independence, was the most influential reformer in his role as de facto head
of state. The government was lead by Vagnorius and his Sajudis pro-
independence party, but Abisala replaced him in 1992 after a vote of no
confidence. In 1992 Sajudis lost the election to the former Communist Party,
now the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party (LDLP). Nevertheless the
coalition government only included a minority of LDLP ministers under
Lubys a former member of the Abisala government. In 1993 Brazauskas was
elected President and Slezevicius was appointed Prime Minister. Slezevicius
lasted until a banking crisis in 1995-96. In 1996 he was dismissed by an
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overwhelming vote of no confidence to be replaced by Mindaugas as Prime
Minister.
Lithuania had its share of economic problems after the separation from
the SU. Lithuania shared the other Baltic States' experiences of sharp GDP
decline, following independence. Inflation also accelerated and until the
beginning of 1993 no real progress was made towards privatisation. The
Lithuanian government was forced to accept the recommendations by the
IMF and the World Bank and the economy started to stabilise thereafter. By
the end of 1995 most business had been privatised and the macroeconomy
was stabilised effectively. The service sector was starting to become more
important, with a corresponding decline in agriculture and manufacturing.
But serious problems remained. Lithuania has a large trade deficit and despite
an increase in FDI there is still a relatively low level, over all. The main
stumbling block in the country's relationship with the EU remains Lithuania's
dependence on its one nuclear power station at Ignalina. The closure of this
outdated and potentially unsafe plant is a pre-condition of membership, yet
Lithuania balks at the cost of closing the source of over 80% of Lithuanian
energy.
The final two applicant countries face even more severe problems.
Romania and Bulgaria are the most remote, geographically, and they are also
the furthest from accession. They commenced their transition from a much
lower starting point and the commitment of the political elite towards reform
has been doubtful. Furthermore, in both countries the communist
nomenclatura has been instrumental in the transition process and it took
almost a decade before a decisive break with the past was achieved. It is hard
to overstate their relative poverty and the lack of progress. Consequently, it is
difficult to envisage accession of these Balkan countries in the near future.
Indeed, it can be doubted whether these countries will become members of
the EU at all.
Bulgaria started transition as the staunchest supporter of the SU in
Eastern Europe. Indeed Bulgaria had previously applied to join the SU and
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the Bulgarian secret service was known as one arm of the KGB. Consequently,
most of the political reform movement was driven initially from within the
reforming Communist Party. The main opposition umbrella party, the United
Democratic Front (UDF), was established in 1989 and scored its first major
victory when forcing the election of their candidate for the presidency, Zheliu
Zhelev, in 1990. The opposition managed to force the resignation of the
Premier Lukanov to be replaced by Dimitru Popov, a non-party candidate. A
new constitution was agreed in 1991 to be followed by free elections, which
were won by the UDF. The UDF nominated the leader of the Green Party Filip
Dimitrov and, despite internal divisions, he was elected as Prime Minister. In
1992, Zhelev was re-elected and strongly criticised the Dimitrov government.
An alliance of the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP), the former communists, and
the Muslim Movement for Rights and Freedom (MRF) managed to carry a
vote of censure. A MRF candidate, Berov, became Prime Minister with a
largely non-party cabinet. Problems with privatisation and foreign debt led to
the resignation of the Berov government in 1994, and the refusal of co¬
operation by the BSP and the UDF, led to the dissolution of parliament. The
BSP managed to reassert themselves strongly, winning an outright majority
and formed a government under Videnov. Despite signing the Europe
Agreement and applying for membership, the Bulgarian government
confronted the EU on a number of issues. Most notably the government
attempted to control the media and restarted one of the reactors of the
Kozlodui nuclear power station, a plant earmarked for closure by the EU. In
1996 in an US-style primary, the UDF managed to defeat the incumbent
president, who had grown apart from the opposition. Petar Stoyanov was
nominated as presidential candidate and became president towards the end
of the year. Videnov resigned as Prime Minister to be replaced by Dobrev.
Dobrev, another BSP candidate did not last long. He was forced to resign by
growing public dissatisfaction and new elections were scheduled. The UDF
managed to gain an over-all majority in 1997, leading to a government under
Ivan Kostov. This combination of a reformist government with a reformist
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presidency gave new impetus to the restructuring of the economy and the
relationship with the EU. Yet many problems with the economy remain and
Bulgaria still has to introduce many reforms to catch up with the first wave
countries.
Bulgaria had inherited a rigid planned economy from the communist
era and reforms were costly. The Bulgarian economy was traditionally
agriculturally led but heavy industrialisation had taken place under the
communists. The internal division of the opposition and the relative strength
of the BSP meant that little was achieved after the transition. But pressure led
to the introduction of a privatisation and banking restructuring programme in
the early 1990s. In 1991 an austerity programme designed by the IMF was
introduced but political instability persisted. The immediate aftermath of the
austerity programme saw inflation soar, alongside unemployment. GDP
collapsed and the government relied increasingly on a budget deficit to
maintain a minimum of social stability. The continuing collapse of the
economy led to widespread poverty and in 1995, almost two thirds of the
Bulgarian population was reported to be below the poverty line. The election
of the BSP was accompanied by a short recovery but this positive
development was negated by the economic policies of the BSP government,
alongside a lack of international confidence.
By the end of 1995, serious problems were noticeable, when the
government announced that the budget deficit would be almost 20% higher
than previously estimated. Some privatisations and a rise in interest rates did
not halt the slide and by mid 1996, the economy was in crisis again. Only the
removal of the BSP government heralded a change in economic fortunes. The
new UDF government in 1997 immediately signed up to another IMF
programme, including the establishment of a new currency board with
control over monetary policy. Thus by 1998, the Bulgarian economy had
stabilised. Yet much ground still needs to be covered, to even reach the level
of GDP pre-transition. The economy is nowhere near competitive conditions
and privatisation and restructuring is not yet complete. The relationship with
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the EU has remained difficult, partially due to the continuation of nuclear
power production but also due to the serious weakness of the economy. The
conflict of the West with Yugoslavia has added further economic problems,
even though a financial compensation programme is under way and,
politically, the EU has acknowledged Bulgaria's support of NATO.
Romania has also been beset by problems in the transition to a market
economy. Romania went through a situation akin to civil war during the
disposal of Ceaucescu. Yet the revolution was led by former apparatchiks
whose main interest was in retaining power. Iliescu became the first
president after the transition and Petre Roman became Prime Minister. The
Council of the National Salvation Front (NSF) was formed as an umbrella
grouping for the opposition, yet it contained many former communists. This
was in the middle of bloody conflict, which saw the secret service, the
Securitate, fighting pitched battles with protesters and the army in the streets
of Bucharest and many other Romanian towns. The announcement of free
elections heralded the victory of the revolution. Yet the NSF used its power to
intimidate opposition parties by mobilising the miners of the Jiu Valley, a
notorious instrument of government power. Despite ongoing protests by the
opposition, the NSF won an overwhelming victory in 1990 and Iliescu was
elected as president with 85% of the vote. The opposition protests, including
an occupation of the university, were broken up violently by police and,
following unrest, the Jiu miners were once again used to intimidate the
opposition with at least 6 people losing their lives. Roman continued as Prime
Minister, appointed by Iliescu, but opposition protests and demonstrations
continued. Partial price liberalisation and privatisation led to protest by the
Jiu miners, a departure from previous support of the government, and
consequently the government resigned. Stolojan formed a new government
including the NSF but also other parties previously in opposition. The NSF
fared badly in local elections in 1992, resulting in a split, with the NSF
retaining Roman as leader, while the new Democratic National Salvation
Front (DNSF) was loyal to President Iliescu. In the 1992 general elections, the
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DNSF won the largest number of seats, followed by the Democratic
Convention of Romania (DCR), a newly formed opposition party. Iliescu was
re-elected president in the second round and the DNSF formed a new
government together with independent deputies under Vacaroiu. The DNSF
was re-named the Party of Social Democracy of Romania (PSDR) in 1993 but
political crisis persisted. The withdrawal of support by key parliamentary
parties in 1994 led to the appointment of ultra-nationalists into ministerial
posts. In 1995, the PSDR lost support from parts of the nationalists but in local
elections it succeeded in gaining the largest number of posts amid allegations
of electoral fraud. The PSDR subsequently removed the remaining
nationalists from government in the run-up to the general elections. The DCR
and the Movement for Change subsequently won these, leading to the second
round defeat of Iliescu by Constantinescu, the DCR candidate. Ciorbea
became Prime Minister, initiating wide spread economic reform. The effects of
the reforms were accompanied by mass protests and resignations and
reorganisation rocked the cabinet. In 1998, Ciorbea was forced to resign and
was replaced by Vasile of the Democratic National Peasants Party, a part of
the DCR alliance. But political uncertainty has persisted and the economic
situation remains dire. The economic and political crisis, which hit Romania
from 1998 onwards, is still being felt and the majority of Romanians remain
desperately poor. The prospect of EU membership is far removed and it
remains to be seen whether Romania will be able to transform, successfully,
into a democratic society.
The political uncertainties have also had a large influence on the
reform process. The first phase of the post-Ceaucescu era was dominated by
the NSF, later renamed the PSDR, ruling from 1990 to 1996. In this period
reforms were gradual and little was achieved in bringing the economy into
line with other applicant countries. In the second phase, the DCR, a mostly
centre-right alliance, initiated far more radical reforms in the period from
1996 onwards. It has, however, to be noted that all Romanian governments
struggled to maintain a political constituency for reforms and one notable
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feature of the transition has been the repeated internal conflict with the
miners of the Jiu Valley. Privatisation has proceeded slowly and has only
been pursued consistently since 1996. Most production was still concentrated
in state owned businesses until then and privatisation has still not been
completed. Macroeconomic stabilisation has proved to be difficult, with
inflation being hard to control and the Romanian currency, the Lei, has
consequently declined significantly in value. Romania has had little success in
implementing austerity measures; partially because of the protest
accompanying any such moves but partially because of a lack of political will.
Furthermore, Romania has been a source of migration since the transition.
The groups of emigrants have included the most educated of society, as well
as various ethnic groups, notably ethnic Germans from the Timisoara region
and Roma and Sinti. The Romanian economy remains in a poor state and it is
unlikely that notable progress will be made in the near future. Some of the
economic and political problems will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 5,
showing how much still needs to be done to overcome the constraints
standing in the way of EU membership.
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the experience of
transition has varied widely from country to country. One argument which
has been widely put forward is that those countries which pursued a 'Big
Bang' reform path have been most successful, especially Estonia and Poland.
Yet it is noticeable that those countries which had most problems in pursuing
a speedy transition have been the countries which started from the most
disadvantaged positions, like Bulgaria and Romania. The most notable
exceptions are Slovakia, which was led into isolation by the Meciar
government, and Estonia, which became one of the first wave countries,
despite being one of the former Soviet Republics. Yet, in general terms, those
countries, which started the accession process from a more favourable starting
point, have been the more successful countries. The countries on the Balkan
fringes of Europe, in particular Bulgaria and Romania (but also those who
have not vet applied to the EU like Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia and
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Macedonia) are far from EU membership. The historical starting point has
been more deterministic for the applicant countries than initially anticipated
and the transformation has proven to be more difficult than expected. The
relationships between the accession countries and the EU have also not
fulfilled high initial expectations. The high hope of speedy membership for
most countries has not materialised and for those countries furthest away, EU
integration remains a distant aspiration. The relationship of the accession
countries with the EU is examined in more detail in the next section.
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Chapter 3: Reforms and the West
b) Relationship with the European Union
After the transformation which took place in Central and Eastern
Europe at the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s there were high
hopes for the swift accession of these countries to Western organisations. In
particular, in the Visegrad countries there were hopes to join the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU) within a
few years. The Baltic States, Slovenia and the Balkan applicants soon joined
the Visegrad countries and expectations were high. But this perceived
"window of opportunity" closed almost as fast as it appeared. NATO
membership was initially blocked by the influence of, first, the Soviet Union
and, after its disintegration, by Russia. Prospective membership of the EU
was also more difficult than first perceived. The economies of the East were
practically bankrupt and Western Europe was struggling with recession and
internal disagreements.
The impetus of enlargement has lead to the recognition that the EU has
to reform internally to be able to accommodate enlargement (See for example
Verheugen, 15.2.2000). The Inter-Governmental Conference (IGC) to discuss
these changes has started in 2000. Yet progress is far from smooth. The
changes to be decided upon are far-reaching and complex. They include
negotiations on a Charter of Fundamental Rights, but also more immediate
practical matters need to be decided. They include the reform of the CAP, as
well as reforming the European Structural Funds. Furthermore, fundamental
institutional reform has to be agreed upon. These reforms include the
increased usage of Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) in the Council, as well as
the reform of voting in the Council itself. The reforms started in the
Amsterdam Treaty have to be concluded, including the reform of the
European Parliament (EP), and the size of the Commission will need to be
controlled. The current intention is that the IGC will lead to an agreement
culminating in a Treaty of Nice during the French presidency in the second
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half of 2000. Yet doubts have been voiced whether the IGC will produce any
substantial progress (Palmer, 2000, p. 1). The institutional challenges the EU
faces are summarised by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office:
"Following the conclusions of the June European Council in Cologne,
Helsinki confirmed that an Inter-governmental Conference (IGC) would be
convened in February 2000 to resolve the institutional issues that need to be
settled before enlargement. It will focus on three main subjects:
• The size and composition of the Commission;
• The weighting of votes in the Council; and
• The possible extension of qualified majority voting.
Provision was made for the inclusion of a few related and additional items.
But they too should be in the context of enlargement and reform. The
Conference should be completed and the necessary amendments agreed upon
by the end of 2000" (Her Majesty's Government, June 2000).
The timetable is tight, especially in the context of previous EU reforms.
The deadline for the agreement of reform has been set as the end of 2000 to
ensure that the changes can be ratified by the end of 2002:
"And last, but not least, to pave the way for enlargement, Member States
made the political pledge to complete the necessary reforms of the EU
institutions, including ratification by the national parliaments, by the end of
the year 2002" (Verheugen, 12.5.2000).
But even the member of the Commission responsible for enlargement,
Verheugen, warns of the consequences if the internal reform process fails:
"It is essential that the target dates set at Helsinki for the completion of
institutional reform should be met. The cost of failure would be too high: the
signal to the candidate countries would be catastrophic, and enlargement
itself would be put at risk. It is therefore worrying that although the IGC is
scheduled to be concluded by the end of this year, no significant headway has
been made so far" (12.5.2000).
The IGC will need to decide on the extension of QMV. The Commission
under Romano Prodi is looking to expand QMV substantially to
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"become the rule not the exception" (Palmer, 2000, p. 2).
This is to prevent the Council becoming unable to make decisions, yet it also
entails a further transfer of sovereignty. Predictably, some member states
have voiced serious objections, among them the Nordic countries and Great
Britain. The introduction of more widespread QMV is linked to voting in the
Council. The weight of votes, currently heavily in favour of small countries,
needs to be addressed. The average size of applicants is smaller than the
current countries. Yet the smaller countries are reluctant to formalise a loss of
voting power. One suggestion is the introduction of a dual majority whereby
a vote has to be passed by the majority of population, as well as QMV.
The size of the Commission itself also needs to be limited. It is generally
agreed that the Commission should have no more than the current 20
members, not the possible 35 the current rules would imply62. The larger
memberstates have agreed to give up their second Commissioner, yet they
"have also made it clear that they will only give up their second
Commissioner if votes in the Council of Ministers are reweighted to reflect
population size more closely" (European Voice, 30.3.2000).
Even this proposal could still mean a Commission of 28 Commissioners. A
current proposal entails a Commission with senior and junior members, as the
smaller states are reluctant to give up the right to have a Commissioner.
The smaller countries are also set to lose influence in the EP. The Treaty
of Amsterdam limits the EP to 700 MEPs. Currently no mechanism has been
proposed to achieve this. The representation in the EP is also heavily in
favour of small countries, yet for some of the smaller countries the reduction
in MEPs could entail a problem of democratic representation. This
representation has also been raised in relation to the Commission. Some
voices have argued that the European electorate should elect, directly, the
62 28 countries with 1 Commissioner + 7 additional Commissioners from the larger member states
(Germany, Turkey, Italy, GB, France, Spain and Poland).
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Commission President. It is unlikely that this proposal will even be discussed
at the IGC.
The CAP presents a major budgetary problem. Given that most CEECs
have a substantial population still dependent upon agriculture, the attempt to
reform the CAP is crucial. The CAP consumes about half of the EU budget
and still relies, in part, on providing price support for farmers:
"The continued existence of compensation payments (albeit at levels less than
100% of full compensation for the price cuts) also raises doubts over the
ability of the CAP to be extended unaltered to Cyprus and the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe who are moving towards EU accession, given the
implications this would have for the EU budget" (Ackrill, 1999, p.21).
Agenda 2000 and the Berlin Summit in 1999 attempted to reform the CAP but
it did not go far enough. This may have been caused, in part, by protests of
farmers and the EU's farmers' lobby.
"Although the budget constraint was intended to force significant reform, the
actual outcome was a reform that can, at best, be described as minimal both in
depth and breadth" (Ackrill, 1999, p. 1).
The question of agricultural reform will need to be addressed before the
largest applicant country, Poland, joins. Poland still has a farming population
of over 4 million and would require significant payments from the CAP.
However, the poorest applicant countries, Bulgaria and Romania, add to the
problem with a farming population of over 1 million and 5 million
respectively. The question of how to deal with this issue has not yet been
addressed and it is unlikely that a quick solution will be found. Official
negotiation on agriculture starts in June 2000 with the 5 first wave countries.
European Structural Funds (ESF) reform poses further problems.
Agenda 2000 aimed to address the need to cut ESF spending for the current
member states to free funds for the Eastern enlargements. Yet even within the
EU disputes were prevalent. The main contention was between net recipients
and net receivers:
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"The richer members of the EU, led by Germany, have been pressing hard for
a reduction of their net contribution, while the poorer ones have tried to
preserve their positive balances" (de la Fuente & Domenech, p.13,1999).
This has led to a limitation of reform of the structural funds. Under
current eligibility rules, to have a GDP below 75% of EU average, all applicant
countries would receive full Objective 1 status. Objective 1, funded mainly
under the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), is the most
generous of the European Funds. Without some limitations on eligibility the
amount of money available for the EU budget, currently fixed at a maximum
of 1.27% of EU GDP, would have to be increased substantially. A limitation
of eligibility could be seen as providing second class membership to the
applicants, but as yet resistance to an extension of the budget remains strong.
There have been a number of estimates of the size of the budgetary
consequences. Baldwin, Francois and Portes estimate that the first wave
countries will be net recipients of EU funds of about 6.8 bn ECU, with Poland
receiving the largest transfer of 1.9 bn ECU. The Second Wave countries
would receive 7.9 bn ECU, with Romania receiving a net transfer of 2.6 bn
ECU (1997).
There are further problems, which will be exacerbated by Eastern
enlargement. The free mobility of labour, guaranteed by the Treaties, will not
easily extend to the CEECs. The cross border flows of workers, already
experienced in the border regions of places like Germany and Austria, has
been politically difficult to manage. The pressure of low-income workers
attempting to find a better life in the richer West will pose serious problems.
A theoretical paper by Hans-Werner Sinn predicts that the migration flow
would increase after enlargement with reversal occurring later (Sinn, 1999).
The question of migration has lead to a study being commissioned by the EU,
which concluded that the EU could expect 335,000 migrant workers from the
East (Sueddeutsche Zeitung online, 24.5.2000). The fear of this widespread
migration has, according to recent reports, led to Germany being unwilling to
124
sign the free movement provision for the applicant countries without a long
term transition period (The Scotsman, 24.5.2000). Consequently, the
enthusiasm in the EU for Eastern enlargement, despite contrary reassurances,
has noticeably dampened:
"For the truth about the European Union is that, in its principle projects, the
biggest of which is enlargement, the lack of enthusiasm for making progress -
or, indeed for cioing almost anything - is far from deafening than this latest
flurry of ministerial speeches" (The Economist, 20.5.2000).
External economic relationships focused on the attempts of the
applicant countries to create an environment of free trade, even though this
enthusiasm soon faltered, not least because of the reluctant reaction of
Western Europe. But the predominant issue for the applicant countries was
the eventual membership of NATO and the EU. NATO created the
"Partnership for Peace", and later admitted the front-runners, the Czech
Republic, Hungary and Poland. But the EU had problems coming to terms
with the new political geography. Even though the memberstates and
institutions expressed the wish to accommodate the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe (CEE), they nevertheless stalled from devising a binding
timetable.
The countries of CEE were initially enthusiastic to join the EU as fast as
possible. There was overwhelming public and governmental support for
membership, which was demonstrated by the official application of some of
these countries to join the EU very early on. This support did become less
pronounced as former communists returned to power, but the commitment of
the applicant countries to Western Europe was not questioned after the
changes in leadership. Public support has been relatively stable, though it has
been falling slightly, as can be seen in the March 1996 Eurobarometer (Central
and Eastern Eurobarometer, March 1996). The percentage of people in Eastern
Europe who would vote for EU membership in a referendum is still well
above 70% in all Europe Agreement countries, with an average of 90% for
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membership and only 10% against63. This large-scale support has, however,
been met with falling support for early membership within the political
system of these countries.
As the economic situation in Eastern Europe deteriorated and the
political situation became increasingly unstable, so the enthusiasm of the
countries of the EU became less noticeable. The West, struggling with a
recession, had to complete the Single Market in time and give the then
European Community a new direction with the Maastricht Treaty.
Additionally, there was internal disagreement about the future of the
European Union, which focused upon the perceived impossibility to deepen
and widen, simultaneously, the integration process. This problem was
aggregated by the institutional problems of the EU, which could only worsen
with further integration. This was perceived as especially problematic in the
areas of qualified majority voting (QMV) and in the additional languages
Eastern Europe would bring. Budget considerations also emerged, as first
estimates showed that neither the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) nor the
structural funds could cope with Eastern enlargement without increasing the
budget of the EU64 or reforming EU spending policies.
Furthermore, the political situation changed radically. The fear of
widespread ethnic conflict was sparked by the civil war in former Yugoslavia,
in the early to mid 1990s, as well as a number of conflicts in the former states
of the Soviet Union (for example the civil war in Georgia and the conflict of
Aserbaidschan and Armenia over Nagorny-Karabach). This made Western
organisations more reluctant to commit themselves in Central and Eastern
Europe, especially as the EU, and its defence organisation the Western
European Union (WEU), did not seem ready to cope with such problems.
Thus the EU created some limited aid programs, like the PTfARE
program, and otherwise focused its attention on the area of trade. Here, the
63 Using the graph Referendum on EU Membership on page 59 of the Eurobarometer (Commission,
1996).
64 For a comprehensive summary of budgetary issues see von Hagen and Kumar in their section B 2;
Budgetary issues (1996).
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so-called Europe Agreements were negotiated in 1991 with most of the
countries of Eastern Europe. These agreements are generally perceived as
being neither very extensive in scope (as they focus almost entirely on trade),
nor are they very liberal, where free trade is concerned. In particular there are
restrictions for access of Eastern European goods to the Common Market.
These restrictions concern so-called 'sensitive products', which reflect the fear
of Western Europe to be swamped with cheap wage goods, produced with
low environmental standards and distorted input prices. But they might also
reflect the producer's interests in some areas. In this, the EU has continued a
one-sided negotiation process, which has been applied to previous applicants:
"So far, the EU has endeavoured to retain the elements of the classical method
of enlargement in its approach to the CEECs. Once geopolitical factors
allowed, the CEECs were granted limited forms of association leading to freer
trade, though with major exceptions for sensitive products. This suggests that
the asymmetric characteristics of previous association agreements has not
changed significantly" (Preston, 1997, p. 209).
These restrictions are crucial as they concern mainly those products
where applicant countries have an extensive industry due to the allocation of
production facilities within the COMECON. There is also some scope for
'managed trade', i.e. trade restrictions, in other areas concerning competition
and stability considerations. This has not stopped trade increasing quite
dramatically and the restrictions might well lead to new sectors of
comparative advantage emerging, based on low wage and high skill
production. Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been more focused on those
countries most advanced in terms of transition and economic development
and Germany has invested most, especially in the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland. Furthermore, the cultural and political ties have also increased,
especially concerning the ties of the Visegrad countries with Germany. There
has been a dramatic increase in tourism, as well as some small scale cross
border trade and employment.
The EU has committed itself early to the eventual membership of the
Eastern European countries. This can be seen in every official paper published
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by the EU. For example, the "Conclusions of the Presidency" at the
Copenhagen Summit, as quoted in Baldwin, (1996), state:
"The European Council today agreed that the associated countries in Central
and Eastern Europe that so desire shall become members of the European
Union. Accession will take place as soon as an associated country is able to
assume the obligations of membership by satisfying the economic and
political conditions required."
But despite these positive commitments65, the EU has not been able to
advance decisively from its initial statements of will, nor from the crucial
White Paper, "Preparation of the Associated Countries of Central and Eastern
Europe for integration into the internal market of the European Union" and
its addendum. This sets out the will of the EU to accommodate the wish of the
countries of Eastern Europe to become memberstates (in the White Paper
itself) and sets out in some detail66 the preparations these countries have to
make to qualify for full membership (in the addendum). It does, however,
lack a timetable or any real objective measuring mechanisms which would
enable the countries of Eastern Europe to judge how far they have come in the
quest for membership. Thus, these countries have the choice between
implementing all or some of the measures the EU requires immediately, or
they could introduce the measures gradually. The immediate implementation
of these measures would be difficult, but would create a 'fait accomplit',
which would commit future governments and force the EU to react.
Gradualism could possibly make the transition less painful, and thus
politically more feasible, making the process of accession a more long-term
objective. This clearly shows a theoretical analogy to the question these
countries faced after the revolutions on whether to implement economic
reforms immediately using the 'window of opportunity' ('big bang'
approach) or whether to introduce them over a period of time to reduce
65 See also the Presidential Conclusions of the European Council, 9-10 December 1994 in Essen,
quoted in M. Mihalka (1995) "The Bumpy Road to Western Europe", p. 79.
66 To give a brief impression of the scope of the addendum, it encompasses 23 different sectors
covering issues like agriculture, transport, taxation, energy and environment.
128
hardship ('gradualism'). The theoretical debate on this issue will be discussed
in the next section.
The Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) face a
momentous challenge in the years to come. Not only have the radical changes
to their economic and political system, partially driven by accession
aspirations, created a number of problems, but they also need to prepare for
the accession to the European Union (EU), which almost all of these countries
aim to achieve. To become a member state of the EU is a difficult process in its
normal due course, but these countries also face tougher entrance criteria than
any accession countries before them. In particular the Copenhagen European
Council of June 1993 states that any of the CEECs could become a member
only:
"if they meet the following conditions:
- Stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human
rights and respect for and protection of minorities;
- The existence of a functioning market economy, as well as the ability to cope
with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union;
The ability to take on the obligations of membership, including adherence
to the aims of political, monetary and economic union"
(Agenda 2000, Summary and Conclusions).
These conditions are not easy to fulfil, as shown by the Commission's
rejection of half of the applicants initially67. These first wave applicant
countries, which are participating in accession talks, do not fulfil these
conditions completely. Rather they are seen as being able to almost meet these
conditions in the medium term, as long as sustained and strong efforts are
made. Thus, those countries, which started accession talks in the first wave,
are not expected to join before the medium term. The Commission states for
example that
"the initial round of accessions would not have any budgetary impact until
about 2002-2003" (Agenda 2000, Volume I).
^ Those countries accepted for accession talks in 1998 are the Czech Republic, Estonia, I lungary,
Poland and Slovenia, while Slovakia was rejected due to political criteria and Bulgaria, Latvia,
Lithuania and Romania were rejected due to the economic criteria.
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Accession is by no means automatic - rather, the contrary applies. The
CEECs are expected to prepare themselves in a number of ways for accession.
They are expected to fulfil the conditions almost completely. Most notably,
they are expected to transpose most68 of the acquis communautaire, the body
of law defining the EU, before accession, which also implies having the
necessary institutions as defined by the EU. This is mentioned repeatedly in
the Agenda 2000. For example, it is:
"imperative that full adaptation to the acquis by candidate countries be
realised as soon as possible. Indeed, too slow or inadequate adaptation could
create serious problems after accession" (Agenda 2000, Volume II).
The full adaptation of the acquis is made even more complicated by the
EU's continuing expansion of legal competence. This process has been linked
to a continuously 'moving goal post'. The latest development has been the
discussion to introduce a constitutional Treaty for the EU in the context of
enlargement:
"Work is already well under way on what may become an EU bill of rights. A
document called the 'Charter of Fundamental Rights' is being drafted by an
ad hoc convention of assorted EU grandees ... The idea of going further, to a
fully fledged constitution, appeals to visionaries who see it as a way of giving
more substance to the Union (The Economist, 22.7.2000).
This extensive list of reforms is reinforced by the EU's resolve to make
pre-accession aid and, indeed, accession itself conditional on the fulfilment of
an accession timetable of reforms:
"From 1998, reinforcement of the pre-accession strategy will be accompanied
by a move to make the granting of European Union assistance, particularly
financial assistance, to the applicant countries conditional upon their
implementing the programmes aimed at preparing them to meet the their
obligations as future Member States " (Agenda 2000, Volume II).
Some areas of the acquis are already seen as virtually impossible to fulfill and thus will probably be
excluded. These include, for example, some environmental and energy directives.
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Thus, applicants have to introduce a number of reforms over the next
few years, while maintaining, or creating, political and economic stability. A
number of reforms are needed in all the applicant countries, with some
having made more progress than others. Even the Commission admits:
"Assessments of the cost of the applicant countries' adoption of the whole
Community acquis ... show that it will be very considerable everywhere"
(Agenda 2000, Volume II).
In fact, some doubts remain whether these costs can be covered even with the
most generous outside assistance.
The adjustments will include reforming administrative systems in all
applicant countries, heavy investment and restructuring in sectors such as
environment, agriculture and transport, the adoption of Single Market
legislation, completion of structural adjustment, and the fight against crime,
while maintaining human rights.
Thus, an accession strategy must allow these countries to prepare for a
later accession in an optimal way, while taking account of certain constraints.
The applicants can choose to introduce all the reforms immediately (Big Bang
Now, BBN), they can introduce reforms consecutively (Gradualism, GRAD)
or they can choose to introduce reforms at the latest possible date (Big Bang
Tater, BBL). To understand the challenge the CEECs face, it is necessary to
analyse closely the conditions the European Union (EU) is setting for the
membership candidates. These have been stated in the Commission's
document, Agenda 2000. In particular the section "Summary and conclusions
of the opinions of Commission concerning the Applications for Membership
to the European Union presented by the Candidates Countries" sets out the
Commission's evaluation in some detail. This section discusses the ten CEECs,
which applied for membership, namely Bulgaria, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, the Czech Republic, Romania, Slovenia and Slovakia. Of
these only five are seen as possible members in the medium term, while five
are excluded from possible membership in the medium term. Even though
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the five Second Wave countries have now joined the negotiation, there is still
a long way to go.
The countries are judged on three criteria and an additional condition
concerning administrative capability, as detailed previously. The criteria are
political criteria, economic criteria and criteria on the ability to fulfil the
obligations of membership. The five countries, which are judged to be closest
to fulfilling the conditions laid out by the Commission, are Estonia, Hungary,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. The initial Visegrad country,
Slovakia, is the only CEEC, which does not manage to fulfil the political
criteria, while for Bulgaria and Romania, recent elections are seen as sufficient
progress towards fulfilling the political criteria. But both Bulgaria and
Romania are seen as not being able to fulfil the Economic or the Obligations of
Membership Criteria in the medium term, which Slovakia is seen as fulfilling.
Latvia and Lithuania are seen as not being able to fulfil, fully, the economic
criteria. Lithuania is evaluated as having serious problems to achieve the
necessary progress towards fulfilling the obligations of membership, which is
also true to a lesser degree for Latvia. It is important to note that all of these
criteria are seen as medium term goals. Thus, a country, which does not fulfil
the criteria at the present moment, which applies to most reforms, is
evaluated on the ability to achieve the criteria in the medium term. This
makes it possible for countries to achieve membership in the medium term, as
long as they put into place a sustained and major effort.
This also means that membership of those five countries mentioned as
being on the right path towards membership, still need to put into place
substantial reforms. Thus, membership is by no means automatic; rather it is
conditional on the appropriate behaviour of countries in the mean time. This
is emphasised at various points in the document. The present situation is thus
only judged on whether countries are making progress towards fulfilling the
criteria. This is the basis of the following table.
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Table 3.b.1: Fulfilling the criteria for membership
Political Economic Obligations Admin.69
Bulgaria Improving No No No
Estonia Yes Yes Yes No
Hungary Yes Yes Yes Yes
Latvia Yes Partially Partially No
Lithuania Yes Partially Partially No
Poland Yes Yes Yes Yes
Czech Rep. Yes Yes Yes No
Romania Improving No No No
Slovenia Yes Yes Yes No
Slovakia No Partially70 Yes Yes
All membership countries are judged, to differing degrees, on efforts to fulfil
the administrative condition.
It is crucially important to analyse each of these criteria in turn and
evaluate the reforms the CEECs must put into place before achieving their
goal of membership to the EU. Each of the criteria is sub-divided into a
number of areas, which are then sub-divided in broad sections concerning an
area of political or economic reform. Some of these sub-divisions overlap, as
they are necessary to fulfil a number of conditions. Some countries are judged
to fulfil some of the conditions already, while there are many reforms where a
sustaineci effort is deemed necessary. All of the countries are judged to have
failed to reform substantially in some areas. The following tables show the
scope of the reform effort and make it possible to understand the major
reforms involved, even for the most advanced countries. The political criteria
are summarised in Table 3.b.2.
69 The ability of the administrative system to enforce the other criteria is only a condition and thus
countries which fail this condition, are seen as prospective members. They do, however, need to put
into place major and sustained efforts to become a member in the medium term.
7() This refers to the possible introduction of restrictive price mechanisms, which is seen as a step
backwards.
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Table 3.b.2: Political Criteria (P)
Stability of institutions:
PI: guaranteeing democracy
P2: the rule of law
P3: human rights
P4: respect for and protection of minorities
The stability of institutions to guarantee certain aspects of a democratic
society is also linked to the relations these countries have with their
neighbours. A good or improving relationship with one's neighbours is seen
as essential as these countries might well end up sharing institutions within
the EU and it is of utmost importance to the EU to avoid being entangled with
nationalistic disputes which are so common in Eastern Europe. The political
condition is reminiscent of the criteria, which has been previously used to
reject Turkey, due to doubtful democratic credentials.
This condition has, however, been extended by a criterion judging the
progress these countries have made in the transition process, which also
includes the ability of these countries to compete with EU economies in the
medium term. These economic criteria are shown in Table 3.b.3
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Table 3.b.3 Economic Criteria (E)
El: Functioning market economy
Ela: Commitment to market-oriented policies
Elb: Privatisation of public sector
Elc: Liberalisation of prices




Elh: Pension/Social Security System Reform
E2: Ability to cope with competitive measures and market
forces within the Union in the medium term71
E2a: Commitment to economic transition in particular with
respect to land reform, privatisation, state firms and
emergence of a private sector.
E2b: Economic stability
E2c: Exporting industries
E2d: Banking and Finance Sector
E2e: Foreign Direct Investment
E2f: Trade and current account balance
Here, the different starting positions of the CEECs are becoming clear,
as some countries have made considerable progress, while some only started
serious reform efforts recently, notably Bulgaria and Romania. These
divisions become even more pronounced when these countries are evaluated
on their ability to be able to take on the obligations of membership in the
medium term. Here the effort and success of countries has differed widely,
which is not surprising as the Commission evaluates the countries on each
and every aspect of the acquis communautaire, (the body of law the European
Union has developed over the last 45 years), as well as their progress under
the Europe Agreements. It is important to note that the Commission, on
behalf of the member states, makes all these assessments. Thus, no appeal is
possible. The obligations under the Europe agreement are summarised in the
following table.
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Table 3.b.4: Obligations of Membership (O)
Ol: Obligations set out in the Europe Agreement
Ola: Right of establishment
Olb: National treatment
Olc: Free circulation of goods
Old: Intellectual property
Ole: Public Procurement
Furthermore, there is a wide range of reforms, which the applicants
must introduce in connection to the Single Market. These are summarised in
the following table.
Table 3.b.5: Obligations of Membership (O)
02: Implementation of measures essential to the Single
Market (White Paper)72
Q2a: Free circulation of goods
Q2b: Approximation of legislation
Q2c: Structures to implement legislation










There are other parts of the acquis, which also need to be addressed.
These are summarised in the following table.
7' Some of these measures overlap with El, as some of the conditions for a functioning market
economy are identical to conditions enabling a country to compete. If the failure of a country is stated
previously it is not repeated in this section.
Some of these measures overlap with Ol, as the measures in the Europe Agreement are only the
first step to 02. If a country has not managed to implement the Europe agreement in these fields, their
failure in the further reaching measures in 02 is not mentioned, as it is self-evident.
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Table 3.b.6: Obligations of Membership (O)
03: Progressive transposition of the other parts of the
acquis
Q3a: Education
Q3b: Training and youth
Q3c: Research and technological development
03d: Fisheries
Q3e: Small and medium enterprises















03u: Participation in the third stage of Economic and
Monetary Union
Q3v: Possible Participation in the EURO area73
03w: Justice and Home Affairs
Q3x: Common Foreign and Security Policy
The massive task these countries face is generally seen by the
Commission as having to take place before accession, with some exceptions.
The main exception is the environmental legislation, where the Commission
recognises the impossibility of achieving a comparable standard before
accession. The CEECs are thus required to put one of the most ambitious and
costly programs into place in the coming years. To be able to achieve this,
they need a capable and efficient administration - an area in which most
CEECs fall short. The administrative conditions are set out in the following
table.
7°
This is not a condition for membership.
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Table 3.b.7: Administrative Condition (A)
Al: Capacity of the legal system to put into effect the
principles of democracy.
A2: Capacity of the legal system to put into effect the
principles of the market economy
A3: Capacity of the legal system to apply and enforce the
acquis in practice
A3a: Applying the acquis effectively
A3b: Uniform application of Community law in the single
market
It is thus clear that the CEECs face a most daunting challenge. Not only
are they required to instigate far-reaching and costly reforms, they also
compete with each other to be among the first to gain entrance.
The scale of reforms is staggering. The applicant countries face a
process, which is as challenging as the transition they faced after the
revolutions. Yet there are qualitative differences between the accession
process and the transition process. Firstly, a large degree of transition has
preceded the accession process and the economic criteria of membership
imply a successful transition. But the accession process goes further. A
country needs to introduce a number of costly reforms, which offer little or no
benefit on their own. Rather, they can only be understood in the context of
accession. These reforms might even be in direct contradiction with the goals
of transition. Yet, they carry an important consequence. The EU sets the
reforms, as pre-conditions of membership. Thus, there is no option to omit
some reforms if membership is desired, driven by the perceived substantial
benefits of membership. Not only do the applicant countries see membership
as an important access route to Western markets, they see accession as the
fulfilment of aspirations to become part of the West, once again. This would
end the period of external control by Russia in the future of the CEECs, and it
is seen as guaranteeing the security of these countries in an uncertain world.
This is especially important in the context of the applicants' history,
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characterised by the major conflicts, which have shaken the political and
economic systems of Europe in the last centuries.
The problem, which has not been addressed sufficiently in past
literature, is the process by which these countries can link their aspirations to
the developments within Europe. In particular, it is unclear what policies are
optimal in the pursuit of EU membership. Transition economic theories can
be usefully applied to the accession process, yet they do not cover some of the
salient features present in the race for fast EU membership. The next chapter
of this thesis sets out a framework in which these questions can be addressed.
In particular, it develops a model of the accession process, which addresses
the questions posed by the combination of accession and transition.
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Chapter 4: The Model
a) Issue Definition
Since the revolutions of 1989 and 1990, ten Central and Eastern
European Countries have applied to join the European Union. The
Commission of the EU has grouped these countries into two groups,
according to their degree of readiness and preparation for full EU
membership (Agenda 2000). This grouping has been reaffirmed in the
progress reports, which were delivered in 1998 and 1999. The First Wave
includes the Central European Countries of the Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland and Slovenia, as well as Estonia. The Second Wave contains Latvia,
Lithuania and Slovakia, as well as the Balkan countries Bulgaria and
Romania.
The applicant countries lag far behind the economic and political level
of development of the current memberstates. Their GDP per capita is below
the level of the poorest Member State, Greece, and their democratic
institutions are in their infancy. The CEECs not only differ in comparison
with the EU, they also differ among themselves in geographical size,
population, and geographical location, including large countries like Poland
and Romania, and a number of small countries like Estonia and Slovenia. The
democratisation process has advanced, but Slovakia, Bulgaria and Romania
still face many problems. The economic situation also differs widely. While
some countries, like Hungary and Slovenia, have made a lot of progress in
terms of reforms already initiated and the achievement of a stable market
economy, other countries still lag behind, for example Bulgaria and Romania.
Those countries lagging behind face a long, and potentially costly, accession
process without the reassurance that, eventually, membership of the EU will
be achieved.
The EU has maintained a close relationship with the CEECs. The
Europe Agreements and the PHARE assistance programme have set a general
framework, as discussed in the previous chapter. The pre-accession strategy,
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which was detailed in Agenda 2000 in 1997, has been followed by the annual
Progress Reports in 1998 and 1999.
The accession requirements of the European Union are substantial.
The CEECs need to fulfil the so-called Copenhagen Criteria. They need a
functioning democracy, including democratic institutions and respect for
minority rights. There is also a need to be economically prepared for
membership, which includes a functioning market economy, as well as
having the ability to compete with EU competitors. The adoption of the
complete acquis communautaire before accession is generally seen as a strict
requirement:
"An important aspect of accession negotiations has always been the insistence
of the existing Member States that the applicant country should accept the
'acquis' - that is, the body of laws and rules which have been developed over
the years - without significant change" (Avery and Cameron, 1998, p. 32).
The Commission states that it is
"... imperative that full adaptation to the acquis by candidate countries be
realised as soon as possible. Indeed, too slow or inadequate adaptation could
create serious problems after accession" (Agenda 2000- Volume II-
Communication).
The accession criteria also pre-suppose administrative structures in the
applicant countries which enable the achievement of these goals.
As yet, no country fulfils these conditions. The most recent Progress
Report (1999) judged Hungary to be the most advanced. Latvia might move
into the First Wave and Slovakia, despite making some progress, is the only
country which does not yet fulfil the political condition. This demonstrates
that the acquis is wide reaching, complex and, in part, costly to implement.
There will be no immediate accession, but countries will join
over a long time period. The first accession could possibly take place in 2003
or a little later. But for some countries this is an open-ended process, which
might only be concluded by 2020:
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"The major question for the future, however, remained the timespan within
which the CEECs might expect accession to the EU" (Gower and Henderson
in Hencierson, 1999, p. 278).
The countries will not join in groups, or the announced waves, but
individually or in small numbers. The nature of this process poses problems
for both the EU and CEECs. As explained previously, one of the main
problems, for the EU, is a distinct need for institutional reform, which should
partly take place in the current year. Both the Common Agricultural Policy
(CAP) and European Structural Funds (ESFs) need to be reformed to take in
the CEECs, which are less developed than the current member states and
have a large agricultural sector. Other problems include East-West migration,
transnational pollution and trade issues which all have to be addressed before
accession.
The CEECs also face major economic and political difficulties, which
are the focus of this thesis. One of the main problems is that of Political
Feasibility. The CEECs need to maintain a political constituency for
membership in the accession process. Problems will be caused especially for
governments in those applicant countries which face a long accession process
and a costly readjustment.
Time Inconsistency also has to be taken into account, which describes a
commitment problem. The CEECs need to commit to a certain accession
process without reneging on promises of reform. The possibility to surprise
the population and markets creates an incentive to go back on previous
announcements which can jeopardise the accession process, especially when
this lack of firm commitment becomes expected by the economic agents.
Uncertainty is a further problem in the accession process. The accession
process entails a high degree of uncertainty about outcomes. This aggregate
uncertainty makes decisions about timing and sequencing of reforms
extremely risky and as the reforms are necessary conditions for membership
uncertainty, can endanger membership itself.
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The EU must choose how best to encourage accession while
considering the constraints detailed above. This requires that the EU uses
transfers in the best way to encourage the necessary reforms enabling
accession, while the CEEC governments must choose the best strategy for the
implementation of these reforms. The optimal way of preparing for accession
is, however, difficult to define. Economic models can be used to examine the
problems of Political Feasibility, Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty.
Analysis is then applied to the CEECs present situation and a policy
recommendation for the EU and the CEEC is made. Thus, the main thrust of
these models is to decide the optimal way of introducing the reforms
necessary for EU membership and how the EU can encourage this process.
To examine the accession process, an economic model is necessary to
be able to determine the interaction of the choices the CEECs can make and
the constraints they face. There is a distinct need to model a process, which
includes the most important aspects of the CEEC position, as well as EU
influence on this process. There are numerous models and literature
concerning necessary EU reforms, which assess the size and significance of
the EU problems, likely to occur after accession. Models and literature
concerning the impact of membership on the CEECs also exist, as well as
dealing with the general transition framework. There are, however, no
economic models and only a limited amount of literature dealing with the
process of accession. Economic models of transition economics can help, but
they overlook some of the salient features of the accession process. The
following section gives a more complete picture of the debate, which has been
conducted in the field of transition economics.
Since the fall of the communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe,
policy makers and economists alike have attempted to find the optimal
strategy by which to transform the planning system into a Western style
market-based economy. Even though a consensus exists as far as the goal of
transition is concerned, the actual method has been widely debated. This
debate has led to a division in the field of transition economics with some
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theorists favouring a "Big Bang" approach while others tend to favour
"Gradualism". The Big Bang approach proposes to introduce the necessary
reforms as soon as possible, using a "window of opportunity", while
Gradualism favours the introduction of the necessary reforms distributed
over a longer period.
While Western theorists and politicians have favoured the Big Bang
approach, the peoples of Eastern Europe have not shared this enthusiasm.
This has been demonstrated by the Eastern European electorate almost
unanimously returning former communists into government after the first
reforms had been introduced. A reversal of this trend is apparent in recent
elections, but this process has highlighted voter dissatisfaction with the
reform process faced by policy makers in the CEECs. Transition economists
have thus attempted to incorporate political constraints in their analysis to
ensure that transformation strategies are optimal even when political
constraints have been taken into account.
Most notably, various papers by Dewatripont and Roland^
highlighted these issues. They demonstrated that, under certain
circumstances, Gradualism maximises economic benefits, while being
politically feasible, whereas a Big Bang approach can be impossible to
implement or sub-optimal. They derived their result by demonstrating that
Gradualism is an optimal strategy if an option value of reversal exists.
Furthermore, they stipulated that a government could use "divide-and-
conquer" methods by introducing reforms over time.
To demonstrate this approach, Dewatripont and Roland (1996) use a
representative agent framework, modelling the effect of a number of reforms
on different sections of the population. Voters are split into three distinct
groups with different reforms affecting each group differently. This split is
somewhat arbitrary as one could split the voting population into any odd
number of groups. However, this would not crucially change the analysis and
^ See for example Dewatripont and Roland (1991, 1996) and Roland (1994) as discussed in Chapter
I.
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thus the three groups are chosen as they present the smallest possible degree
of mathematical complexity. The government will only implement a reform
strategy if a majority of voters supports this particular policy. This behaviour
of the government is based on the government's intention to remain in power
and effective lobbying by different groups in society, while altruistic motives
are disregarded. Voters only support reforms, which offer a direct benefit to
their group in each time period. By distributing reforms over time, the
government can control the negative effects so that only a minority votes
against the proposals. This minimises adverse publicity and disruption in
each period and, thus, all reforms can be implemented. In this framework, the
Big Bang approach is politically impossible as the majority of voters feel the
adverse effects. This assumes that voters are "myopic"; they only evaluate
present outcomes and not future gains or losses and no discounting takes
place. If voters are fully rational, the "divide-and-conquer" approach cannot
be implemented and the model thus relies entirely on a very limited view of
rationality in the form of the myopic voter.
The framework set up by Dewatripont and Roland, (1996) can be
adapted to incorporate the special circumstances which a country faces when
preparing for membership of the European Union (EU). In this context, the
reforms are synonymous with the adjustments of the economic system
required by the European Union. The necessary adjustments to prepare the
countries of CEE for the Single Market are set out in the White Paper
("Preparation of the Associated Countries of Eastern and Central Europe for
integration into the internal market of the European Union" and
"Addendum", 1995) of the Commission and cover a number of different
sectors of the economy. The Copenhagen Criteria and Agenda 2000, as
discussed in the previous chapter, detail further necessary reforms. These
adjustments can be seen as necessary conditions for accession, but their
implementation does not mean immediate accession, as membership will not
be attainable for a number of years (See for Example, Baldwin, 1995,
Executive Summary xvii-xviii). Thus, the process of accession can be regarded
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as a specific form of transition which must take account of political
constraints.
The political constraints of any given adjustment path are assessed by
using a model of voting behaviour adapted from Dewatripont and Roland's
"divide-and-conquer" model (1996, p. 10). This model has been extended to
incorporate the notion that voters are rational and consider future scenarios.
It, thus, removes the restrictions imposed by the myopic voter assumption,
which assumes extreme limitations on individual rationality. Furthermore,
the framework has been extended to model the problems which the CEEC
governments face in relation to Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty.
The model incorporates a positive benefit from membership to society
as a whole even if a minority is adversely affected. This benefit becomes
partially available during the period leading up to accession, depending on
the number of adjustments already implemented. The benefit to society as a
whole is assumed and thus open to debate, but there seems to be a good
argument that membership is beneficial to CEECs as a whole, while adversely
affecting some sections of society.
As these positive benefits only transpire when all reforms are
implemented, there is no option value of reversal as this removes the country
from the ultimate "trophy" of membership. There also has to be a benefit for
the current EU member states to ensure that the EU has an incentive to pursue
enlargement. Baldwin, Francois and Portes, (1997) estimate the effect from
membership as being an increase of income of 0.2% for the EU and 1.5% for
the CEEC775, under a conservative estimate. Under a less conservative
estimate, the CEECs gain much more with income increasing by 18.8%,
mainly due to an assumed increase in investment caused by a reduction in
Uncertainty. However, Rodrik warns in his discussion of the paper:
"... that the authors exaggerate the economic benefits of enlargement - wildly
so in the case of the CEECs - and ignore some of its costs" (p. 170,1997).
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By introducing a positive gain from membership, the model can be used to
determine an optimal strategy for the introduction of adjustment measures
necessary for accession to the EU, while taking account of constraints.
The models developed thus include a number of features, which
cannot be found in models of transition economies. The main assumption is
that the effect of membership is positive for both the EU and the CEECs. This
positive effect includes both political and economic elements. For the CEECs,
"Arguments in favour of joining the EU tend to be presented in terms of the
logic of historical precedent, geographical position and psychological need.
These are often reinforced by reference to expectations that membership will
bring substantial economic benefits ..." (Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson,
1999, p. 189).
This is a debatable point, but generally agreed in the literature. The EU's
benefits are mainly presented in economic terms:
"On balance, enlargement should be economically beneficial for the Union
because it is likely to lead to better performances ..." (Avery and Cameron,
1998, p. 141).
The effect of reforms, however, can be positive or negative. A positive
outcome might involve the macroeconomic reforms necessary for the
functioning of a market economy. Negative reforms might involve the
introduction of parts of EU legislation, for example, the environmental
standards. Reforms will also have a distributional impact, which is crucial for
the problem of Political Feasibility. In general, voters must have an overall
positive effect from the accession process, where future outcomes are
discounted, as they will vote against a process, which will deliver a negative
outcome.
There are prior benefits from the accession process, which can be
explained by trade and EU transfers. Reforms are interconnected, which
means that positive or negative complementarities exist between different
75 Their model excludes the Baltic States.
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reforms. As there is a benefit from introducing unanticipated changes, the
problem of Time Inconsistency can be observed. This benefit comes from
population adjustment to negative reforms, which are ultimately not
introduced. An example might be an adjustment by firms to anticipated price
liberalisation, which is then not carried out. A residual uncertainty of reforms
and membership not taking place is also included in the models, which can be
explained by changes in the international economy or the possible failure of
internal EU reforms. As previously noted, reforms are necessary conditions to
become a member of the EU, so no opt-out exists. A limited number of
reforms will only be introduced prior to accession if they are beneficial for the
majority of the population, as transition periods will be put into place for
some sectors76. The CEECs have to choose when and in what order to
introduce reforms. This means a strategy has to be chosen and sequencing
will be important. Within these parameters the EU and the CEECs have
certain choices.
The EU can determine some variables. These are mainly the size of
transfers and whether transfers are dependent on introducing reforms by the
CEECs. Even though the applicant can choose to use internal redistribution
to correct effects caused by the accession process, this will be limited by the
lack of public funds. The EU can choose between unconditional transfers that
the applicant receives without a punishment if reforms are not introduced.
Conditional transfers are tied to the success of the reform process and will be
cancelled if the process falters.
The variables, which are determined by the CEECs, are related to the
introduction of reforms and whether there exists a credible pre-commitment
to this process. The applicant's strategy is mainly linked to the speed of
introducing reforms. Under Big Bang Now (BBN), the applicant chooses to
introduce all reforms as soon as logistically possible. This would involve
introducing beneficial as well as costly reforms immediately. Big Bang Later
76 The most obvious sector will be environment, as the cost of introducing the environmental acquis
will be prohibitive. Certain parts of the environmental acquis could also be exempted.
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(BBL) on the other hand involves the introduction of all reforms as late as
logistically possible, i.e. immediately prior to accession. Under Gradualism
(GRAD), the applicant chooses to introduce some reforms immediately and
some prior to accession but it would also involve deferring some costly
reforms to the future.
A BBL approach would defer any costly payments to the future and
might avoid sunk costs in the mean time, in particular, in areas where the
economic policies of the EU are of doubtful economic merit for the Eastern
European countries or indeed for the EU members themselves. There is,
however, a problem of credibility and the applicants would be disadvantaged
in the accession negotiation, given the conditions the EU has set. Countries
could also miss a window of opportunity, which might make this policy
costly and politically unfeasible. When considering a BBL strategy, one is
struck by how far this strategy deviates from the advice given to the transition
countries. A BBL strategy postpones difficult decisions to a later date in time.
It is not necessary to have successful reforms to finance transfers, as there will
be substantial transfers from the European Union as soon as the applicant
countries become members of the EU. A problem might arise with
complementarity of reforms. If one reform is a precondition for another one, it
is impossible to enact all the reforms at the point in time of membership. This
would mean that some of the reforms would have to be enacted during the
accession negotiations.
But a problem arises with public support of a BBL strategy. Firstly, the
initial enthusiasm concerning membership might ciiminish over time. If such
a trend took place, the window of opportunity might disappear. Furthermore,
long term satisfaction of Eastern Europeans might be risked if there is a BBL
strategy. The first few years could prove painful, economically, if all reforms
are implemented at once, despite possible transfers of the EU. This could lead
to a negative image being attached to EU policies, which might be difficult to
change in the long term. David Phinnemore states that:
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"If CEECs are required to assume early on the more economically
burdensome elements of the acquis, such as environmental, health and safety
standards, fears of job losses could dampen enthusiasm for membership" (in
Henderson, 1999, p. 78).
Expectations and reality could diverge after membership and this might not
enable the creation of a solid constituency for the EU. This could mean that
the chances for re-election of the government leading the country into the
Union would be diminished. Thus, under a BBL strategy the commitment of
governments to EU membership could be Time Inconsistent and would not be
believed by the EU institutions and memberstates, the populations of Eastern
Europe and the international markets. That could prove disastrous for these
countries in the immediate future, as it would create a situation in which the
EU would not be willing to consider seriously the Eastern enlargement.
Furthermore, credibility of these countries, internationally, would be
seriously challenged. This would mean that government policies, like
exchange rate and price stabilisation, would become more costly and could be
aggravated by the lack of investment. The BBL strategy could thus undermine
political support in the long term and might make the immediate future more
painful. This could even result in membership becoming postponed,
indefinitely. The advantage of this approach is the availability of transfers,
through the mechanisms of the EU after membership and the avoidance of
costly reforms. But as membership itself becomes doubtful, this could prove
to be a costly reform path.
To address radically the problem of lack of credibility, the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe could introduce immediately most of the laws
and mechanisms of the EU. One has to note that this Big Bang Now (BBN)
strategy will not entail introducing all laws of the European Union now, as
this is impossible while not being a member. In particular, transfers from the
Union cannot be expected to be of a comparable scale and, thus, some of the
more costly programmes, like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and the
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European Structural Funds, would be impossible to implement.^7 These
transfer considerations will be particularly relevant to the discussion of "big
bang" versus gradualism in the context of preparation for EU membership.
Big Bang Now would use the window of opportunity given by the large-scale
support for EU membership and would constrain future governments, but it
might be very costly. A proponent of this approach is Messerlin as advocated
in his paper "The EC and Central Europe: The missed rendezvous of 1992?",
(1993). He contrasts the possibility of the most advanced applicants joining
the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) with the possibility that the
Visegrad countries
"... (and other CEECs once they are ready) would simply adopt the Treaty of
Rome for themselves and start exactly the same process of economic
integration as did the six founder states of the EC in 1958" (p.105).
He then concludes that the adoption of the Treaty of Rome is optimal for
these applicants.
Further support for a Big Bang approach comes from a paper by
Dehejia and Dwyer, "Output and Unemployment Dynamics in Transition",
(2000). The paper concludes that because workers will start quitting before an
announced reform,
"This can be taken as an argument against announcing a delayed reform: the
losses in output implied by the endogenous cycles would be attenuated if the
reform were unanticipated, i.e. announced at a given date and implemented
with immediate effect" (p. 16).
It is important to note that a BBN solution would entail a variety of
practical difficulties in the context of accession. Firstly, transfers between
CEECs would be politically controversial, as they entail sacrificing own
economic development for the potential net contributors. Structural Funds are
central for the European Union, but as there are no rich countries in Eastern
77 No analysis is made of the desirability of such programmes, as the assumption here is that with
eventual accession, the Visegrad countries have to accept these programmes and thus the associated
costs will have to be paid at that point in time.
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Europe, these funds would be impossible if not financed by the West. Some
EU programmes would be difficult to implement in Eastern Europe at the
moment. The CAP is an obvious example, which would be very costly and
would make the relatively large agricultural sector in the applicant countries
a 'black hole' for funds. Even if the CEECs have to adopt this policy with
eventual accession, it would be optimal to postpone costly reforms until such
a time. The institutional structure of the European Union could not be
implemented immediately either. A Eastern European Court of Justice would
have to refer decisions to the Court of Justice of the European Community as
it would otherwise mean that the law is interpreted differently in both parts
of Europe, creating difficulties when accession takes place. It is also
questionable whether the countries of Eastern Europe are economically ready
for the Treaty of Rome, despite offering tangible benefits from trade. There is
an argument that the CEECs need to protect some industries (a slightly
altered infant industry protection argument) and might need to maintain
inefficient industries in a variety of sectors, to keep levels of unemployment at
a low pain threshold and to maintain a political constituency for EU
membership.
Gradualism, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, seems to be the
approach which has been favoured up to now. Whether this is economically
optimal and will continue to be economically optimal is an unresolved
question. Gradualism, nevertheless, seems to be the most feasible option from
a political perspective, and might be least costly. The advantage of
Gradualism in the accession process is that this strategy offers the
opportunity to defer some of the more costly reforms until the future. This
overcomes some of the problems of the Big Bang strategies cietaileci above. In
particular, the gradual strategy can reap benefits of reforms now, while
maintaining a political constituency for reform. Furthermore, a country
pursuing a gradual strategy still demonstrates progress within the accession
process and thus eventual membership remains attainable.
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Yet Gradualism also shares some of the disadvantages of the Big Bang
Now strategy. A gradual approach can miss an important window of
opportunity, as some reforms are deferred. The EU might also judge a
gradual progress as being less decisive, creating the possibility for a country
to fall behind in the accession process. The gradual strategy also shares some
of the problems of the Big Bang Later strategy. In particular, the temptation
not to introduce costly reforms despite announcing them previously can
cause problems of Time Inconsistency. Furthermore, the Uncertainty
associated with such a strategy could further reduce welfare.
Thus, even though the aggregate effect of membership is positive, a
number of different strategies can be employed by the applicant countries to
attain membership. The beneficial impact of membership occurs in the future
so the population will not value it as highly as current benefits or costs. It is
thus necessary to use discounting when considering the present situation. As
reforms are positive as well as negative, they will affect different groups in
society to different degrees. Transfers, especially of the EU can increase the
benefits for all groups and thus reduce the problem of Political Feasibility.
The CEEC governments cannot commit credibly to a reform
programme, as any announced reform can be later cancelled. This can bring
benefits to the economy if people adjusted to a negative reform and then it
does not take place. Given this incentive, the people will not believe any
government announcements. But as the reforms are necessary for EU
membership, the population will forego the discounted benefit from
membership. Because the EU can make transfers contingent upon reforms, the
EU can credibly commit the applicant government to a reform programme.
Thus, we need to determine which strategy might be Time Inconsistent and
what size of EU transfers is necessary to credibly commit the applicant
government to a reform programme.
The choices of the CEEC and the EU are made in an uncertain world
and their choices will influence the likelihood of reforms and membership.
Both the EU and the CEEC government have to take into account the choices
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of the other to derive the best choice for themselves, but there will be a
residual uncertainty neither of them can influence. The resulting probability
of reforms and membership taking place will crucially depend upon whether
EU transfers are conditional or unconditional on reform programmes. But the
probability of reforms and membership taking place will also crucially
depend upon the incentive to go back on earlier announcements of the CEEC
government, potentially creating a Time Inconsistency problem.
These constraints are difficult to model. Yet they are essential to
capturing the current position of the applicant countries. Furthermore, they
have to be combined with the choices a CEEC government can make, in
particular, with the choice of strategy. The EU's influence on this process also
has to be included explicitly, particularly with respect to transfers. The
increasing complexity of such a number of variables makes it necessary to
model each constraint individually and to then combine the results. The
models are interconnected and many of the variables and choices influencing
the different constraints are the same. The best way to illustrate the
relationship between the different models is through diagrams. The following
diagram shows the relationship between the choice variables and political
feasibility.
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The reform strategy of the applicant country, as well as the level of transfers
of the EU, crucially influences Political Feasibility. Furthermore, the
interaction between the different reforms, i.e. their complementarity, will also
affect the distribution of costs and benefits and thus Political Feasibility.
The following diagram shows a similar interaction for the time
consistency constraint.
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Time consistency, again, crucially depends upon the interaction between the
strategy of the applicant and the transfers of the EU. Here, conditional
transfers are crucial, as they can commit a government to a time consistent
strategy by punishing deviation.
The following diagram shows the interaction between the choice variables
and Uncertainty.
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Diagram 4.a.3: Relationship between the choice variables and
























The diagram illustrates that the probability of membership taking place
depends upon the choices the EU makes, as well as a level of residual
uncertainty present in the accession process.
The following diagram combines the previous diagrams to illustrate
the scope of the modelling in this thesis.
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It is clear that all the models are interrelated and thus the results from each
model can be combined to give overall results of the interaction between
choice variables and the constraints.
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b) The Model
The model uses a representative agent framework adapted from the
Dewatripont and Roland, (1996) "divide-and-conquer" analysis. There are
three time periods, the Short Run (SR), the Long Run (LR) and Membership
(M) with associated time discount factors dgp=l, dpR and d]yp These
discount factors take a value between 0 and 1 and a low discount factor
signifies a high degree of future discounting or "impatience".
The model divides the voters into three population segments - type A,
type B and type C, affected differently by different events. There are three
events: Reform 1, Reform 2 and Membership. Reform 1 and Reform 2 are
associated with dummy discount factors. These dummy discount factors are a
modelling device to analyse benefits, which depend on the implementation of
these reforms. These benefits are multiplied by the dummy discount factor,
which takes a value below 1 as long as the reform is not in place and takes the
value of 1 in the period after the measure is implemented. Their respective
size depends on the importance of that particular reform. The reforms can
also be seen as groups of reforms enacted simultaneously and having
aggregate benefits or losses. In this model, the reforms are the adjustments an
economy has to make to attain membership of the European Union.
Membership is associated with respective benefits or losses for each
population type, with the aggregate benefit being positive.
This total effect of Membership is assumed to be positive (Al). This
assumption is open to debate and it will be later examined in the context of
the CEECs. Furthermore, prior benefits from Membership become attainable
in the model in the short and long run. These could be the effects of increased
trade or increased Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and these effects are
distributed unequally throughout the population. These prior benefits depend
on the number of reforms implemented, which is modelled by using the
dummy discount factors mentioned above.
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The total combined effect of Reform 1 (TR1) on all types is assumed to
be positive (A2), whereas the total combined effect of Reform 2 (TR2) on all
types is assumed to be negative (A3). These two assumptions are designed to
simplify the analysis. Any strategy, which postpones the second reform, can
only work if the second set of reforms has a negative effect in aggregate,
which is then discounted to the present. To postpone positive reforms only
means fewer benefits are obtained presently, while incurring costs for the
postponement. Thus, if there are only gains from reforms, implementing all
reforms as early as possible is always optimal, while if there are only losses,
implementing the reforms as late as possible is optimal. These scenarios
appear to be extremely unrealistic and thus the model discusses separable
reforms with distinctly different effects.
The initial analysis excludes the effect of any complementarity of
reforms. The model is, however, extended in the next section to include the
effect of complementary reforms. The extension of the analysis in the next
section will relax the assumption of independent benefits and losses from
different events. Complementarity of adjustments can also exist when the
benefits or losses of each adjustment depend on the prior or simultaneous
implementation of another measure. These cases certainly do exist in the case
of transition and justify examination in greater detail (See for example
Roland, 1994, and Friedman and Johnson, 1996). This model can be extended
to take account of these cases and it therefore offers a basic framework in
which these cases can be examined. This does not invalidate the conclusions
reached in this section, but rather, it suggests that each adjustment has to be
examined carefully to determine whether complementarities exist and there is
a need to expand the present framework, to consider these cases.
When discussing the validity of the assumptions, it is important
to note that this model does not actually assess the desirability of membership
of the CEECs, but takes this desirability as an a priori assumption, as given by
Al. The model does not examine a case for or against membership, but takes
the decision to join the EU as given, and then tries to find an optimal process.
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The assumption A1 reflects this consideration and, as such, is open to debate.
In light of the strong commitments of most Eastern European countries to
speedy accession to the EU, there seems to be a conviction within the CEECs
that this holds true and it is taken as the basis of the model. Furthermore,
there is a strong consensus among economists that EU membership would be
beneficial economically and politically for the CEECs (See for example Gros &
Steinherr, 1995, Part V, Chapter 16, 5.)
The EU's benefits are mainly presented in economic terms:
"On balance, enlargement should be economically beneficial for the Union
because it is likely to lead to better performances ... " (Graham Avery and
Fraser Cameron, p. 141,1998).
In general, the desirability of Eastern enlargement, under the right conditions,
is taken as a given. It can be argued that the EU would not enter into the
accession process if no benefits were present on both sides.
Assumptions A2 and A3 can be treated together as their main
emphasis is on a separability of reforms into two or more groups where at
least one of these groups contains reforms or adaptations to EU practice,
which convey a benefit to a majority of the population while another group
conveys a loss to the majority of the population. There is a good case to be
made for the existence of such groups of adjustments. The analysis could be
extended to incorporate a variety of groups; some which might then be
implemented together to avoid Political Feasibility constraints and thus
finding a feasible and optimal path. It is not possible to create such
complementarity of outcomes with only two groups of reforms and, as such,
this remains a possible extension of the model.
The model also includes a negative effect on one group of society.
While the exact size of this group is debatable, it is unlikely that no such
group exists. Vaclav Prucha notes:
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"The exaggerated restrictive policy of 1991-92 which has been conducive to a
steep decline of production and labour productivity has reduced the
resources available for investment and welfare purposes. This has slowed
down the restructuring of the economy, constrained environmental policy
and made it necessary to abolish some welfare measures from the past. At the
same time, however, the sums of money expended as support to the
unemployed show a continuous increase. Owing to the fact that the adverse
effects of economic depression have had different intensities in different
regions and in different professional groups, conditions have been created for
national, social and regional conflicts" (in Teichova, 1997, p. 35).
The costs and benefits of reforms, as well as Membership, are
summarised in Table 4.b.l:
Table 4.b.l: Cost/benefit Table of events
Type a Type B Type C
Reform 1 (R^) Gia G1B "L1C
Reform 2 (R2) g2A "L2B "L2C
Membership (M) m M -m
Both reforms are necessary conditions to realise the cost or benefit from
membership. Thus, an option value of reversal does not exist, as the aggregate
effect of membership outweighs the aggregate effect of both reforms.
The government can use three strategies to implement reforms - "Big
Bang Now" (BBN), "Big Bang Later" (BBL) or "Gradualism" (GRAD). These
strategies reflect a different sequence of reforms over time and are
summarised in tables 4.b.2 to 4.b.4. The Big Bang Now strategy consists of an
introduction of all reforms in the Short Run as seen in Table 4.b.2:
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Table 4.b.2: Time Table for "Big Bang Now" (BBN)
Discount factor: Event:
Short Run (SR) 1 Rl, R2
Long Run (LR) dLR None
Membership (M) dm M
where l>D]_j]^>Dfvj>0.
The Big Bang Later strategy introduces all reforms in the long run, which is
seen in Table 4.b.3:
Table 4.b.3: Time Table for "Big Bang Later" (BBL)
Discount factor: Event:
Short Run (SR) 1 None
Long Run (LR) dLR Rl, Rp
Membership (M) dM M
The final strategy, Gradualism, distributes the reforms over time. Reform 1 is
introduced in the Short Run, while Reform 2 is introduced in the Long Run
for the reasons mentioned above. This is shown in Table 4.b.4:
Table 4.b.4: Time Table for "Gradualism" (GRAD)
Discount factor: Event:
Short Run (SR) 1 Rl
Long Run (LR) dLR r2
Membership (M) dm M
In the Short Run and the Long Run, some prior benefits or losses from
approaching membership become available. These are calculated by using the
following formula:
P = adidp(loss/benefit from membership for each type),
where a is a proportion of loss or benefit from membership (l>o>0) and cb[
and dp are dummy discount variables taking values according to l>d^, d2>0
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if R} or R2 are not implemented and taking the values of d^,d2 = 1 in the
period after the reform is implemented. These prior benefits, applied to each
strategy, are summarised in table 4.b.5:















To calculate Political Feasibility for myopic voters, the sign of the sum
of all benefits and losses for each type in each period is taken. To examine
Political Feasibility with fully rational voters, the sum of all present and all
discounted future losses and benefits for each type in the long and short run
is taken. Thus, the Total Present Value is calculated by discounting future
events and adding them to the short run benefits and losses for each type,
whereas the Total Future Values treats the long run as if the economy is at
that stage already. Thus past losses and benefits are ignored as they can be
considered as sunk costs, i.e. Dlr=Dsr=1. Using this information we can
calculate all costs and benefits for each type in all periods, as well as Present
and Future Values, under each strategy.
It is important to note that these costs and benefits can contain
intangible costs and benefits as well as direct economic gains or losses. These
could include political benefits from increased security as well as some kind
of "feel good" factor. Furthermore, to determine Political Feasibility these
values can be expecteci losses and benefits when taking account of future
outcomes, as voting decisions will be taken on expectations of future
outcomes. These expectations can, to some degree, be seen as self-fulfilling
and they will thus play a crucial role in the accession process.
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c) Political Feasibility
To analyse the political constraints and optimality of each strategy we
can now construct tables showing the costs and benefits, or expected costs
and benefits, of each type. These tables are constructed by firstly entering all
direct gains and losses associated with each event for each type. These will
occur in different time periods under different strategies. These can thus be
ordered by using the timetables shown in the tables 4.b.2 to 4.b.4. We then
add the prior benefits or losses, according to Table 4.b.5. To calculate the Total
Present Value, we add the discounted future outcomes to the Short Run gains
and losses. These are discounted depending on the period in which they
occur. The Total Future Value is calculated by adding the discounted benefits
or losses from Membership to the Long Run gains and losses. The right hand
side provides a check on whether the sum in the appropriate row is positive,
negative or indeterminate. This is done for all types under each strategy as
seen in tables 4.C.1 to 4.C.3. The maximum benefit from membership, prior and
discounted values, is summarised as Km to show the loss which occurs when
a strategy defers implementation of adjustments until the future. Thus we can
construct the following tables for each type under each strategy.
The benefits and losses of all types under Big Bang Now are shown in
tables 4.c.l to 4.C.3:
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Where K=ad;[d2+dLRa+dM represents the total possible gain from
membership.











Table 4.C.3: Benefits/Losses under BBN for Type C
Benefits/losses Positive?
SR -Li (p-L2C"adl d2m X
LR -am X
M -m X







Similarly, the benefits and losses of all types under Big Bang Later are
shown in the tables 4.C.4, 4.C.5 and 4.C.6:

















































And finally, the benefits and losses of all types under Gradualism are
shown in tables 4.C.7 to 4.C.9:















































We can now establish conditions to determine whether a strategy is
Politically Feasible. Assuming that voters are fully rational, a strategy is only
Politically Feasible if the majority of voters will experience a positive outcome
in each period when all future outcomes are taken into account. Thus, we can
establish the first Political Feasibility condition:
Political Feasibility condition (I) (assuming fully rational voters):
Assuming fully rational voters, a strategy is Politically Feasible if, and only if, at
least two out of three types will experience a total positive present value ofall present
and future outcomes in any given period.
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When assuming that voters are myopic no future values are taken into
account. A strategy is thus only Politically Feasible if the majority of voters
have a positive outcome in each period. Thus we can establish the following
condition:
Political Feasibility condition (IIj (assuming myopic voters'):
Assuming myopic voters, a strategy is Politically Feasible if, and only if at least
two out of three types will have a positive outcome ofevents in any given period.
Given these two constraints we can determine which strategy is
optimal by calculating the total present value of each strategy across voters.
By comparing these values between strategies, we can determine under what
circumstances each strategy yields the maximum amount of economic
benefits. Thus, we can establish the following condition to determine
optimality:
Optimality condition:
A strategy is optimal if, and only if, the sum ofall present values across all types is
greater than the sum ofpresent values ofall types ofany other given strategy.
The Political Feasibility conditions both depend crucially on the
outcomes of each strategy for Type B, as the outcomes of any given strategy
are always positive for Type A and always negative for Type C, as one can see
when examining the tables 4.C.1 to 4.C.9. Type B thus represents the median
voter or swing voter.
By taking the relevant values from the tables, we can thus construct a
table of rational (I) Political Feasibility conditions. Type B is the important
group to examine, but we also need to look at different periods for each
strategy. For the Big Bang Now strategy, it is clear that we have to examine
the Total Present Value of Type B, as the Total Future Value is always
positive. For the Big Bang Later strategy we have to examine the Total Future
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Value. If the Total Future Value is positive, then the Total Present Value will
be positive, as this means adding a discounted positive value to a positive
value in the Short Run. For Gradualism, we need to examine the Long Run as
the Short Run is always positive. Again we will use the Total Future Value to
determine whether this strategy is Politically Feasible (I). Thus, we can
construct the following table of Political Feasibility (I) conditions:
Table 4.C.10: Rational (I) Political Feasibility Conditions
Feasible (I) if, and only if,:
BBN (3lB-L2B+Km>0
BBL GlB"L2B+dld2am+(dM/LLR)m>0
GRAD -L2B+d2am+ (dM/ LLR)m>0
This table demonstrates that as long as membership is attained, and there is a
positive effect of membership, all strategies are probably Politically Feasible,
when assuming rational voters. This is because a small loss from the second
reform is outweighed by gains to be made in the future and realised gains
before that. One should note that Big Bang Now is the strategy, which fulfils
the condition most easily, while the comparison between Big Bang Later and
Gradualism depends upon the size of gains from the first reform and the
dummy discount factor associated with the first reform.
Similarly we can establish the following table of conditions of myopic
(II) Political Feasibility. These come from those periods, which might be
negative, i.e. the short run for Big Bang Now and the Long Run for Big Bang
Later and for Gradualism.
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Table 4.C.11: Myopic (II) Feasibility Conditions




Assuming myopic voters, we can see that the feasibility conditions of
Big Bang Now and Big Bang Later are identical as they represent the same
process, only delayed into the future. This is irrelevant for the myopic voter
as, here, future outcomes are ignored in each period and thus the voting
condition is identical. These conditions are fulfilled easily, as long as the loss
of the second reform of Type B is not excessive. Gradualism is more
constrained in its feasibility (II). Here, a small loss of the second reform to
Type B, a high benefit from membership, a low importance of the second
reform and a high proportion of benefits from membership occurring prior to
membership, all contribute to Political Feasibility (II). This shows that the
Political Feasibility (II), assuming myopic voters, is more difficult to achieve
than the Political Feasibility (I), assuming rational voters, as the myopic voter
reacts inherently irrationally by ignoring future benefits. This means that if
voters are strongly myopic Big Bang Now might be the only strategy which is
feasible. Comparing the two conditions directly we can construct the
following table:
Table 4.C.12: Comparing Rational (I) and Myopic (II) Feasibility




This table shows clearly that it is easier to fulfil the Political Feasibility
condition (I) than to achieve Political Feasibility (II). In fact, any strategy,
which is feasible assuming myopic voters, will also be feasible for rational
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voters. Thus, finding a strategy which is optimal and Politically Feasible with
myopic voters, will be necessarily feasible with rational voters.
We can now determine how the strategies compare to each other. To
construct the optimality condition we will firstly sum the present value of all
types for each strategy, as demonstrated in table 4.C.13 to 4.C.15:


















By using these present values of outcomes from all types, we can create
the following pay-off table for all strategies which allows a direct comparison:
Table 4.C.16: Pay-off table for all strategies
Reform 1 Reform 2 membership loss of waiting
bbn tra tr2 Km 0
bbl DlrTRI dlrTR2 Km -(l-dld2)adLRm
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GRAD TRi dLRTR2 Km -(l-d2)adLRm
Where TRi=Gia+Gib-LiC anc^ TR2=G2A-L2B~L2C-
We can now compare the different outcomes from each strategy with
each other. Firstly, we will compare Big Bang Now to Big Bang Later. For any
strategy to be optimal in comparison to another, the sum of all present values
of all types of that strategy must be strictly greater than the sum of all present
values of the other strategy. Thus:
BBN will be optimal in comparison to BBL if, and only if,
TRi+TR2+Km>dLpTRi+dLpTR2+Km-(l-d;id2)a,dLpm
Cancelling the identical terms:
TRi+TR2>dLRTR1+dLRTR2-(l-did2)adLRm
This illustrates that the only way this condition will not hold is if either
the total effect of one reform is strongly negative or if the combined effect of
two negative reforms is relatively large in comparison to the loss from
waiting. Because of A2 and A3, this must mean that BBN is only not optimal
in comparison to BBL if the second reform is strongly negative.
Similarly we can compare Gradualism to Big Bang Later:
GRAD will be optimal in comparison to BBL if, and only if,
TR2+dRRTR2+Km-(l-d2)adpRm>dLRTR2+dLRTR2+Km-(l-d^d2)adRRm







We now have a negative term on the RHS and the discounted value of the
first reform, compared to the full value of the first reform on the LHS. The
only way this equation does not hold is if the first reform has a negative
effect. This means that given A2, Big Bang Later is never optimal in
comparison to Gradualism.
Finally we can compare Gradualism to Big Bang Now:
GRAD is optimal in comparison to BBN if, and only if,
TR}+dLpTR2+Km-(l-d.2)adLpm>TR^+TR2+Km
Cancelling the identical terms:
dLRTR2-(1"d2)adLRm>TR2
This is more difficult to interpret. As the second reform is negative (A3), this
condition holds only with certain parameter values. In particular, the
condition holds if there is a strong LR discount, i.e. if it has a small value, if
the effect of the second reform is relatively large in comparison to the benefit
from membership, if a relatively small proportion of gains or losses from
membership are realised a priori and if the second reforms are relatively
important in comparison to other reforms, i.e. the dummy discount factor is
low.
As Gradualism is always preferable to Big Bang Later in this model,
these are the conditions which will be the deciding factor in choosing between
Gradualism and Big Bang Now. Big Bang Later will always be disregarded,
because if Big Bang Later is preferred to Big Bang Now, Gradualism will
always be chosen. If Big Bang Now is preferable to Big Bang Later, the above
conditions apply, as they will determine whether Gradualism is optimal in
comparison to Big Bang Now.
Thus, we can conclude that in the given mociel, Big Bang Later will
never be chosen. In addition, there are conditions under which Gradualism is
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preferable to Big Bang Now and there are conditions under which the
opposite applies.
Given that the feasibility condition is harder to fulfil for Gradualism
than for Big Bang Now, are there circumstances under which Gradualism is
optimal and Politically Feasible? We can check this by using the feasibility
condition (II) as an identity and introducing it into the optimality condition.





Replacing TR2 with the identity TR2=(G2A-L2B-L2C) defined before:
dLR(G2A-L2B-L2C)-(l-d2)adLRm>(G2A-L2B-L2C)
Substituting the feasibility condition into the equation:
dLR(G2A-d2am-L2C)-(l-d2)adLRm>(G2A-d2am-L2C)
This can be rearranged to:
-(l-dLR)G2A-(l-dLR)(-L2C)-(l-dLR)(-adLRm)~(l-d2)adLRm>0
Multiplying by (-1) and rearranging yields:
(l-dLR)L2C>(l-dLR)G2A+(dLR+d2)adLRm
It is clear that, given certain parameter values, Gradualism will fulfil
both conditions simultaneously. Thus, "Gradualism" can be Politically
Feasible and optimal, notably depending on low discount factors and an
unequal negative distribution of the second reform. This does not mean that
Gradualism will always be favourable. Notably, if one looks at the three
assumptions, they will be crucial in determining whether Gradualism is
optimal. In particular, there must be a distinctive set of reforms which is
separable from the other reforms and which, in aggregate, has an unequal
negative effect on substantial parts of the population. The adjustment with a
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negative effect can be postponed into the future and will thus be discounted
at the present time. Furthermore, there must be a "price" which can be gained
(in this case benefits from membership), which is desirable for a majority of
the population. Examining the Political Feasibility Condition for
"Gradualism" highlights the conditions under which Gradualism will have a
political constituency. The Political Feasibility condition of Gradualism is
given by the following condition:
-L2B+d2am>d
This condition is likely to hold in the CEECs, as there are some reforms,
which will have a negative effect on most parts of the population without
being excessively negative for the swing voter. These could, for example,
include adapting the legal system to ELI standards, which would only carry a
limited administrative fee. This would then have to be paid for by taxes or
fees. The negative effects from certain reforms would, however, be
outweighed by the gain from membership, which is realised partially before
accession (am), even if it is discounted for the importance of these negative
reforms (d2). Thus, it seems that there are a number of reforms where the
feasibility condition for Gradualism might hold. This is even more likely if
one considers the strength of this condition. It does only refer to voters with
limited rationality. If people do take into account future outcoxries, then it is
much easier to implement these reforms as one approaches membership, as
the benefits from membership are taken into account to a stronger degree.
Thus Political Feasibility will be easier to fulfil if people are rational - making
the case for Gradualism stronger.
Examining the conditions for optimality of Gradualism gives an
indication for the circumstances under which the CEECs should pursue a




This condition holds if the second reform is substantially negative for the
population as a whole, while a strong future discount (dpp) and a low
importance of these reforms (d2) could serve to reduce the size of benefits
from membership, making Gradualism feasible. As there are substantial
negative adjustments, like the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and a
strong future discount, due to a substantial time period until accession, there
are good arguments for at least a limited form of Gradualism for these
countries.
In this context, an important extension of the framework will have to
be an assessment of uncertainties on this process. Uncertainty will be crucially
important in determining whether a strategy is time consistent, as well as
having an important impact on the realisation of prior gains and on the
various discount rates. The framework can be extended to include
uncertainties and the effect of uncertainty will be an important constraint on
policy-making. The possibility of CEE governments reneging on previous
announcements will also have to be considered. This commitment problem,
termed Time Inconsistency, can also be accommodated by the model and will
be examined later. The analysis of Time Inconsistency will be conducted in
section e) of this chapter, while Uncertainty will be examined in section f).
It is important to stress that in all the CEECs, there is evidence of
constraints, albeit being dissimilar in a variety of other characteristics. The
evidence for constraints will be examined in greater detail in Chapter 5.
Strong constraints could make gradual adjustment optimal and Politically
Feasible for all CEECs. The speed of these adjustments does, however,
depend upon the stage of the country at present, as this will crucially
determine Political Feasibility. The different time periods until these countries
are permitted to join and their prospective benefits from membership will
crucially influence Political Feasibility. For a more specific analysis of
countries for which gradual adjustments are optimal, the constraints in the
applicant countries have to be examined in more detail in Chapter 5.
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d) Complementarities
Within the context of economic reforms in Central and Eastern Europe,
it is essential to consider the interaction of adjustments. These cases certainly
do exist in the case of transition and merit further investigation (See for
example Roland, 1994, and Friedman and Johnson, 1996).
In particular one has to consider that adjustments introduced
simultaneously can have complementary effects. This would mean that a
reform could be more effective in conjunction with a second reform, as is
possibly the case when introducing price reforms and privatisation. There is,
however, the possibility that reforms will have a negative effect when
introduced simultaneously (for example by increasing uncertainty and
reducing distributive welfare). To model these interactions, the model
introduced in the previous section of this thesis will be used, with the
addition of a switching variable modelling complementarity. This variable
will be a factor, Cnm, which is multiplied with the total effect of a particular
reform, (TRn), as soon as the complementary reform (Rm) is introduced.
These factors can be positive or negative, reflecting the direction of the
interaction between the adjustments. Thus in the case of two reforms, R^ and
R2, the effect of R^ being introduced by itself is given by TR;[ whereas the
simultaneous introduction of Reform 2 will add or subtract a term C42TR1 to
this effect. Thus, the total effect will be (1 + C^jTRi- As the second reform is
similarly affected, the total effect of Reform 2 is (1 + C21JTR2, where C42 and
C21 are not necessarily equal or might even have different signs. Thus, we can
show the effect of complementarities in the following table:
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Table 4.d.1: Complementarities of 2 Reforms








This can easily be expanded to any number of reforms. Table 4.d.2
shows this for 3 reforms.
Table 4.d.2: Complementarities of 3 Reforms
Already in place or introduced If rx is If r2 is If r3 is
simultaneously: introduced introduced introduced
rx trx c2xtr2 c3xtr3
r2 cx2trx tr2 c32tr3
^3 cx3trx C23tr2 tr3
If any of these are not introduced simultaneously, then the effect can
easily be seen by deleting the relevant row and column. The focus will be on
the interaction of 2 reforms as this means fewer permutations, without losing
the analysis of the essence of complementarity in reform strategies.
Inevitably, these complementarities are difficult to measure. By their
nature, the effect of complementarities can only be determined ex post and in
comparison to a modelled counterfactual. However, for public policy
decisions, judgements have to be made ex ante. These will have to be based on
estimates, which are difficult to construct. However, modelling possible
complementarities can help to construct estimates. Furthermore, these
estimates can be used to give an indication of the sign of complementarities,
which will be crucial in determining the success of different accession
strategies.
Thus, when considering the different strategies we can summarise the
effects of each of the complementarities in the following table:
181














We can use this information to analyse the effect of complementarities
on Political Feasibility. Here we assume that the effect of the complementarity
on each population group will be determined by the same factor affecting the
outcome of the reform as a whole. This means that additional to the gain or
loss of each population group, the switching factor, when appropriate,
multiplied by the individual gain or loss will be added. We can thus construct
the table with the Rational Feasibility Conditions for each strategy78.
Table 4.d.4: Rational (I) Political Feasibility Conditions




Similarly we can establish the following table of conditions of myopic
(II) Political Feasibility.
m The gains and losses for each type are taken directly from the previous section, as well as the basic
form of the political feasibility conditions.
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Table 4.d.5: Myopic (II) Political Feasibility Conditions




Again the myopic feasibility condition is just a more stringent case of
the rational feasibility condition and will thus be analysed to determine the
effect of complementarity. As these switching factors can have different signs,
it is most appropriate to show their effect by using the following tables. In the
first table, the effect of complementarities on both BBN and BBL are analysed
as the effect on myopic feasibility is identical:
Table 4.d.6: Effect of Complementarity on Political Feasibility of BBN
and BBL, depending on the sign of the switching variable
Signed additional term Effect on Political
Feasibility
C12+; C2i+ G12+G1B+"G21+L2B+ indeterminate
Ci2+; c2r c12+g1B+"C21'l2B+ reinforced
Ci2"; C2i+ g12"g1B+-g21+l2B+ reduced
C12"; c2r g12"g1B+-g21"l2B+ indeterminate
A similar table can be constructed for Gradualism:
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Table 4.d.7: Effect of Complementarity on Political Feasibility of GRAD,
depending on the sign of the switching variable
Signed additional term Effect on Political
Feasibility
C12+; C2i+ -C2i+L2B+ reduced
Ci2+; C2r "C21"l2B+ reinforced
c12~; c21+ -C2i+L2B+ reduced
c12b c21~ "C21"l2B+ reinforced
We can thus directly compare the effect of complementarities on
Political Feasibility in the following table:
Table 4.d.8: Effect of complementarities on Political Feasibility
Effect on Political Effect on Political
Feasibility of BBN/BBL Feasibility of GRAD
Ci2+; C21+ indeterminate reduced
C12+; C21" reinforced reinforced
Ci2-; C2i+ reduced reduced
Ci2"; C21- indeterminate reinforced
It is thus clear that the existence of positive complementarities will
reduce the Political Feasibility of Gradualism, while having an indeterminate
effect on Big Bang Now and Big Bang Later. Similarly, the existence of
negative complementarities reinforces the Political Feasibility of Gradualism,
while having an indeterminate effect on Big Bang Now and Big Bang Later.
The effect of a positive complementarity on the first reform combined with
the effect of a negative complementarity on the second will reinforce Political
Feasibility of both Big Bang and Gradual strategies, while the opposite
combination reduces Political Feasibility for both types of strategy.
We can now compare the different strategies by using the previously
stated Current Optimality condition.
Current Optimality condition:
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A strategy is currently optimal if and only if the sum ofnil present values across
all types is greater than the sum ofpresent values ofall types ofany other given
strategy.
By using these present values of outcomes from all types we can create
the following pay-off table for all strategies, which allows a direct
comparison79:
Table 4.d.9: Pay-off table for all strategies
BBN BBL GRAD
Reform 1 tri dlrtri tri
Reform 2 tr2 dLRTR2 dLRTR2
complementarity c12tr1+ dLR(c12TRl+ dLR(c21TR2)
c21tr2 c2itr2)
membership Km Km Km
loss of waiting 0 -(l-dld2)adlrm -(l-d2)adLRm
We can now compare the different outcomes from each strategy with
each other. The same factors will apply as in the previous section with the
addition of the variables expressing complementarity. As these can have
different signs, each of the four permutations will be discussed in turn.
Firstly, we will compare Big Bang Now to Big Bang Later. For any strategy to
be optimal in comparison to another, the sum of all present values of all types
of that strategy must be strictly greater than the sum of all present values of
the other strategy. Thus:
79 These terms, with the exception of the effect of complementarities, are taken directly from the
previous section and will be later used to compare the optimality of the different strategies.
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BBN will be optimal in comparison to BBL if, and only if:
TRi+TR2+Km+Ci2TRi+ C2^TR2>
dLRTRl+dLRTR2+Km+dLR(c12TRl+ c21TR2)"(1"dld2)adLRm





We can summarise the effect this variable will have in the following table80:
Table 4.d.10: Effect of Complementarity on optimality depending on the
sign of the switching variable; BBN over BBL
Signed additional term Optimality of BBN
over BBL
Ci2+; C2i+ (l-dLR)+(C12+TR1++ C21+TR2") small, indeterminate
Ci2+; C2r (l-dLR)+(C12+TR1++ C21-TR2-) small, reinforced
Ci2"; C2i+ (l-dLR)+(C12-TR1++ C21+TR2-) small, reduced
c12~; c2i" (l-dLR)+(C12-TR1++ C21-TR2-) small, indeterminate
Similarly we can compare Gradualism to Big Bang Later.
GRAD will be optimal in comparison to BBL if and only if:
TRl+dLRTR2+Km+dLR(c21TR2)-(l-d2)adLRm>
dLRTRl+dLRTR2+Km+dLR(c12TRl+ c21TR2)-(1"dl d2)adLRm
This assumes (as in the previous section) that the first reform has a positive effect, while the second
reform has a negative effect. This assumption will also be used when constructing tables 4.d.l I and
4.d. 12.
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We can thus construct the following table:
Table 4.d.11: Effect of Complementarity on optimality depending on the
sign of the switching variable; GRAD over BBL
Signed additional term Optimality of GRAD
over BBL
Cf2+; C2i+ "dLR+c12+TRl+ reduced
Cf2+; C2i" -<lLR+Cl2+TRl+ reduced
Cl2"; c21+ "dLR+c12"TRl+ reinforced
c12"; c2i" -dLR+Cl2+TRl+ reinforced
Finally we can compare Gradualism to Big Bang Now:
GRAD is optimal in comparison to BBN if and only if:
TR^+dpRTR2+Km+dLR(C2iTR2)-(l-d2)adRRm>
TRi+TR2+Km+Ci2TRi+ C21TR2




This gives us the following results:
Table 4.d.12: Effect of Complementarity on optimality depending on the
sign of the switching variable; GRAD over BBN
Signed additional term Optimality of
GRAD over BBN
ci2+; c2i+ -C12+TR1+-(l-dLR)+(C2l+TR2-) Reduced
c12+; c21- -C12+TRi+-(l-dLR)+(C2i-TR2-) Strongly reduced
C12"; C2i+ -Cl2"TR1+-(l-dLR)+(C21+TR2") Strongly reinforced
Ci2"; C21- -Ci2-TRi+-(l-dLR)+(C2i-TR2-) Reinforced
We can now use these results to summarise the effect of
complementarity on the current optimality of each strategy:








c12+; c21 + small,
indeterminate
reduced reduced
c12+; c21- small, reinforced reduced strongly reduced




We can thus determine the effect of each possible combination of
complementarities.
In the case of both switching variables being positive, indicating the
reinforcement of the effect of both reforms, the case for Gradualism is
weakened. As both reforms depend in their magnitude on each other, a Big
Bang strategy becomes optimal for a larger range of parameter values. The
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decision between Big Bang Now and Big Bang Later depends on the
magnitude of each effect and is thus indeterminate.
If the effect of the first reform is reinforced while the second reform has
a smaller effect, the Big Bang Now strategy becomes clearly optimal for a
larger range of parameter values than both the Gradualism and the Big Bang
Later strategy. The optimality of a gradual strategy is strongly reduced,
making the case for a Big Bang Now strategy much stronger.
The opposite does, however, apply when considering a reduction in
the magnitude of both reforms signified by a negative switching factor for the
first reform and a positive switching factor for the second. Here, Gradualism
clearly becomes the better strategy, both in comparison to Big Bang Later and
to Big Bang Now. The Big Bang Now strategy also becomes less optimal in
comparison to Big Bang Later - further strengthening the case for a more
gradual approach.
Gradualism also becomes optimal for a larger range of parameter
values when the effect of the second reform is increased, while the effect of
the first reform is reduced. In this case the magnitude of the change is not
quite as large but Gradualism still comes out as a clear favourite. The
optimality of Big Bang Later compared to Big Bang Now is indeterminate, but
due to the small scale of the effect, it is unlikely that Big Bang Later will be
optimal for a larger range of parameter values, due to the likely size of the
other variables, as discussed in the previous section.
This applies to all the results. Thus, Big Bang Later is unlikely to
become the optimal strategy, due to complementarities. But the case does
alter when Big Bang Now and Gradualism are considered. Here, the
optimality depends mainly on the effect of the second reform on the pay-off
of the first reform (C12). If the effect is positive, the case for Big Bang Now is
reinforced, while a negative effect reinforces Gradualism. The effect of the
first reform on the pay-off of the second reform (C21) only serves to reinforce
or reduce this result.
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Thus, complementarity plays a vital role in determining the optimal
strategy of introducing reforms. If the reforms need to have complementary
reforms introduced to be successful, the case for a Big Bang Now strategy is
reinforced. This could be the case when considering the creation of a legal,
economic and social framework, which might be necessary for any other
reforms to be successful. If the effect of complementarity does, however,
reduce the gains from the first, successful reforms, Gradualism is an optimal
strategy for a larger range of parameter values. This might be the case when
the introduction of reforms will create a great deal of uncertainty and
unemployment in a number of sectors or possibly if a large degree of taxes
have to be raised to introduce a particular reform.
To assess the effect of complementarities on political feasibility and
optimality we can use the following table:
Table 4.d.14: Effect of Complementarities on Political Feasibility and
optimality of all strategies
c12+; c21+ ci2+;
c2r




























reduced reinforced Reduced reinforced
When interpreting the result of this table it is necessary to discuss, in
turn, the case of each different combination of the direction of
complementarities. The analysis will concentrate on the comparison of
Gradualism to Big Bang Now, as the case for Big Bang Later is weak due to
190
the very low range of parameter values which could possibly make this
strategy optimal.
When both switching variables have a positive sign, the case for Big
Bang Now is strengthened, as the range of parameter values for which this
strategy is optimal becomes larger, while the effect on Political Feasibility is
indeterminate. Simultaneously, the possibility for Gradualism to be Political
Feasible is reduced.
The case for Big Bang Now is also reinforced when the first switching
variable is positive while the second one is negative. Here, the Political
Feasibility of this strategy is also reinforced, but it is interesting to note that
Gradualism also becomes Politically Feasible for a larger range of parameter
values.
The situation is very different for the opposite direction of the
complementarities. Here, Gradualism becomes optimal for a larger range of
parameter values, while the Political Feasibility of Gradualism is reduced. But
at the same time Big Bang Now also becomes less Politically Feasible.
When both switching variables are negative, the case for a Gradual
strategy is unambiguously improved. The strategy becomes optimal and
Politically Feasible for a larger range of parameter values, while the effect on
Political Feasibility of Big Bang Now is indeterminate.
Thus the effect of complementarity is important for both Political
Feasibility and optimality but one has to consider the effect of each particular
reform to assess the degree and sign of the interaction to determine whether
Gradualism or Big Bang Now is the better strategy.
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Chapter 4: The Model
e) Time Inconsistency
The accession countries face a difficult process in which they have to
maintain a political constituency for membership. They need to introduce a
large number of reforms in light of the constraints they face. The introduction
of reforms is reinforced by the EU's resolve to make pre-accession aid, and
incieed accession itself, conditional on the fulfilment of an accession timetable
of reforms:
"From 1998, reinforcement of the pre-accession strategy will be accompanied
by a move to make the granting of European Union assistance, particularly
financial assistance, to the applicant countries conditional upon their
implementing the programmes aimed at preparing them to meet their
obligations as future Member States" (Agenda 2000 - Volume II, Method, B).
As such, the applicants have to introduce a number of reforms over the
next few years, while maintaining or creating political and economic stability.
A number of reforms are needed in all the applicant countries, with some
having made more progress than others have. Even the Commission
acknowledges that the
"Assessments of the cost of the applicant countries' adoption of the whole
Community acquis ... show that it will be very considerable everywhere"
(Agenda 20000 - Volume II, III).
An accession strategy must allow these countries to prepare for a later
accession in an optimal way, while taking certain constraints into account.
The applicants can choose to introduce all the reforms immediately (Big Bang
Now, BBN), they can introduce reforms consecutively (Gradualism, GRAD)
or they can choose to introduce reforms at the latest possible date (Big Bang
Later, BBL). This section establishes a theoretical basis for pursuing a given
strategy, on the basis of the Time Inconsistency constraints these countries
face.
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In particular, this section deals with the problem of commitment,
which will have important consequences for the benefits from any strategy.
The Time Inconsistency problem arises when a government has the possibility
to relinquish an earlier promise. In this particular case, the government can
decide to announce an accession strategy and then introduce the reforms at a
different stage than was announced previously. This results in a surprise
reaction of the economy, which expected the announced reforms and adjusted
accordingly. If the economic agents have perfect foresight they will adjust to
this development and adjust to the expected outcome. The government has,
however, the advantage of moving later in the game and can thus attempt to
cheat on the expected strategy. The problem of Time Inconsistency was
highlighted in connection to the conduct of monetary policy by authors such
as Barro and Gordon (1983). The wider application of Time Inconsistency to
government policy is based on pioneering work done by Persson and
Tabellini (1992,1994 and 1997).
Thus, there is a need to analyse which reform strategies are likely to be
time consistent and which face a serious problem to follow a pre-announced
time path. The analysis shows that all accession strategies face problems of
Time Inconsistency, which can only be solved when introducing punishment
by an outside agency, which in this case is the European Union. This
punishment can take the form of making pre-accession aid contingent upon
the fulfilment of a reform timetable, which is, indeed, the approach suggested
by the Commission in Agenda 2000. This would be further reinforced by the
signal function of any such aid to private investors. The granting of reform
contingent aid could signal progress and thus attract a higher level of FDI.
Gradualism can be the optimal strategy but it can only be implemented when
accompanied by a sufficient punishment by the European Union, contingent
upon the fulfilment of a pre-announced timetable of reforms.
It should be noted that there are other potential possibilities for an
accession country to pre-commit to a particular accession strategy. In
particular, the government can commit by staking its own future on the
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success of an accession strategy within the internal political arena. This is
similar to the reputation and credibility effects highlighted in connection to
monetary policy (See, for example, Backus & Driffil, 1985). However, in part
there will remain a large potential for Time Inconsistency in the accession
process as governments can attempt to utilise the inherent uncertainty of
transition. One of the most credible commitment mechanisms will be a
personal commitment by influential actors in the accession process. If a
commitment is based on personal belief, as has been the case for some of the
actors in CEE, it can be potentially credible. Furthermore, for certain policies
there is the possibility to delegate policies to an independent agency, similar
to an independent central bank. This has been done, for example, in relation
to privatisation, notably in Germany where the Treuhandanstalt was
established to privatise the state-owned industries of East Germany. This is
similar to delegating monetary policy to an independent central bank, where
in general the positive effects created by credibility outweigh the problem of
inflexible policy (See for example the discussion by Rogoff (1985) and
Lohmann (1992)). However, the accession process is a multi-subject process at
the heart of the legislative powers of the state. Thus, delegation of the process
as a whole is not feasible without undermining the democratic fabric of the
CEECs. The Time Inconsistency described in this section focuses on the
interaction between the EU and the CEECs, in particular the role of transfers.
The theoretical discussion does not claim to cover all aspects of Time
Inconsistency. Rather, it attempts to capture a crucial aspect of the accession
process - the attempt to commit to a strategy for an uncertain accession
process, taking into account the influence which the EU can have on this
constraint.
To discuss all possible strategies, we need to establish the benefits and
costs of each. Thus, to define the optimal strategy we have to calculate the
following equations:
IBBNt = ZGgBNt + £LBBNf
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ZBBNf = IGBBNf + £LBBNf
ZBBLt = ZGBBLt + £LBBLt
ZBBLf = ZGBBLf + £LBBLf
ZGRADt = ZGGRADt + ^GRAD4
IGRADf = ZGGRADf + £LGRADf
Here, the sum of all strategies is expressed in terms of benefits (B) and losses
(L). The superscript t stands for a "true" strategy where the announcements
are fulfilled, while superscript f stands for a "false" strategy, involving the
relinquishing of a promise. This means a reform is announced and then not
actually carried out at the pre-announced time. In the case of BBN and GRAD,
an announced reform is not put into place until a later date, while BBL
involves introducing a reform before it is expected.
We will first demonstrate which strategy will be chosen when time
consistency is not taken into account. The government tries to maximise the
benefit of accession by choosing the accession strategy, which will produce,
on balance, the greatest gain. The gains are the benefits of each event suitably
discounted, while the losses come about by deferring strategies to a later
point in time. The following table shows the benefits and losses for each
strategy, discounted according to the period in which they occur. This table is
taken from the previous section and will be applied to the problem of Time
Inconsistency, later on in this section.
Table 4.e.1: Pay-off table for all strategies
Reform 1 Reform 2 membership Loss of waiting
BBNt Rl r2 Km 0
BBLt dLRRl dLRR2 Km -(l-did2)adpRm
GRADt Rl dLRR2 Km -(l-d2)adLRm
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There are three time periods, the Short Run (SR), the Long Run (LR) and
Membership (M), with associated time discount factors dsp=l, dpR and djyj.
These discount factors take a value between 0 and 1 and a low discount factor
signifies a high degree of future discounting or "impatience". There are three
events: Reform 1, Reform 2 and Membership. Reform 1 and Reform 2 are
associated with dummy discount factors (d^and d2). Prior benefits from
Membership (am) become available in the short and long run, depending on
which reforms are in place. Membership is expected, so a discounted benefit
also accrues (djypn).
Benefits, which all strategies have in common, are summarised by Km
(Km = F{d^,d2,ot,dpp,d]y[,m}). A delay of reform will result in a loss from
waiting, which depends on whether one (GRAD) or both (BBL) reforms are
delayed (-(l-d2)adLpm and -(l-d^d2)adLpm, respectively). The total effect of
Reform 1 (Rl) is assumed to be positive, whereas the total effect of Reform 2
(R2) is assumed to be negative. These two assumptions are designed to
simplify the analysis. If the second reform is positive, deferring until the
future is unnecessary as it only means that the benefit will be discounted
GRAD and BBL do not, however, necessarily follow from a negative second
reform, as the postponement will result in some costs.




We need to distinguish between the effect of announced and fulfilled
expectations to address the question of Time Inconsistency. The variables
affecting this constraint are given by the relationships:
-Yl(Rla-Rl) and Y2(R2a"R2)
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Rla and R2a take the value Ri and R2 respectively when the associated
reform is fulfilled, while they take the value 0 when the expectation is not
fulfilled. Ri and R2 are the total effects of Reform 1 and Reform 2
respectively, where the second reform is assumed to be negative. This means
there is a positive benefit from announcing a reform, which is then not
fulfilled. The benefit from "cheating" will only occur in preparation for the
reform. Thus, a reform, which is carried out earlier than expected, will not
yield this benefit.81 The following table shows the sequencing of reforms
under each true and false strategy.
Table 4.e.2: Difference between true and false strategies.
SR LR
GRADt Rl r2






For GRAD^ one could also choose to introduce Ri and R2 in the first
period. This, however, would be exactly equivalent to BBNt, which is
dominated by GRADt , as demonstrated previously.
The cheating for BBL could also take the form of introducing BBN, but
as GRAD is optimal, as shown earlier, it is better to introduce an unexpected
Gradual strategy. For BBL^ one could also choose to introduce R} and R2 in
the first period. This, however, would be exactly equivalent to BBNt, which
has been shown to be dominated by GRADt. There are no surprise benefits, as
the expectation is for a later introduction, with no adjustments taking place.
^' Even if the possibility of this kind of benefit is included, the relative punishments of the different
strategies are unaltered. BBL would then need to be punished by A = p + yj.
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Similarly, the BBN strategy involves emulating the gradual strategy
while trying to cash in on changed expectations. Thus, only the second reform
is postponed. BBN^ is more complex. It would involve introducing both
reforms in the second period. This would realise both surprise benefits for
both reforms in the first period. Thus the following condition needs to be
satisfied to determine that the false strategy dominates any other false
strategy:
Rl>dLpRf.+YiRi-(additional loss from the postponement)




This condition holds in general, which is demonstrated in the numerical
example, introduced later on in this section82.
Thus, we can show the benefits and losses of each strategy, excluding
those benefits and costs which all strategies have in common.
Table 4.e.3: All benefits and losses of the different strategies.
BBNt BBNf GRADt GRADf BBLt BBLf
loss of X -(l-d2) -(l-d2) -(l-d1d2) -(l-did2) -(l-d2)
waiting
(LR)





R1 R1 X X R1
Reforms
(LR)







X -Y2r2 X Y1r1 X X
(SR)
We can, therefore, establish the identities for the "false" strategies:





The actual parameter values in this surprise function vary from reform
to reform. Due to the breadth of reforms required by the EU, the functional
form needs to be suitably general to incorporate any possible benefit from
relinquishing an earlier promise. The general form means that any benefit
from "cheating" which is positive can be taken into account. This can, for
example, take the form of an inflationary bias, as the EU requires the full
liberalisation of trade and prices, while pressing for stable prices as well.
Governments might be tempted to let inflation run higher than expected for a
while, to cushion the contractionary effect these liberalisations can have. It
could also take the more general form of encouraging FDI by establishing a
reputation as an early entry candidate and, once the investment has occurred,
slowing down the pace of transformation. A further example would be the
announcement of strict budget controls on state firms. This would lead to a
drive towards more efficiency, as well as encouraging mobile workers to
move. Once this has happened, it might not be in the interest of the state to
close those factories, which have not met the strict constraint, as these are
often large industries with a substantial amount of non-mobile workers. Thus,
there are various examples of Time Inconsistent reform announcements in the
accession process. If those concerned and the markets realise that a strategy is
Time Inconsistent, they will try to adjust to a strategy which they judge to be
realistic. It can, however, be the case that any accession strategy is judged to
be Time Inconsistent. An example might be when a government acts contrary
to any guideline of the EU, while still maintaining that they want to be a
member in the near future, which arguably has been the case for Slovakia.
Thus, the issue of time consistency is crucial in determining whether a
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strategy will actually be carried out or whether it is announced to reap the
benefits without intending to actually pay the price.
Gradualism will be Time Inconsistent if the benefit from the true
strategy is outweighed by the false strategy, i.e. if, and only if:
IGRADf>IGRADt





The RHS of this equation is negative, provided the long run discount factor
and the gain from cheating are together larger than 1, this condition has to be
fulfilled. It is thus likely that GRAD is Time Inconsistent. We then need to
examine the other two strategies to see whether they are Time Inconsistent,
even though they are not optimal83.
Big Bang Now will be Time Inconsistent if the benefit from the true
strategy is outweighed by the false strategy.





The RHS is positive, but relatively small. The RHS must be positive as the
discount factor is smaller than 1. It will be relatively large as the discounting
GRAD is not optimal when directly compared to the "false" strategies. This hinges crucially on the
surprise reaction of economic agents. These strategies are however not feasible, as the economic agents
in the economy will foresee this temptation and thus will not react accordingly.
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is outweighed by the additional effect of cheating. Thus, BBN is also Time
Inconsistent, which leaves BBL as the only alternative.
Big Bang Later will be time inconsistent if the benefit from the true







As the RHS is positive and the LHS is negative, this demonstrates that BBL is
always Time Inconsistent under the circumstances modelled in this
framework.
Thus this analysis shows that all accession strategies are Time
Inconsistent. This could mean that accession itself becomes doubtful if there
are reforms, which are seen as a necessary condition. Thus, it is necessary for
an outside agency to enforce a time consistent strategy by introducing a
punishment, the effect of which will be shown in the next section.
To address this problem of Time Inconsistency, it is necessary to
transfer some control to an outside agency. In this case the EU has an interest
in enforcing a time consistent strategy by making pre-accession aid contingent
upon the fulfilment of a pre-announced timetable. The EU is a credible
enforcer as it is in the EU's self-interest to enforce a credible strategy and the
punishment mechanism exists in the form of pre-accession transfers84. In this
model there will be a parameter p, which is set by the EU. This will result in a
punishment of -P1R1 and P2R2 if either reform is announced but put into
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place at a different time. As this cheating is apparent in the short run, this
punishment does not need to be discounted. We can introduce this




To analyse the effect, we will introduce the punishment into time consistency
conditions and then solve for the punishment parameter. Note that the
greater sign has been switched for an equality as now it is establishing a
necessary and sufficient condition for time consistency.




For BBN we get the following time consistency condition:
-(1 +y2"dLR)R2+P2R2=(1"d2)adLRm
p2=(l-d2)adLR(m/R2)+1+Y2-dLR
And finally for BBL:
(l"dLR)Rl"PlRl="(l"dl)d2adLRm
The EU could further enforce time consistency by operating a clearinghouse by which a fixed sum
of transfers is distributed to all accession candidates according to the progress they have made. This
would mean that they would also have to compete against each other to obtain these funds.
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Pl=(l-d1)d2adLR(m/Ri)+l-dLR
These values are difficult to evaluate. But running through two short

















One can see that GRAD needs a substantial punishment to be enforced,
which turns out in most cases to be a multiple of the actual reform benefits or
losses. BBN needs the least amount of enforcement and BBL is somewhere in
between. Thus, to enforce the optimal strategy of Gradualism, the European
Union has to make a substantial amount of pre-accession aid contingent upon
the fulfilment of reforms. If the EU would want to enforce either BBN or BBL,
GRAD is optimal, as demonstrated earlier.
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a smaller amount of punishment would be necessary. These strategies are,
however, not optimal and even here some punishment is needed to ensure
that these strategies are time consistent.
This analysis supports the basic premise of the Commission, which is
recognised in Agenda 2000:
"In most cases, a gradual process of adaptation of candidate countries to the
acquis would appear to be the only realistic path, given the complex character
of the process, its costs, and the need to alleviate related adjustment strains.
The bulk of this effort should be deployed during the period leading to
accession, when progress could also be linked to the further gradual opening
of the Community markets" (Agenda 2000- Volume II, Part III: Conclusions,
7).
The analysis has however shown that all accession strategies are Time
Inconsistent. This has very important implications for the accession process.
In particular, it is necessary to assess whether the process includes a strong
incentive for applicants to keep to their announced accession strategies. This
has been taken into account by the European Union, which makes the
accession and pre-accession aid conditional after 1998, thus creating an
effective punishment mechanism. The European Union does, however, need
to make sure that this gradual accession strategy is actually backed up by a
substantial and credible punishment schedule, as otherwise, Gradualism
might turn out to be Time Inconsistent, while a sub-optimal process, such as
BBN or BBL, might not be.
86 GRAD is optimal, as demonstrated earlier.
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f) Uncertainty
Uncertainty has been a notable problem in transition economies since
the revolutions of 1989 and 1990 swept the old system from power:
"Communism's demise destroyed the political barriers dividing Europe and
shattered Eastern European economic structures including trade agreements.
Integration and reconstruction are under way, but the outcome is still
uncertain" (Baldwin, 1994, p. xv).
The Uncertainty concerns not only the structure of the Eastern European
countries but also their relationship with the EU. Richard Portes states an
example among many:
"Political and economic uncertainty will severely restrict our direct
investment there [Central and Eastern Europe] for a considerable period"
(1993, p. 13).
In a sense the whole field of transition economics developed in response to
the uncertainties involved in changing a formerly planned economy with an
authoritarian government, to a market economy with a democratic
government.
We will begin by modelling the choice of the Central or Eastern
European (denoted by EE) applicant country. It is important to note that the
modelling in this section uses linear welfare functions. As a result, the
resulting solutions are often boundary or corner solutions. While a linear
welfare function does not capture all the complexities of the accession
process, it is nevertheless sufficient for the purpose of this model, namely to
determine the interaction between the choice of the CEECs and the choice of
the EU. The welfare function is initially linear in the choice variable, as
endogenised Uncertainty is only introduced in the next section. The resulting
analysis can, thus, not determine the optimal choice of the applicant. Rather
the solutions to the equations determine the boundaries of the problem.
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Welfare, in a world without uncertainty, will be defined by the following
equation:
WEE = dR + dM + XM + (l-d)(l-o)R
Where R is the sum of reform benefit and losses, M is the discounted
benefit from joining the EU and A.M represents a transfer from the ELI to the
applicant country. The reforms R are a necessary condition to join the EU and
the benefits and losses associated with membership will only occur when the
reforms actually take place. If the reforms take place, the dummy d will take
the value 1, while it will be 0 when the reforms do not occur. (l-cr)R is a
surprise variable, where a (a > 0)87 is a choice variable of the applicant
country. R anci M are dependent upon the reforms being introduced,
otherwise they all take the value 0. X (X > 0)88 is the choice variable of the EU
representing a transfer factor while a is the choice variable of the applicant
representing a surprise policy decision for the economy. The surprise to the
economy as a whole comes from the government deciding to change policy
after adjustments by the economy as a whole have taken place. Consequently,
the government is tempted to announce policy and then to change direction
to benefit from adjustments without incurring the actual cost of the policy.
The reforms will be initiated if the benefits from doing so are larger
than the benefits of cancelling the reforms. Thus:
87 The bounding of the variable ensures that the applicant country cannot derive more benefit from
"cheating" than R. The applicant can however credibly commit by, for example, entering financial
agreements which could ensure a value higher than 1, which suggests a loss, rather than gain, being
associated with no reforms.
88 The bounding ensures that the EU cannot extract transfers from the applicant. At the extreme, the
EU will transfer nothing while it can either transfer a fraction or a multiple of the benefits from
membership of the CEEC prior to accession.
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R + M + XM > XM + (l-a)R
R + M > (l-a)R
M > -cR
a > -M/R
This boundary shows under which circumstances the introduction of reforms
will be beneficial to the applicant. Only if the surprise variable is substantially
negative will there be a benefit from not introducing the reforms. As the
surprise variable is bounded to be positive (a > 0), reforms will always be
more beneficial than no reforms.
We will now turn to the choice of the European Union (EU). The
welfare function is given by:
WEU = dfM - XM
Welfare for the EU, in a world without uncertainty, in case reforms take place,
will be determined by the following equation:
WEU = fM-XM
While no reforms yield the following result:
WEU = -XM
The factor f (f > 0)89 represents a weighting on the benefits of the CEECs
which reflects the benefits for the EU as a whole. The reforms will be initiated
as long as the benefits from doing so are larger than the benefit of cancelling
the reforms. Thus:
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fM - XM > - XM
Thus:
fM > 0
Thus, for the EU, the introduction of the reforms in the CEEC will be more
beneficial than the cancellation of reforms as long as there are positive total
benefits for the EU associated with membership. This is independent of the
transfer variable but a 0 transfer clearly maximises the functions as long as
membership is beneficial. However, for the EU to engage in the process,
membership has to be ensured to obtain any benefits. Furthermore, even if
membership happens, f > A, has to be fulfilled to obtain positive benefits for
the EU. This point is discussed in detail, later. It has to be noted that other
benefits could accrue in the run up to accession, for example gains from trade.
However, the benefits identified here relate directly to the accession process.
Trade will take place whether accession takes place or not and thus will not
influence the negotiation position of the EU.
Combined welfare (Wl), in case the reforms happen, is thus
determined by:
Wl = R + M + AM + fM - AM
Wl = R + (1 + f)M
In case the reforms do not happen, the combined welfare function (W2) is:
W2 = AM + (l-a)R - AM
W2 = R-aR
89 The variable is bounded above 0 to ensure positive benefits of the EU from membership of an
applicant country. This can represent economic as well as political benefits and arguably it is the reason
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Reforms will be beneficial if the combined welfare associated with the reforms
is larger than the combined welfare associated with no reforms. This will be
true as long as the following equation is satisfied:
W1 > W2
R + (1 + f)M > R - aR
(1 + f)M > - aR
a > - (l+f)M/R
Thus the only circumstance under which the reforms are less beneficial than
no reforms is a very large positive effect occurring when the reforms do not
take place. As the variable is bounded, in this simple case reforms will always
be better than no reforms.
We will now introduce uncertainty (a) into this model, a is the
probability that a reform happens while (1-a) is the probability that the
reform fails. In this section, this probability is determined by exogenous
factors. In the next section of this chapter we will incorporate the choices of
the economic agents and their influence on overall success or failure of the
reform process. However, in the case of factors exogenous to the model
determining Uncertainty, we can see that the general welfare functions are:
WEE = a[ R + M + AM] + (l-a)[kM + (l-a)R]
WEE = aR + aM + akM -aA.M - a(l-a)R + kM + (l-a)R
WEE = aR + aM - aR + aaR + kM + R - aR
WEE = R + aM + aaR + kM - aR
From this welfare function for the Eastern European applicant we can see that
the only negative term is related to the surprise variable, which is in part
offset by the same term, reduced by the uncertainty factor. Thus, a low
the EU will accept any new member in the first place.
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surprise value will increase welfare. In addition, the positive benefit from
membership is reinforced by the transfers from the EU.
Similarly, we can now establish the welfare function of the EU under
uncertainty.
WEU = <x[fM - A.M]-(l-a)A,M
WEU = afM - aA.M- + aXM
WEU = afM - XM
A positive M will yield a positive welfare when f is larger than X if there is no
uncertainty, while welfare is negative when the reverse applies. If this
condition is applied and as long as welfare is positive, no uncertainty will
maximise the welfare function. We can assume that the EU would not get
involved in the process when this results in a negative welfare for the EU.
Thus, we will assume that the benefits to the EU will be positive in further
discussions. This means that f must be larger than the transfer variable.
Differentiating both functions with respect to the choice variables determines
the boundary condition for the welfare functions. Beginning with the
applicant country:
dWEE/dcr = aR - R = (l-a)*(-R)
The boundary value for the welfare function turns out to be at the value when
reforms take place with certainty, i.e. a = 1. At this point the effect on the
surprise variable is indeterminate. For any other positive probability of
reform happening, as given by the bounds, a low surprise factor, i.e. high
surprise effect, will maximise the applicant's welfare as long as the reform has
a positive outcome.
We will now determine the boundary condition for the EU:
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dWEU/dA, = -M
The border solution of the welfare function for the EU is given by WEU = -M.
If M is positive, maximum welfare implies that A = 0, i.e. that no transfers take
place. The corner solution occurs when M = 0, when transfers are
indeterminate. As explained before, we assume that M is positive. This would
imply that no transfers are optimal, which is not surprising, given that in the
model in this section transfers can not be used to enforce a positive outcome
for the EU as there is no conditionality attached to the transfers.
If we now combine the welfare functions, we get the following result:
W = R + aM + aaR + AM - aR + afM - AM
W = R + aM + aaR - aR + afM
Maximising combined welfare, we get the same result as when maximising
the welfare of the applicant country. Namely, for any positive probability of
reform happening with the exception of the corner selection when reforms
happen with certainty, a low surprise factor, i.e. high surprise effect, will
maximise the applicant's welfare as long as the reform has a positive
outcome. However, Uncertainty is crucially influenced by the behaviour of
the economic agents, the EU and the applicant. The next section will thus
incorporate the influence of the agents' behaviour on overall Uncertainty. In
other words, the decision of the economic agents will be endogenised.
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Chapter 4: The Model
g) Endogenised Choices
Building on the previous section, we will now endogenise the decisions
of both players. The previous section assumes that the probability of reform
success is determined by exogenous factors. However, realistically the
behaviour of the economic agents, the applicant and the EU, will affect the
outcome. In this section, it will be shown how aggregate Uncertainty in the
accession process is related to transfer payments from the EU and to
unanticipated policy changes. For this purpose, the model introduced in
previous sections will be extended to endogenise the probability of reforms,
and membership. Two players, the EU and one applicant country, will
determine a choice variable each, which will impact on each other. The EU
chooses to set a transfer payment while the applicant country can choose to
create an unanticipated policy change, which by itself would be welfare
enhancing. The decisions of both players will impact on aggregate
uncertainty. Namely a high transfer and a low policy surprise value will
increase the probability of a reform taking place. A higher surprise value (1-
ct)R will thus increase the chance of reforms not taking place. Similarly, a
higher transfer TM will increase the chance of reforms taking place. Thus a
high X and a high a will increase the probability of reforms taking place,
while a low X and a low a decrease the probability of reforms taking place.
In this section, the difference in definition between aggregate and
residual uncertainty is important to bear in mind. While either the EU or the
CEECs cannot influence residual uncertainty, aggregate uncertainty depends
on policy choices made by these actors. Aggregate uncertainty is the level of
uncertainty for the actors in the economy as a whole, while the CEECs and the
EU can, in part, trade off their choices against each other's choice and residual
uncertainty. The remaining economic actors have to take aggregate
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uncertainty as a given. Aggregate uncertainty is thus a combination of
residual uncertainty and the choice of the EU in terms of transfers, as well as
the choice of the CEEC to relinquish on a pre-announced accession strategy.
This will be endogenised in the model and a reaction function for both
players will be derived. Included in this will be a residual level of uncertainty,
which will be important in the later analysis. The equilibrium in the model
will occur when both players incorporate each other's reaction functions.
Thus an equilibrium value of the surprise variable, as well as an equilibrium
level of transfer payments, can be derived.
Due to the complexity of the results, the equilibrium levels are
analysed by using a numerical simulation. The numerical simulation will also
be used to make welfare comparisons. This simulation shows that transfer
payments and the surprise variable, as well as residual uncertainty, will
determine the level of aggregate uncertainty. Furthermore, it shows that
variables such as the value of reforms itself, the benefit of membership and
the differential of accession benefits between the EU and the applicant
country, all influence the outcome and will have differing effects on different
variables. The analysis covers a situation in which the reforms are costly as
well as one in which the transfer payments are conditional on the success of
reforms. The introduction of aggregate Uncertainty in this section results in
the welfare functions becoming quadratic and an optimal choice for the
applicant and the EU can be derived.
To capture this effect we will use the following equation to calculate
the probability that reforms take place:
X = ^P
and
(1 -X) = (1-Acrp)
where (1 is a residual probability that the reforms take place (1>P>0). This can
be seen as a probability influenced by outside factors such as the global
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economic climate, the economic climate within the applicant country and the
political processes which might influence the decisions of the applicant
countries.
Given that the choice variables are part of aggregate uncertainty, the
formula introduced above will be reintroduced into the welfare functions of
the applicants. This expands the current linear welfare functions and they
become quadratic in the choice variable. Thus, the optimal choices of the
CEECs and the EU can be obtained by differentiating the welfare functions
and then setting the derived reaction functions against each other.
As before, the boundaries of the choice variables are given by:
X > 0 and a > 0
This means that there will always be a positive probability associated with
reforms taking place. There can however be 'overkill', i.e. a % larger than 1.
This will occur when both players try to overcompensate for the possibility of
reforms not taking place. Here, reforms will happen with certainty, i.e. y = 1.
We will begin with the decision of the applicant country. The welfare
function is given by
WEE = R + yM + yoR + - gR
Substituting y = A.gP
WEE = R + (kop)M + (XgP)gR + A.M - gR
WEE = R + XofiM + (^a2p)R + XM - gR
To determine the reaction function of the applicant country, we differentiate
by g.
dWEE/dG = kpM + 2^gPR - R = 0
G (2A-PR) = - kpM + R
G = -M/ (2R) + 1/2A-P
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We can now explore the extreme cases. If the applicant country has the
perception that there will be no EU transfers, the above equation takes an
infinite value. Due to the boundaries this means that a = 1, i.e. the policy
surprise value becomes 0. The same result applies to a perceived residual
probability of 0 of reforms not taking place. A high benefit of membership
and a low value of reform increase the policy surprise value.
We will repeat the process for the EU. The welfare function is given by:
WEU = XfM - XM
Substituting y = A,ctP
WEU = Xg[3fM - XM
To determine the reaction function of the EU we differentiate by X.
dWEE/dk = opfM - M = 0
o = l/pf
The same result as for the applicant applies to the residual uncertainty that
reforms might not happen, whereas the effect of f will depend on whether f is
a fraction or a multiple. We can now derive the equilibrium.
To determine the equilibrium solution for the equilibrium amount of
transfers, we now put the separate solutions together:
a = -M/(2R) + l/2A.p
Substituting a = 1/pf
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1/pf = -M/(2R) + l/2A,p
2/pf = -M/R + 1/A.p
2A,/f + A-PM/R = 1
^ (2 + fpM/R) = f
X = fR/ (2R + f(3M)
We can see that the equilibrium level of transfers is increased by a
higher reform value, decreased by a higher benefit from reform and increased
by a low residual probability of reforms taking place. This effect mirrors the
result from the equilibrium policy surprise value. In both cases the effect of f
will depend on f being a multiple or a fraction.
We can now determine the equilibrium levels of welfare.
The welfare function of the EU is given by:
WEU = taipfM - A.M
Substituting a = 1/ pf
WEU = A.M - XM = 0
The equilibrium outcome will thus always result in a zero welfare for the EU.
This is a startling result. It suggests that the EU is indifferent between starting
the accession process and not entering it in the first place, indicating that the
applicant can extract maximum benefit.
Combined welfare (W) will thus be the welfare function of the
applicant.
The welfare function of the CEEC is given by:
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WEE = W = R + XapM + (Xa2P)R + XM - aR
Substituting X = fR/ (2R + fpM) and a = 1/pf
WEE = R + fRpM / pf(2R + fpM) + (fpR2/p2f2 (2R + fpM)
+ fRM/(2R + fpM) - R/pf
The actual influence of the variables on the size and direction of the choice
variables is difficult to determine. We will thus use a numerical simulation
which will be explored later.
Finally, we can derive the aggregate possibility that reforms will take place.
X = A.CTp
Substituting X = fR/(2R + fpM) and a = 1/pf
x = yf = R/(2R + fpM)
Again, we will use a numerical simulation to show the effect of changes in the
variables, in determining aggregate uncertainty.
For this section, numerical examples have been constructed. The actual
spreadsheet with the different calculations can be found in Appendix A. The
numbers do not represent actual estimates, they have merely been chosen to
examine the trends in the solutions for the choice variables.
The boundaries which are set up within the model, namely X > 0 and cr
> 0, will not always be met by the crude figures. By excluding those results
which exceed these boundaries, as well as only using results yielding 1 > x ^
0, we can make a meaningful analysis of the figures. As stated before, the EU
217
would choose not to get involved in the process if EU welfare is negative90.
Thus, negative welfare results of the EU can be ignored. The results, which
conform to these conditions, will be the ones used in the analysis to maintain
consistency with the model.
We will firstly examine p. The residual uncertainty p influences %
negatively, i.e. the larger the residual uncertainty, the lower is total
uncertainty about reform outcomes. P has an inverse effect on the surprise
variable and on the transfer variable. The larger is P, the lower is a. This
means that the policy surprise value increases as the residual probability of
reforms happening increases. Transfers decrease as the residual probability of
reforms happening increases. Thus the more probable a reform's success is,
the lower transfers will be. The policy surprise value for the applicant is high
and the resulting aggregate probability of reforms happening is low. This will
reduce aggregate welfare.
When examining f, the results are similar, f has an inverse effect on the
surprise variable and on the transfer variable. The larger is f, the lower is a.
This means that the policy surprise value increases as the benefit differential
between the applicant and the EU increases. Generally f is estimated to be
relatively large, as indicated by many papers (see for example Baldwin,
Francois and Portes, 1997). Transfers decrease as f increases. Thus the higher
the differential of membership benefits, the lower transfers will be. The policy
surprise value for the applicant is high and the resulting aggregate probability
of reforms happening is low. This will reduce aggregate welfare.
Finally, we will examine the relationship between M and R. We can
clearly see that to obtain meaningful results, M must be substantially bigger
than R. The larger this differential becomes, the lower the transfer variable
will be and total transfers fall. As a result, there will be a lower aggregate
probability that the reforms happen and welfare will decrease.
00 It can be assumed that in such a case both the EU and the CEEC would not be involved in the
process, as they are both rationally forward looking. The welfare of both associated with this process
would thus be 0.
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We will now examine the case of costly reforms being necessary for
membership. Instead of using R, we will use -R. The welfare function of the
EU is unchanged and thus the equilibrium reaction function is still given by:
c = l/pf
The welfare function of the applicant has, however, changed. It is now given
by:
WEE = -dR + dM + XM + (l-d)(l-a)R
The surprise function remains unchanged to enable a direct comparison of the
surprise variable. Welfare under uncertainty is:
WEE = X[ -R + M + XM] + (l-x)[XM + (l-a)R]
WEE = -yR + yM + x^M -x^M - x(l-n)R + + (l-a)R
WEE = ~xR + xM - xR + X°R + + R - oR
WEE = R + xM + x^R + - aR - 2xR
Substituting x = A.aP
WEE = R + (IaP)M + (XaP)aR + XM - aR- 2^apR
WEE = R + XvfiM + (tar2P)R + XM - aR - 2XapR
To determine the reaction function of the applicant country, we differentiate
by a.
dWEE/da = ^pM + 2XapR - R - 2XfiR = 0
a (2^pR) = - A.pM + R + 2XpR
a = -M/(2R) + 1/2A.P+1
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Substituting a = 1/ (3f
1/pf = -M/ (2R) + 1/2X-P +1
2/ pf = -M/R + 1/A.p + 2
2k/f + kpM/R + 2kp = 1
1 (2 + fpM/R+ 2fP) = f
k = fR/ (2R + fpM+ 2fp)
We can see that the new term 2fp will reduce the amount of transfers as
long as this term is positive. As previously demonstrated, this will lower the
aggregate probability of reforms taking place and will reduce welfare. The
only substantial difference in the effect of the variables on the aggregate
possibility is that the probability of reforms happening is lowered by the
introduction of more costly reforms.
The previous sections have assumed that the EU has no control over
the use of funds. They are bound to pay the transfer whether reforms are
introduced or not. This is clearly unrealistic in this extreme form. An
examination of the other extreme is required, by exploring the effect of
making transfers conditional on reform. The previously introduced model
and the dummy factor d will be used to make the transfers conditional upon
the introduction of reforms.
This section firstly considers the decision of the applicant country. The
welfare function is given by:
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WEE = dR + dM + dA,M + (l-d)(l-a)R
WEE = x[R + M + A.M] + (1-x)[(1-cj)R]
WEE = xR + xM + x^M - x(l-a)R + (l-a)R
WEE = xM + xcrR + R - crR + x^M
Substituting x = AxjP
WEE = R + (^cP)M + (XaP)aR + (Xap)^M - aR
To determine the reaction function of the applicant country we differentiate
by a.
dWEE/da = tyJM + 2?,apR - R + (A.p)A.M = 0
a (2XpR) = - XpM + R - (A-p)A-M
a = -M/(2R) + 1/2A-P - XM/2R
The process is repeated for the EU. The welfare function is given by:
WEU = xfM - x^M
Substituting % = A,ctP
WEU = XapfM - A,apA.M
To determine the reaction function of the EU we differentiate by A..
dWEE/dA, = crpfM - 2apXM = 0
f - 2A, = 0
A, = f/2
The equilibrium level of policy changes can now be derived:
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a = -M/(2R) + 1/2A-P - XM/2R
Substituting X = f/2 yields:
a = -M/(2R) + 1/2A-P - XM/2R
a = -M/(2R) + 1/fp - fM/4R
Again this is analysed by using a numerical simulation. The actual
spreadsheet with the different calculations can be found in Appendix B. The
numbers do not represent actual estimates, they have merely been chosen to
examine the trends in the solutions for the choice variables.
The boundaries which are set up within the model, namely X > 0 and a
> 0, will not always be met by the crude figures. By excluding those results
which exceed these boundaries, as well as only using results yielding 1 ^ X ^
0, we can make a meaningful analysis of the figures. As stated before, the EU
would not get involveci in the process if EU welfare is negative91. As such,
negative welfare results of the EU can be ignored. The results, which conform
to these conditions, will be the ones used in the analysis to maintain
consistency with the model.
The results clearly contradict some of the conclusions from the
previous section. When the level of transfers stays constant and the surprise
value increases, we get a higher probability that reforms happen and thus a
higher welfare, which is similar to the previous section. However, when the
level of transfer increases, we get a lower surprise value, which indicates a
higher policy surprise. As a result, aggregate uncertainty increases but
welfare increases. A high level of remaining uncertainty, expressed by a low
P, will have an ambiguous effect. A low value of membership and a high
benefit from reforms, together with a decrease in residual uncertainty, will
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result in cycling levels of aggregate uncertainty and welfare. Here, f being a
fraction rather than a multiple, will be crucial to determine any results. As f
increases together with a high membership value and a low reform value, the
aggregate uncertainty is increased. This does, however, increase welfare.
Furthermore, the EU can actually gain welfare from this process and is not
indifferent to accession, as in the case of unconditional reforms, even with
rational foresight. These are crucial differences to the previous section. It
suggests that given a low differential of benefits for the EU and for the
applicant, there are circumstances under which there should be conditional
transfers to maximise welfare. This suggests that there are two different
groups of countries, which should be treated differently.
The analysis has shown that Uncertainty plays a crucial role in the
accession process. By endogenising the policy surprise value of an
unanticipated change, as well as transfer payments and residual uncertainty,
the model throws up some startling results.
When regarding the size of membership benefits for the applicant in
comparison to the reform benefits, it is clear that the higher this differential,
the lower transfers will need to be. The possibility to create a positive effect by
using an unanticipated change increases and thus the aggregate uncertainty
increases as welfare decreases. A high effect of present reform programmes is
thus desirable while a high benefit from membership acts to reduce the
likelihood of accession. This result is unchanged whether the reforms
themselves are negative or whether the transfers of the EU become
conditional on success of the reforms.
As the residual probability of reforms taking place increases, the lower
the transfers will be. At the same time, the policy surprise value will increase,
as the applicant's government tries to derive maximum benefit from the
decrease in residual uncertainty. This will, however, decrease the aggregate
probability of reforms happening and thus will reduce welfare.
It can be assumed that in such a case both the EU and the CEEC would not be involved in the
process, as they are both rationally forward looking. The welfare of both associated with this process
would thus be 0.
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If there is a high differential between the benefits from membership
and the benefits for the EU, the gain from unanticipated policy changes will
be substantial. Transfers will be lower if they are unconditional and this will
increase aggregate uncertainty and reduce welfare. However, by making
transfers conditional on the success of the reforms, the EU can increase
aggregate welfare.
Thus the model has demonstrated some interesting features of the
accession process, which require application to the present situation. These
include facts such as aggregate uncertainty, but more crucially, the effect of
transfers and unanticipated policy changes on this process. The implications
for policy change and will be later examined, in more detail. It is, however,
clear that the results are startling in some aspects. Large benefits from
membership for the applicant, as well as a high residual probability of
reforms happening, will actually decrease the likelihood of accession. If one
assumes that larger benefits are derived from a substantially different country
due to comparative advantage, we can demonstrate a further startling result.
The results indicate that a country with a high degree of structural differences
with the EU should receive unconditional transfers, while a low degree of
structural differences suggests conditional transfers. The EU can benefit more
in terms of welfare from these countries, while unconditional transfers
suggest no welfare gain for the EU. This indicates that the accession process of
more structurally sound applicants is of interest for the EU, while the EU is
indifferent to not entering or entering the accession process with countries
receiving unconditional transfers. This conclusion is reinforced by evidence
from the accession process. Baldwin states that:
"The EU's economic interest in enlargement is probably quite minor ... When
an economically small region integrates with an economically larger region,
both gain but the smaller region gains much more. Moreover, when a low-
wage/low-productivity region and a high-wage/high-productivity integrate,
most of the large region's gains come from cheaper imports of labour intense
goods such as clothes and shoes" (1995).
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Furthermore, Baldwin reinforces the need for transfers to make membership
viable:
"As argued above, the economic gains from membership are likely to be large
for the CEECs ... The only big economic gains that would require full
membership are exactly those that create the most political problems in the
EU: participation in the CAP and transfers to poor regions" (ibid.).
This clearly suggests a different treatment of different groups of applicants
and it is thus highly relevant to the management of the accession process. The
following tables summarise the theoretical results of this section.
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In the following section, these theoretical results will be combined with
the results of the previous sections of this chapter, to summarise the key
features of the accession process from a modelling perspective.
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h) Results of the theoretical analysis
The models have shown that the constraints substantially influence the
choices of the CEECs and the EU. The constraints have to be taken into
account in the accession process. Political Feasibility will be a major problem
if there is an unequal distribution of benefits and losses. In extreme cases, this
might make membership unfeasible. A high benefit from membership is
important to overcome this problem, especially if the discount factor is high,
i.e. a long time period until accession is expected. The strategies available to
the CEECs need to be examined carefully to enable accession. The analysis
shows that BBL is never an optimal option, but, depending on some variables,
both GRAD and BBN can be optimal. GRAD will be optimal if there is a high
discount of future benefits and if the reforms have an unequal distributive
effect, while BBN will be optimal if discounts are relatively low and if effects
of reforms are relatively evenly distributed. Transfers of the EU, as well as
internal transfers, can improve the feasibility of reform programmes. The
analysis shows that countries further removed from accession are more likely
to have problems of Political Feasibility. This will be especially true if the
reforms have unequal distributive effects and will be aggravated by a lack of
transfers and by negative complementarities. Conversely countries closer to
accession are less likely to have problems of Political Feasibility. They will
benefit if the reforms have few unequal distributive effects and will require
lower transfers, especially if there are positive complementarities.
Time Inconsistency is also a major problem in the accession process.
The CEEC government generally has an incentive to go back on earlier
announcements about reform strategies, especially when costly reforms are
announced. Therefore, the population cannot believe announcements and ex
ante all reform strategies (BBN, BBT and GRAD) are Time Inconsistent. EU
conditional transfers will be necessary to enforce accession strategies, but the
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size of these transfers will depend on the accession strategy which is chosen.
BBL requires the highest conditional transfer, but GRAD also requires a
relatively high conditional transfer. BBN requires a relatively low conditional
transfer.
It is clear from the analysis that Uncertainty reduces welfare and that
EU transfers and unanticipated changes crucially influence the probability of
reforms and membership taking place. A high degree of residual uncertainty
can act to encourage large unconditional transfers. If the EU's membership
benefits are high in comparison to the applicant's benefits, large
unconditional transfers are optimal. A high incentive of introducing
unanticipated changes will, however, be present. If EU membership benefits
are comparable to the applicant's benefits, conditional low transfers will be
optimal. A low incentive to introduce unanticipated changes will be present
in that case.
Thus, the analysis has shown that there are two distinctive types of
countries. Type A is far away from accession and a gradual strategy is
optimal, while type B is close to accession and the immediate introduction of
the remaining reforms is optimal. These theoretical results are summarised in
the following tables.
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The analysis has shown that there are two distinct types of countries.
The distinction between the two types depends crucially upon the benefit
from membership ratio of the EU and the CEEC. Discounting can be
interpreted as a proxy for the total size of membership benefits. The distance
from accession will also be crucially important. Residual uncertainty and
aggregate uncertainty increase the need for large transfers, as well as an
uneven distributional effect of reforms. The applicant's strategy and incentive
to introduce unanticipated changes will be different for both types. In the case
of countries close to accession, the introduction of reforms should happen as
fast as possible, while countries further away from accession should introduce
reforms gradually. The EU should also use a different transfer strategy, as
well as differently sized transfers, for both types. The countries close to
accession should receive low, conditional transfers, while countries distant
231
from accession should receive large, unconditional transfers. These results are
summarised in table 4.g.3.






































The analysis of the theoretical model demonstrates a need to
distinguish between different types of accession candidates. The conclusions
cannot be applied directly to the applicant countries in so far as the models
are simplified to capture the process. Nevertheless, the distinction between
countries close to accession and countries further away should be taken into
account. The size and nature of transfers associated with each type should be
applied, instead of using the same method for all CEE applicant countries.
Preliminary analysis seems to support the conclusions of the
theoretical models. Two different groups, and possibly intermediary groups,
of countries can be identified. The Commission has separated the applicants
into two groups by designating them First and Second wave. This, in part,
might be a self-fulfilling distinction as the designation into Second wave
means people expect a longer accession period. A more rigorous timetable of
accession might enable the decision to treat countries differently, over time. A
longer accession period could mean the gradual introduction of reforms as
well as large conditional and unconditional transfers.
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The examination of the recent history of the applicants should yield
evidence of Political Feasibility, Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty
problems. It is clear that the analysis highlights some important aspects of the
accession process. Thus, there is a need to examine the problems of Political
Feasibility, Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty in more detail. Indeed, there
are indications that these economic problems are occurring and that the
CEECs fall into different categories. A change in the strategy of the CEECs
and the EU thus seems to be necessary, especially for those countries which
appear to be lagging behind in the accession process. The evidence of
constraints is examined in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Economic Constraints
a) Evidence of constraints in the applicant countries
Initially, the EU opened accession talks with five of the applicants, but
decided at the Helsinki Summit in December 1999, to expand the accession
92
talks to the remaining five applicant countries . Of these five countries,
Bulgaria and Romania are, at present, the furthest behind the EU, in economic
terms, as demonstrated in Chapter 3 of this thesis. Despite the inclusion of
these countries, serious doubts have been raised as to whether Bulgaria and
Romania will become full members of the European Union in the foreseeable
future. Yet they remain optimistic about membership. In April 2000, Petre
Roman, the Romanian Foreign Minister, stated that:
"It is our aim to make up lost ground in the negotiations, and we have
basically succeeded in doing that" (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6.4.2000).
This chapter analyses the evidence of constraints in the accession process
from the view of the applicants. The accession process is a one-sided affair,
almost determined entirely by the Commission on behalf of the EU. The EU
has published two Progress Reports and in both, Romania and Bulgaria
remain at the end of the list of accession countries, albeit they have changed
their respective positions to each other. It seems that, despite making some
efforts to fulfil the accession criteria, these countries are still far away from
eventual membership.
All the CEECs face major difficulties in the accession process. The
model developed in the previous chapter suggests that one of the main
constraints is the problem of Political Feasibility. The CEECs need to maintain
a political constituency for membership in the accession process. The model
indicates that the constraints will be especially prevalent for governments in
02 Cyprus and Malta join the ten CEECs and Turkey has become a membership candidate but will not
be included in negotiations immediately.
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those applicant countries, which face a long accession process and a costly
readjustment.
Residual uncertainty is a further problem in the accession process. The
accession process entails a high degree of Uncertainty surrounding outcomes.
Furthermore the model has demonstrated that the choices of the CEEC
governments and the EU crucially influence the probability of reform, and
consequently accession, taking place. These choices, combined with aggregate
Uncertainty, make decisions about timing and sequencing of reforms
extremely risky and, as the reforms are necessary conditions for membership,
Uncertainty can endanger membership itself.
The model suggests that Time Inconsistency is a key determinant of the
accession process, especially in light of the EU's transfer strategy, as detailed
in the pre-accession strategy of Agenda 2000. Time Inconsistency
demonstrates a serious commitment problem, which could lead to delays in
the accession process. The CEECs need to commit to a strategy to manage the
accession process without reneging on promises of reform. The model has
shown that governments can benefit from surprising the population and
markets, which creates an incentive to renege on pre-announced strategies.
This could jeopardise the accession process, especially when the lack of a firm
commitment mechanism alters expectations by the economic agents.
There are already signs of these constraints. Political Feasibility
problems are noted most frequently:
"In most of the ten CEECs, positive views of the EU were high in the early
years of transition and then declined" (Grabbe and Hughes in Henderson,
1999, p. 186).
Time Inconsistent behaviour can also be observed. Commenting on the case
of Slovakia, Karen Henderson states that:
"The new government's programme stated that "the government considers
the implementation of the programme of European integration its foremost
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task", but its real commitment to this goal was questionable" (in Henderson,
1999, p. 227).
Uncertainty is closely linked to this problem. It is endemic in any
transformation and can be observed frequently in the accession process. As
Jackie Gower states in the context of the problems of the accession
negotiations:
"There remain, therefore, many outstanding issues and uncertainties about
the CEEC's accession to the EU" (in Henderson, 1999, p. 16).
The model suggests that these constraints are especially prevalent in
countries far from accession, such as Romania and Bulgaria. These countries
already started the accession process behind the other accession countries, in
economic terms. Romania was ruined economically by the dictatorship of
Ceaucescu, while Bulgaria adopted the Soviet model most faithfully by
introducing a rigid, and inefficient, planned economy. As a consequence of
this lower starting point, and the failure to initiate decisive reform in the post-
revolution years, these countries continue to lag behind. GDP per capita in
Bulgaria stands at 23% of EU average, while Romania is slightly ahead at 27%.
In both countries, there is still a strong agricultural sector and industrial
production is still below the 1995 average. Inflation is over 20% in Bulgaria
and almost 60% in Romania. Trade is less than 1% of extra-EU trade, despite
these countries being among the more populous applicants with a population
93
of 22.5 million in Romania and 8.2 million in Bulgaria . The democratisation
process has advanced, but Bulgaria and Romania still face many problems,
which will be later examined. Thus, their economic situation is still
substantially below the EU average and, indeed, at the bottom end of the
applicant countries, while the political process seems to be stagnating. The
link between these developments and the accession process has not been
examined in previous literature in great detail and the model and the
93 Data taken from Eurostat, Memo No 10/99- 7 December 1999.
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following discussion attempt to address this gap.
The accession process is characterised by choices and is by no means
an automatic process with a defined endpoint. The EU must choose how to
use transfers in the best way to encourage the necessary reforms to enable
accession, while the CEEC governments must choose the best strategy for the
implementation of these reforms. The optimal method of preparing for
accession is, however, difficult to define. The model developed in the
previous chapter has indicated that constraints are crucially important to
examine in the accession process. The following section examines the
accession literature to determine whether these constraints are observable in
the accession countries.
The EU crucially influences the accession process. Not only does the
EU set the conditions for membership but it also influences other choice
variables in the process. The model has demonstrated the importance of the
size of transfers and whether transfers are dependent upon introducing
reforms by the CEECs. Even though the applicant can choose to utilise
internal redistribution to correct effects caused by the accession process, this
is limited by the lack of public funds. The EU can choose unconditional
transfers the applicant receives without a punishment if reforms are not
introduced. Conditional transfers are tied to the success of the reform process
and will be cancelled if the process falters.
The variables, which are determined by the CEECs, are related to the
introduction of reforms and whether there is a credible pre-commitment to
this process. The applicant's strategy is mainly linked to the speed of
introducing reforms. Under Big Bang Now (BBN), the applicant chooses to
introduce all reforms as soon as logistically possible. This would involve
introducing beneficial as well as costly reforms immediately. Big Bang Later
(BBL), on the other hand, involves the introduction of all reforms as late as
logistically possible, i.e. immediately prior to accession. Under Gradualism
(GRAD) the applicant chooses to introduce some reforms immediately and
some prior to accession. This would involve deferring some costly reforms to
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the future.
The applicant needs to commit to any one of these strategies to be able
to introduce the reforms. This may occur, under certain circumstances, by
"tying his hands" to a certain accession process. There is, however the
possibility that the applicant reneges on a strategy. The applicant can choose
not to introduce a pre-announced reform if this is beneficial for the economy.
Under such circumstances, economic agents know about this incentive and
will not believe an announced strategy.
The CEEC governments will only initiate reform programmes if they
do not decrease their electoral chances. These will be decreased if the voting
majority suffers from the programmes. The distributional effect of these
programmes will thus have to be taken into account. These will be influenced
by internal transfers and by the interaction of reforms. This is the problem of
political feasibility. David Phinnemore states that:
"If CEECs are required to assume early on the more economically
burdensome elements of the acquis, such as environmental, health and safety
standards, fears of job losses could dampen enthusiasm for membership" (in
Elenderson, 1999, p. 78).
Even though the aggregate effect of membership is beneficial, this effect is
discounted when considering the present situation. As reforms are positive as
well as negative, they will affect different groups in society to varying
degrees. Transfers, especially of the EU, can increase the benefits for all
groups and thus reduce the problem of Political Feasibility.
The CEEC governments cannot commit credibly to a reform
programme, as any announced reform can be cancelled later. This can bring
benefits to the economy if people adjusted to a negative reform and then it
does not take place. Given this incentive, the people will not believe any
government announcements. But as the reforms are necessary for EU
membership, the population will forego the discounted benefit from
membership. Because the EU can make transfers contingent upon reforms, the
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EU can commit the applicant government to a reform programme. It is thus
necessary to determine which strategy might be Time Inconsistent and what
size of EU transfers is necessary to credibly commit the applicant government
to a reform programme.
The choices of the CEEC and the EU are made in an uncertain world
and their choices will influence the likelihood of reforms and membership.
Both the EU and the CEEC government have to take the choice of the other
into account, in order to derive the best option for themselves, but there will
be a residual uncertainty neither of them can influence. The final probability
of reforms and membership taking place will depend crucially upon whether
EU transfers are conditional on reform programmes or unconditional. But the
probability of reforms and membership taking place will also depend
crucially on the incentive to renege on earlier announcements of the CEEC
government.
The models have shown that the constraints substantially influence the
choices of the CEECs and the EU. The constraints are thus fundamental in the
accession process. Political Feasibility will be a major problem if there is an
unequal distribution of benefits and losses. In extreme cases, this might make
membership unfeasible. A high benefit from membership is important to
overcome this problem, especially if the discount factor is high, i.e. a long
time period until accession is expected. The strategies available to the CEECs
need to be examined carefully in order to enable accession. The analysis
shows that BBL is never a politically feasible option, but, depending on some
variables, both GRAD and BBN can be optimal. GRAD will be optimal if there
is a high discount of future benefits and if the reforms have an unequal
distributive effect, while BBN will be optimal if discounts are relatively low
and if effects of reforms are relatively evenly distributed. Transfers of the EU,
as well as internal transfers, can improve the feasibility of reform
programmes. The analysis shows that countries further removed from
accession are more likely to have problems of Political Feasibility. This will be
especially true if the reforms have unequal distributive effects and will be
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aggravated by lack of transfers and by negative complementarities.
Conversely, countries closer to accession are less likely to have problems of
Political Feasibility. They will benefit if the reforms have few unequal
ciistributive effects and will require lower transfers, especially if there are
positive complementarities.
Time Inconsistency is also a major problem in the accession process.
The CEEC government generally has an incentive to renege on earlier
announcements about reform strategies, especially when costly reforms are
announced. Announcements will, thus, not be believed by the population
and, ex ante, all reform strategies (BBN, BBL, and GRAD) are time
inconsistent. EU conditional transfers will be necessary to enforce accession
strategies, but the size of these transfers will depend upon the chosen
accession strategy. BBL requires the highest conditional transfer, but GRAD
also requires a relatively high conditional transfer. BBN requires a relatively
low conditional transfer.
It is clear from the analysis that Uncertainty reduces welfare and that
EU transfers and unanticipated changes crucially influence the probability of
reforms and membership taking place. A high degree of residual uncertainty
can act to encourage large unconditional transfers. If the EU's membership
benefits are high in comparison to the applicant's benefits, large
unconditional transfers are optimal. A high incentive of introducing
unanticipated changes will, however, be present. If EU membership benefits
are comparable to the applicant's benefits, conditional low transfers will be
optimal. Under such circumstances, a low incentive to introduce
unanticipated changes will be present in that case.
Thus, countries facing a long accession process are characterised by
high residual uncertainty and a high EU/CEEC benefit differential. A gradual
strategy is optimal but there is a large incentive to introduce unanticipated
changes and, thereafter, problems of political feasibility will be apparent. In
general, high conditional and unconditional transfers by the EU are needed to
minimise the costs of the process of accession.
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In the following sections the countries are examined together and then
individually to determine whether evidence of constraints can be found. From
the theoretical model we would expect to find most evidence in those
countries furthest from membership. Furthermore, we would also expect a
strong link between the constraints, as demonstrated by the model.
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Economic Constraints
b) Winners and Losers?
i) Evidence for all applicant countries
"Western Europe was stirred by the peaceful changes of regime and
the prospect of democracy in the East. But the difficulties of the
transformation have caused some disillusion in both East and West. People
need a clearer idea of the future of democracy if they are to have the
confidence to overcome the difficulties and do what is needed to see the
changes through""(Pinder in Pridham, Herring and Sanford, 1994, p. 140).
Initially, public support for enlargement in all CEECs was very strong.
However, if public support declines it becomes much more difficult to
maintain a political constituency for the process. There are already signs of
Political Feasibility problems in the accession process as a whole and one can
also see an endemic level of Uncertainty and Time Inconsistency. In
consequence of these economic constraints, it can be noticed that expectations
for rapid accession are losing momentum. The European Communities
Committee of the House of Lords comments that:
"Although we recognise the need to keep up momentum, we think that the
target dates being quoted both by the applicants and by the Commission may
well be over-optimistic. We consider that it might be better for that to be
explicitly recognised now" (House of Lords, 21st Report, 1999, p. 27).
The report recognises
"the danger of arousing expectations which will not be satisfied if momentum
is lost" (ibid. p. 33),
implicitly acknowledging the problem of Political Feasibility. These problems
exist in the accession process as a whole. In addition, a higher incidence of
Political Infeasibility, Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty problems in those
countries furthest removed from accession is to be expected. This is a
problem, which is generally perceived in the accession process, as the process
seems to be too slow for even the most advanced countries. This has led to an
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examination of the accession process as a whole. Even the House of Lords
noted that the members
"were concerned that the process might be slowing down" (House of Lords,
1999, p. 6).
Among the reasons for the slowing down of the process is the patchy nature
of reforms so far achieved:
"Not all of them are all the way there, or even half of it. The rule of law is not
universal; corruption is still widespread; clapped-out industries are unready
for stiff competition; air is polluted and rivers are foul: the list goes on" (The
Economist, 7.11.1998).
The inclusion of the Second Wave countries in the negotiation process
has raised hopes in these countries:
"The hopes of most of the countries excluded from the First Wave at the
Vienna summit in December 1998 that they can catch up with their rivals look
optimistic, to say the least" (European Voice, 2000, p. 64).
These hopes are likely to be unfulfilled. One of the problems outside
the control of the CEECs is the lack of progress in EU institutional reform,
which could have an adverse effect on the confidence of applicants. There is a
"...fear that the most likely outcome is that the pace of enlargement will be
constrained by failure to agree on the detail of institutional reform. This
would be seriously damaging to the confidence of the applicants" (House of
Lords, 1999, p. 9).
"Not that enlargement was ever likely to be a simple affair: it means changing
the balance of power among existing members, reforming the way the EU is
run and directing subsidies away from some of the poorer regions in Europe's
West to even poorer newcomers from the East" (The Economist, 21.3.1998).
The scale of reforms necessary should not be underestimated:
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"Eastern enlargement seems to be the most challenging enlargement in the
whole history of European Integration. Unlike previous enlargements, itwill
entail numerous structural changes to EU institutions and procedures" (Barta,
1998, p.l).
The institutional problems of the EU have been demonstrated on numerous
occasions. The reform of the CAP is one of the issues, which consistently
reappears in the accession process. This problem is particularly important for
Poland:
"With such feeble reform of farm policy, it seems increasingly doubtful
whether the EU can rapidly absorb a Poland of 39m people, including more
than 2m farmers" (The Economist, 10.4.1999).
"Changes to the structural funds could be even more controversial still, not
least because they require unanimous approval, whereas CAP changes don't"
(The Economist, 21.3.1998).
The problem remains that, without extending the EU's budget, current
policies cannot be extended to the applicant states. The applicants have noted
this:
"They are already warning that the EU has simply not budgeted for the costs
of extending the payments to new member states, judging by the financial
provisions laid down in the deal for 2000-2006 struck by Union leaders in
March 1999" (European Voice, 1999, p. 63).
"But the pressure is on the applicants. As the jostling in the doorway of the
rich men's club continues, the length of the process and its sheer complexity is
itself causing problems" (The Guardian, 29.6.1999).
But the CEECs must introduce reforms to prepare themselves at the same
time. Costly reforms can create political feasibility problems in the accession
process. It is now generally agreed that there will have to be transition
periods for some areas of the acquis:
"It is clear that the obligation to match EU environmental standards will
impose enormous demands in both financial and human resources which
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none of the applicant States will be in a position to meet for some years"
(House of Lords, 1999, p. 9).
But even in the field of environmental reform the EU is not going to accept
indefinite transition:
"The European Commission may tolerate a short transition period. But the
EU will not tolerate slackers" (The Economist, 11.12.1999).
In a theoretical paper by Jan Fidrmuc, the problems of political support for
reforms are further explored. The paper demonstrates that excessive
unemployment can cause problems of political feasibility:
"These results show that the continuation of economic reform can indeed be
put at question if unemployment gets too high" (1996, p. 16).
The distributional impact of reforms can change the political constituencies
during the reform process, further creating political instability:
"... if radical reform is endorsed by state-sector workers at the outset, the
same workers will eventually want to slow it down. The 'backlash' develops
even when these workers are becoming better off over time" (Rodrik, 1995, p.
22).
The EU has announced that the applicants would be monitored more strictly
to determine whether promises are kept. But this is unlikely given the
problem of Time Inconsistency:
"This is designed to keep up the pressure on the hopefuls to maintain the
pace of reform at home, but it threatens to prolong the haggling if candidates
are unable to match their words with deeds" (European Voice, 2000, p. 63-64).
Despite the optimistic mood at the beginning of the accession process,
problems were noted from an early stage. Andrzej Olechowski, the then
Polish foreign minister, stated that:
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"The road to the Unionwill be long, hard and uncertain" (as quoted in
Transition, 30.1.1995, p. 750).
The House of Lords noted that uncertainty makes an agreed timetable for
accession impossible:
"We do not think that there is any realistic prospect of setting a formally
agreed timetable either for the closure of individual chapters or for the overall
completion of negotiations. This does not mean that the targeting should be
abandoned, but it should be seen as aspirational, because there are too many
uncertainties for the EU to commit itself to targets being met" (House of
Lords, 1999, p. 8).
The EU has made it clear that no date will be set for accession. The
member of the Commission responsible for enlargement, Verheugen, has
consistently reinforced this message, as, for example, in a speech in Warsaw
in connection with the reforms to be decided at the IGC:
"The prospect of seeking solutions to these difficult issues may of course seem
daunting, and there is sometimes talk of fears that negotiations may be
"delayed". This is a false dilemma. There is no imperative cut-off date, at
which enlargement must take place, come what may and at any cost. There
can be no such date because a badly prepared enlargement will weaken the
Union, instead of enriching it. It will also be a missed opportunity for the
candidate countries to complete the momentous transformation of their
societies, which needs to be done, with or without accession to the EU"
(11.5.2000).
This lack of commitment has, however, been criticised by the applicant
countries, who find it more and more difficult to maintain a political
constituency for the necessary reforms:
"Eastern officials say they need the incentive of a clear date for EU entry to
win over workers, bureaucrats and businessmen for the difficult reforms
needed to leave behind the stagnation and poverty inherited from
communism" (International Herald Tribune, 19.6.2000).
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Problems of Uncertainty created by the EU in the accession process
have also been noted:
"Several applicant countries have criticised the EU for sending out confusing
signals about its intentions. The sorest point has been the persistent refusal of
European leaders to set even a provisional target date for admitting the first
new members. Candidates complain that they cannot carry on indefinitely
with the contentious and costly reforms needed to qualify for membership
without some firm date to concentrate minds and stiffen backbones at home"
(The Economist, 23.10.1999).
Recent developments have further added to the uncertainty inherent in
the accession process:
"The first three or four new members are generally expected to join in 2004,
give or take a year - or they were until recently, at any rate. The entry of the
far-right Freedom Party into the Austrian government has injected a new note
of uncertainty, since each admission requires the unanimous agreement of
existing members" (The Economist, 12.2.2000).
The House of Lords notes that the funds allocated to accession in Agenda
2000 might be too low:
"... we are less convinced that the new financial perspectives will provide
sufficient resources for, and we urge that it should be reviewed ..." (House of
Lords, 1999, p. 8).
Thus, there is evidence of all of the constraints in the accession process
as a whole. From the theoretical model introduced in Chapter 4, we would
expect that those countries furthest away from accession would face the most
severe constraints. From the historical development presented in Chapter 2,
and the current situation examined in Chapter 3, we would expect that
Bulgaria and Romania, and to a lesser extent, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovakia,
would be in this category. The following section examines all the applicant
countries in turn, to determine whether the constraints highlighted by the
model are most prevalent in those countries furthest from accession, as
predicted in the previous section.
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Economic Constraints
b) Winners and Losers?
ii) The Baltic States
The Baltic States have faced particular problems since their transition.
In particular, they were required to create a market economy, and they also
had to establish completely new institutions after being an integral part of the
Soviet Union, as well as managing this volatile relationship. In economic
terms, the Baltic States had to create an independent economy from scratch
with a collapse of trade and the threat of energy shortages aggravating the
situation:
"In some ways, indeed, their current economic difficulties are more severe,
given the enormous complexity of changing from a centrally planned
economy to a market one" (Smith, 1994, p. 179).
Ethnic divisions within the Baltic States, most notably a significant Russian
minority, further complicate the transition:
"In 1991, the Baltic States also inherited an ethnic legacy of decolonisation, the
presence of large Russian-speaking communities, but which, at least in the
case of Estonia and Latvia, citizenship legislation has not fully resolved" (ibid,
p. 8).
The ethnic situation is still not fully resolved:
"Today, the population of Estonia is 30 percent Russian; of Latvia, 34 percent;
of Lithuania, much lower at 9 percent ... The potential for social instability is
therefore considerable" (Yergin & Gustafson, 1994, p. 249).
Despite Estonia becoming a First Wave country, the Baltic States are
examined together in this section. This is partially done in view of the strong
historical similarity and their experience during the revolutions and, in part,
because of the lack of accession literature on individual Baltic States.
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Estonia has been one of the front runners of accession. Yet even for a
country like Estonia, expectations after the revolutions were unfulfilled. An
early publication on Estonia states:
"Despite all the problems, chances were good that Estonia would privatise,
improve quality, and reinvest at a rate sufficient to start catching up with the
other Nordic countries. Within a few years, it was likely to become an
associate member of the European Community, with full membership
possible by the year 2000" (Taagepera, 1993, p. 216).
It is clear that the few years to EU membership have stretched further than
expected initially.
Latvia has lagged behind Estonia, especially in the field of economic
reforms. The transition process was not carried out as decisively as in Estonia
and, consequently, privatisation has lagged behind, as examined in Chapter 3.
Latvia was thus designated a Second Wave country in Agenda 2000. The 1999
Progress Report has, however, recognised the progress made and it is likely,
that Latvia will be included in the First Wave in the near future.
The Commission also classified Lithuania as a Second Wave country.
EU membership has been an explicit goal of Lithuania's consecutive
governments since the break away from the Soviet Union, yet the population
does not necessarily share this enthusiasm:
"Although the government is flush with pleasure at the EU's invitation in
Helsinki, many ordinary Lithuanians are not so keen" (The Economist,
8.1.2000).
Lithuania appears reluctant to accept the closure of the Ignalina
nuclear power station, albeit that this is a clear condition for EU membership:
"Given that the Lithuanian government intends to decommission the plant at
some point, the solution is likely to be that decommissioning is delayed for a
further five years or decade, with Lithuania remaining in the 'second round'
group of applicants for EU membership as a consequence" (Field, 1999, p. 11).
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The closure of the plant is now scheduled for 2005, with membership delayed
at least until then.
By the early 21st Century the Baltic States have made some progress.
Estonia is continuing on the fast track with Latvia and Lithuania starting to
close the gap. Latvia has made some progress in the over-due privatisation
process, while Lithuania has finally declared the intention to close the nuclear
plant at Ignalina by 2005. Yet there is still some doubt about how fast the EU
can integrate these countries. In a recent article the Sueddeutsche Zeitung
reported that there is a distinct danger that the current waiting position could
become a loop without an endpoint in sight (Sueddeutsche Zeitung online,
5.6.2000).
We can, thus, observe evidence of constraints in all the Baltic States. It is,
however, clear that Estonia has been the most successful Baltic applicant,
where constraints are least prevalent. Latvia has advanced since the first
progress report, yet economic constraints still hinder acceptance into the Eirst
Wave. For Lithuania, the constraints are most noticeable especially with
regard to the closure of the Ignalina nuclear power plant, which is still
surrounded by uncertainty.
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Chapter 5: Evidence of Economic Constraints
b) Winners and Losers?
iii) Bulgaria
Bulgaria is still struggling to catch up with the First Wave of accession
candidates:
"Bulgaria, ... , gets a big pat on the shoulder for trying hard - but there is still
no question of membership in the near future" (Business Central Europe,
December 1998/January 1999, p. 46).
Bulgaria has now been included in accession negotiations with the
other Second Wave applicants (not least because of the support for NATO in
the Balkan conflict). As a result, a more optimistic mood can be noted. Yet,
cautious voices have already been raised:
"But once the euphoria generated by the decision to give them a seat at the
negotiation table subsides, the six will soon realise this is only the start of a
long journey leading to eventual membership of the Union" (European Voice,
2000, p. 64).
In Bulgaria the situation has been different to most accession countries
since the changes which took place in 1989 and the early 1990s. Immediately
after the overthrow of Zhivkov, very few economic reforms were introduced.
Reforms only started in 1991 partially due to reform demands by the IMF.
These did not produce the desired results. A noticeable feature of that time
was political instability, with allegations of widespread corruption. Inflation
spiralled out of control and in late 1991 the opposition, United of Democratic
Front (UDF), won the general election. This new government was not able to
introduce decisive reforms, despite pledging themselves to move the reform
process forward in the run-up to the elections. This demonstration of Time
Inconsistent policies resulted in a further deterioration of the economic
situation. In 1995, the former communists were reinstated into government
and the reform process almost ceased to progress. In mid-1996 the economy
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had all but collapsed and only the electoral victory of the UDF in 1997
stopped the deterioration. The link between EU transfers and the reform
process can be illustrated by the proposed shutdown of the nuclear power
station, Kosloduj. The Bulgarian government had previously agreed to
shutdown the four oldest reactors by the end of 1998. This was revoked by the
parliament until such a time when Bulgaria and the EU would come to an
agreement concerning the associated costs, clearly demonstrating the
problems of Time Inconsistency in the absence of large transfers.
Further evidence of economic constraints in countries far removed
from accession comes from a paper by David Phinnemore (1999). His
arguments apply to the Balkan applicants, Bulgaria and Romania, and should
be read to refer to both. He draws attention to the significant costs associated
with the accession process for those countries furthest removed from
membership. He asserts that financial assistance is being made available by
the EU but that these states might be unwilling to spend further funds if
guaranteed membership is not the perceived outcome of the process. He
draws attention to the possibility that harmonisation might lead to the
undermining of the ability of these countries to achieve the economic reforms,
which are necessary to fulfil the Copenhagen economic criteria. The evidence
thus points to the inappropriateness of the conditionality imposed on the
countries furthest away from accession. Furthermore, there is an indication
that the funds of the EU are insubstantial to give these countries a sufficient
incentive to continue the accession process. He also mentions a problem of
Political Feasibility:
"Within the domestic political arena, governing parties may find themselves
unable to justify the use of resources for legislative approximation and
harmonisation" (Phinnemore, 1999, p. 15).
He warns that:
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"If the EU is intent on promoting integration with its European associates and
ensuring domestic support within those states for closer ties, a situation
whereby states and their populations sense imposition without reward needs
to be avoided." (ibid. p. 17).
This further indicates the possibility of running into problems of political
feasibility.
The economic problems of the Balkan applicants persist:
"Bulgaria and Romania, having been so disastrously served by previous
governments, are at the bottom of the list on economic criteria. They say they
are determined to pursue reform and attract investment. If they do, and are
rewarded with fast growth, their time in the EU's waiting room could shorten
considerably. If they don't, then they will at some point just drop off the list"
(Business Central Europe, July/August 1997).
Bulgaria is among the poorest European countries. Within the
accession process, Bulgaria lags far behind the First Wave of applicants.
Evidence of constraints is noticeable throughout the last decade. Time
Inconsistent policies, in part, caused by changes in government have deterred
FDI and reform progress. Governments have been unstable, leading to a high
degree of Uncertainty, in political and economic life. Consequently,
Bulgaria's prospects, despite some positive developments in the late 1990s,
are still bleak. It is unlikely that Bulgaria will become a member of the
European Union in the foreseeable future. Indeed, there have to be doubts
about Bulgaria achieving membership at all.
253
Chapter 5: Evidence of Economic Constraints
b) Winners and Losers?
iv) Czech Republic
"The positive aspects of the accession of the CEEC will not show
immediately for the biggest part of the population. ... On the background of
growing foreign direct investment a possible result could be a rising
apprehension over a "selling-out" of the country and subsequently an
increase in nationalism as has been noted, e.g. in Poland and the Czech
Republic. As a consequence, the effort for reforms might slow down and the
political support of adopting EU regulations could decline" (Jacobsen, 1997, p.
7).
The Czech Republic, once considered as the front runner for accession, now
lags behind the other First Wave countries. One of the reasons is that the
political leadership has not always been supportive of the Commission's role
in the process:
"Whereas most Czech politicians seem ready to do almost anything to get
their country into the European Union as fast as possible, Mr. Klaus does not
conceal his dislike of Brussels (The Economist, 23.1.1999).
The most notable economic constraints have been evident in the Czech
Republic in the exchange rate crisis, which hit the Czech Republic in 1997.
Partially as a consequence of this crisis, the Czech Republic has moved from
being the front-runner of the accession process to the bottom of the list of the
First Wave. The main direct effect of the crisis was that the Czech Crown's
peg to the Deutsche Mark had to be abandoned. Initially the peg was directly
to the dollar with a narrow band of plus or minus 0.5%. A significant
Deutsche Mark component^ was introduced in 1993. Currency speculation
in 1996 led to attempts to stabilise the peg by introducing a wider band of
plus or minus 7.5%. Yet renewed speculation in May 1997 was too much and
in consequence, the peg was abandoned in favour of a managed float. Even
though there were some external factors,
94 Pegging the Crown to a basket of 65% Deutsche Mark and 35% US dollars.
254
"... it is difficult to see the Czech crown as the innocent victim of speculative
frenzy. The trend deterioration of competitiveness, sustained over several
years, was evident" (Begg, p. 26,1998).
The Czech Republic has been one of the front-runners of the accession
process. Consequently, the Commission designated it as a First Wave country
in Agenda 2000. Flowever, since then, the Czech Republic has experienced
strong political constraints. Furthermore, the currency crisis of 1997 has
shaken confidence in the Czech model of transition. This has led to policies
being perceived as Time Inconsistent and the resulting Uncertainty has made
speedy accession doubtful. As a result, the Czech Republic, once considered
the most likely first new member state, has moved towards the end of the
queue of First Wave countries.
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v) Hungary
Hungary is now regarded as the most likely candidate for early
accession. Yet even in Hungary the process is not smooth. Some of the
problems became apparent, when the new Fidesz party took power and
clashed with the EU on the handling of transfers under the PHARE
programmes:
"The EU's ambassador in Budapest, Michael Lake, recently assailed the
government's handling of EU grants under the PHARE programme of aid to
the ex-communist countries. ... Half the money provided in the 1996's three
year programme was not allocated until this September, the last possible
moment. Even with a last minute rush, E8.8m ($9.2m) in free money was lost"
(The Economist, 6.11.1999).
There have also been problems with Hungary's commitments under the EU's
environmental protection rules:
"Hungary's accession to the EU could be threatened if it signs an agreement
with Slovakia backing the construction of new hydro dam on the Danube
River" (WWF, 18.2.1998).
It is clear from the above discussion that Hungary is currently
experiencing few constraints in the accession process. Hungary was
perceived to be reforming too gradually at the beginning of the transition
period. Yet, since then, successive Hungarian governments have maintained
steady progress. Consequently, Hungary is now considered to be the most
likely applicant to become the first new Eastern member of the EU.
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vi) Poland
Poland has been among the front-runners of the accession process since
the beginning. But even Poland has been periodically lagging behind:
"All in all, people in Brussels who are keen on enlarging the club to the east
are worried that the Poles have not seriously begun to tackle the reforms that
are needed to prepare the country for membership" (The Economist,
6.6.1999).
Even Poland has problems maintaining a political constituency, despite
being one of the front runners of the process:
"The EU expansion will be a slower business than the optimists used to think.
Poland is certainly Central Europe's hardest-to-handle applicant. And many
more Poles are beginning to debate the merits of joining" (The Economist,
10.4.1999).
In a recent paper, the emergence of a lobby against EU accession in Poland
was considered a likely outcome:
"The level of support for EU membership in Poland has traditionally been
among the highest of the Central and Eastern European Applicants. This
paper argues that it is likely to decrease and that the number of Polish
eurosceptics will go up during the course of the accession negotiations"
(Szczerbiak, 1999, p. 2).
The paper continues by demonstrating that Political Feasibility is crucially
dependent on distributional effects:
"
... the importance of socio-economic factors is also reflected in the strong
correlation between support for or opposition to Polish EU membership and
age, place of residence, education, distribution of income, assessment of
personal financial prospects and certain occupations" (ibid. p. 13).
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The beginnings of some discontent are becoming visible:
"In any event, the negotiations to get into the EU, and the public debate
surrounding them, are clearly hotting up. Polish talk about "Europe" has
become less romantic, more down-to-earth The talk is much more about
the economic nuts and bolts, about how much itwill cost Poland to join" (The
Economist, 31.7.1999).
Furthermore, Poland is likely to present problems, because of its large
agriculture sector. In March 2000 it was reported that the Commission was
pushing for an agreement for the liberalisation of agricultural trade. This was
seen as crucial before the beginning of the accession negotiations on the
agricultural acquis (European Voice, 30.3.2000). Yet two weeks later, it was
reported that the talks had broken down. The main issue was reported to be
the lifting of agricultural duties, which were imposed by the Polish
government to protect its own farmers, particularly in light of the protests the
farming lobby had staged previously. After the refusal of the Polish
government to lift these duties, the Commission withdrew from the talks and
no solution has yet been found (Sueddeutsche Zeitung, 14.4.2000). Yet again,
this shows political constraints becoming more prominent in the accession
process.
There is also evidence of Uncertainty, especially in regard to the
accession timetable, which has also led to noticeable economic constraints.
This has also led to a reluctance of introducing costly reform, as would be
predicted by the theoretical model. As Kawecka-Wyrzykowska states:
"Without a definite commitment to membership on the part of the EU, the
pre-accession strategy has provided Poland and other CEE countries with
little additional incentive to undertake the potentially painful reform of their
regulatory regimes" (1997, p. 131).
He concludes:
"Problems still, however, exist on both sides on the way towards Poland's
accession to the EU In Poland they include - among others - greater
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progress in implementation of the acquis communautaire, broad adjustments
of the whole economy, and, above all, improvement in the competitiveness of
the economy" (ibid. p.133).
"Recently the Polish coalition government was struggling to maintain unity
after the finance minister introduced taxes on agricultural products"
(Sueddeutsche Zeitung Online, 24.5.2000).
The Polish government has now introduced a fast track legislative
process to speed up implementation of the acquis. In part, the system has been
designed in response to the likely loss of power of the current government in
the coming general election:
"The Democratic Left Alliance, expected to win both forthcoming elections by
a wide margin, is also pushing Jerzy Buzek's Solidarity minority government
for a greater say in Poland's accession effort" (Financial Times, 14.7.2000).
Poland is one of the First Wave countries, which has followed the Big
Bang approach to transition. Despite its relatively low GDP, and the large
population still dependent on agriculture for employment, Poland is one of
the most advanced countries in the accession process. Yet, Poland still faces
many constraints. Most notably, maintaining political feasibility of reforms
remains difficult. The current crisis in government is the latest sign of the
many unresolved issues for Polish accession. It thus remains to be seen
whether Poland can maintain its position as a candidate for early
membership.
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vii) Romania
Romania continues to lag behind the other accession candidates. The
general political and economic problems of Romania have been demonstrated
in a number of papers. The weak structure of the economy and the associated
problems are, for example, demonstrated in a paper by Scutaru and Ghita.
They consider that
"... the ownership rights are poorly defined: this implies a high degree of
uncertainty" (1999, p. 2).
They further determine that
"... the political factor and its conjectural criteria substantially interferes with
economic processes" (ibid.)
and show that the consequence of the presence of these key criteria
"... is an instability of the economic system" (ibid.).
Recently, Romania has experienced further political instability. In
Romania the economic constraints of the reform process are easily observable.
The change in government policy since the revolution has been startling.
Nevertheless, these changes seem to have had little effect on the stagnant or
even declining economic situation. After the revolution, from 1990 to 1996
Romania was governed by the National Salvation Front (later the Party of
Social Democracy of Romania). This government was replaced in late 1997 by
a coalition lead by the Democratic Convention of Romania.
The initial years after the revolution were characterised by gradual
economic reform. These reforms focused initially on the liberalisation of
restrictions on consumption, which were introduced by Ceaucescu. There was
a move to introduce more rapid reforms when in late 1990, the gap between
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domestic supply and demand started to grow untenably large. These reforms
which included price liberalisation with a predictable inequality of effects on
the different parts of Romanian society, led to widespread protests, which
culminated in the violent demonstrations by miners in Bucharest in
September 1991. These demonstrations led to the downfall of the
government, demonstrating the Political Infeasibility of these rapid reforms.
The following years were characterised by further Uncertainty and
political instability. The new government was seen to be committed to further
reforms, but in practice, turned out to be unwilling to risk further upheavals.
This demonstrates that Time Inconsistency is an important feature of
Romanian politics. This kind of gradual and inconsistent approach to the
reform process continued until the general election of 1996, despite changes in
government.
A paper by Rachel Walker, (1998), focuses on the period of 1997-1998 in
which Romania introduced Big Bang reforms partially to prepare the country
for EU membership. In her paper, she analyses the "shock therapy"
programme introduced in 1997 by the newly elected centre-right government.
The 1997 programme contained provisions for the rapid restructuring of
industry as well as privatisation and a host of other measures including
further price liberalisation. These measures can be seen as pre-conditions for
achieving a functioning market economy and to fulfil one of the Copenhagen
Criteria. Walker comments:
"Although, the new programme seemed to provide a framework for
transformation, policies suffered from inconsistencies and delay" (1998, p. 11).
These inconsistencies and delays indicate the presence of economic
constraints. The expected effect of any such constraints would create
economic costs, which could be substantial. The immediate effect of the
reforms was an increase in inflation, which was followed by a deep recession
in 1998. The effect has been a further stalling of the transformation, coupled
with political instability.
261
In February 1999, the discontent of miners led to a violent
confrontation with the government and resignations of senior Ministers (see
the Economist, 6.2.1999). Later in the year, the country faced political
uncertainty over the choice of the next Prime Minister. Walker comments that
the economy still seems to be characterised by
"... the prevalence of the soft budget constraint in the face of mounting losses,
inconsistent fiscal and monetary policy amid fears of social unrest; and
persistent back-pedalling over timetables for downsizing and closing loss-
making state industries" (1998, p.15).
She concludes:
"The structural reforms necessary for transformation are simply not taking
place" (ibid.).
Here, we have a summary of Time Inconsistencies, Political Feasibility
problems and Uncertainty leading to the delay or postponement of necessary
reforms. At present the economic situation of Romania does not seem to have
improved and political instability continues into the new millennium. In 1999
swift changes in the leadership of the country make the long term outlook
uncertain. The crisis in 1999 created many problems, not least a high degree of
Uncertainty:
"Amid all this confusion, no wonder that reform has stalled and the economy
is crumbling" (The Economist, 23.1.1999).
As well as reforming the economy to be able to join the EU, Romania
still faces fundamental problems in many other areas:
"The new government may well gulp at the agenda it faces. It has to get
privatisation moving much faster; on some estimates, 80% of the economy is
still run by the state, a figure to make the EU's jaw drop. The black economy
is far too large; a way has to be found of persuading people to declare more of
their income. The inefficient and corrupt civil service needs to be opened up,
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and its top officials probably have to be paid better" (The Economist,
23.12.1999).
Romania's problems continue into the 21st Century. The current
coalition government is facing political difficulties. After the reformist
government's defeat in the June local elections, the Economist reports:
"Four years after they rejected Ion Iliescu and the left-wing populism learned
at the side of his mentor, Nicolae Ceaucescu, Romanians appear ready to take
him back, chiefly out of exasperation with the ruling coalition of the
purportedly reforming right" (10.6.2000).
The situation has become even more serious with the President, Emil
Constantinescu, deciding not to contest the forthcoming election due to the
unpopularity of his party and his person. This will almost certainly lead to the
election of Iliescu and power for the PDSR, made up of former communists.
This will negatively affect the negotiations with the EU:
"The country had hoped to join by 2007, but a PDSR leadership could well
make joining near-impossible" (The Scotsman, 19.7.2000).
Romania is still the poorest of the applicant countries. As already
mentioned, in Section b) iii) it shares many problems with its neighbour,
Bulgaria. Romania has suffered terribly in the last fifty years, culminating in
the bloody revolution of 1989. Constraints are endemic in all sectors of
society. Successive Romanian governments have not been able to maintain a
time consistent approach to economic reform. There has been no political
stability and the economic crisis of 1997-1998 has further undermined
Romania's position. It is, thus, clear that membership, or even continuation of
reform programmes is highly doubtful. This situation is summarised aptly by
Daniel Daianu:
"At the end of the 1980s the Romanian economy, the country and the people
presented a desolate image. After more than four decades of forced
industrialisation, the competitiveness of the economy was at the bottom of the
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communist league, disequilibria among sectors and shortages were
increasing, the people's plight was beyond imagination; the country was
imploding. Romania was a laggard among her neighbours in terms of
institutional prerequisites for the post-communist transition; there was little
psychological preparedness in the population for abrupt change, and almost
no social base for market reforms. Moreover, the 'shock therapy' of the 1980s
had created very high expectations for an immediate and substantial
improvement of material conditions after a change of ruler (or of regime),
which presaged a high degree of intolerance for new austerity measures. The
legacy of Romanian communism was a unique economic and institutional
backwardness which has seriously affected Romania's post-communist
transition" (in Teichova, 1997, p. 89-90).
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viii) Slovakia
Slovakia's aspirations suffered under the Meciar government. The
Meciar government was responsible for Slovakia being the only country to
fail the political criterion of the EU. During the Meciar regime, policy was
determined through a populist approach. The most notable Time Inconsistent
policy was the reversal of the previously announced continuation of the
Czechoslovakian voucher privatisation. However, many more instances of
constraints could be catalogued, as described in Chapter 3 of this thesis.
After Meciar was ousted in the 1998 general election, the country's
prospects of membership improved significantly. The process continued with
the arrest of Meciar for alleged corruption in April 2000:
"It was either a blow for justice and an important signal, to be noted across
post-communist Central Europe, that nobody is above the law. Or it was a
crude act of vengeance that could polarise and destabilise Slovakian politics"
(The Economist, 19.4.00).
But the removal of Meciar has not provided an easy way into the First
Wave of accession countries:
"But Bratislava's plea for an early report recognising the progress made by
the new administration fell on deaf ears as the Commission insisted on seeing
real changes before passing judgement" (European Voice, 17.12. -6.1.1999).
With the inclusion of Slovakia in accession negotiations, the hope for a
fast catch up with the First Wave countries was raised. Yet the EU has not
been supportive:
"The picture was not much rosier for Lithuania, ..., or Slovakia, which
was warned that it needed to improve its administration" (European Voice,
2000, p. 64).
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Evidence of constraints became dominant during the reign of the
Meciar government. However, the removal of Meciar from power has not
resulted in its ascent into the First Wave of applicants. The 1999 Progress
Report still judges Slovakia to have serious deficiencies in terms of the
political and administrative structure, as well as problems of enforceability of
the rule of law. It remains to be seen how far the new Slovakian government
can overcome the Meciar legacy. It is, thus, unclear when Slovakia will
become a member of the EU.
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ix) Slovenia
Slovenia belongs to the countries furthest along in the accession
process. Slovenia is expected to join the EU in the near future and the reform
of the communist system has been comparatively successful. However, a
number of difficulties remain:
"But now, after all, it will have to dance to someone else's tune - taking on,
among other things, the EU's acquis communautaire, the club's great body
(80,000 pages) of law. It will have to drop a lot of protectionist and nationalist
rules of its own, including those that make it hard for Slovene companies to
borrow abroad and for foreigners to buy Slovene shares" (The Economist,
6.6.1999).
Slovenia has made progress in fulfilling some of the conditions of the
EU, but the EU is insisting on the almost complete adoption of the acquis. This
leads to a situation where
"... new and onerous reforms ordered by their governments at the EU's behest
are becoming hard to bear. Opposition to the whole EU project is growing in
places such as Slovenia" (The Guardian, 29.6.1999).
This has led to the virtual collapse of the coalition government in early 2000
and the possible appointment of an Argentine exile as Prime Minister, who is
considered the only feasible candidate for the coalition partners on the left
and right of the political spectrum (The Economist, 20.5.2000).
Slovenia has been able to avoid the legacy of violent conflict of the
region. Despite being part of Yugoslavia, which disintegrated into bloody
civil war in most of its territory, Slovenia managed a relatively clean break.
The main constraint in the immediate aftermath of the break-up of Yugoslavia
was caused by Slovenia's historical legacy. In particular, Slovenia had to find
a compromise with current EU member states on the compensation of people
dispossessed after the Second World War. Since this compromise, Slovenia
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has been one of the front runners of the accession process and, because of its
small size and proximity to the EU, it will be among the first applicants to
become a member of the EU.
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x) Summary
As identified, all of the accession countries face economic constraints in
their pursuit of accession. Yet the scope and scale of the constraints varies
between the different countries. While some countries seem to face few
constraints, like Hungary and the Czech Republic, the situation is much more
difficult in countries such as Bulgaria and Romania:
"Romanians and Bulgarians are tenaciously clutching their EU candidacies,
even though they know they will not join the club in the first wave" (The
Economist, 8.7.2000).
It is noticeable that the Political Feasibility constraints, Time Inconsistent
policies and Uncertainty are linked strongly in those countries furthest away
from accession. The link between these constraints is modelled in the
previous chapter and the model demonstrates that under certain
circumstances, it is likely that all of the constraints would be observed
together.
The starting point of the accession process has crucially influenced the
progress of each country. Those countries starting with a weak economy have
not progressed as quickly as initially expected. In fact, these countries have
actually fallen further behind. In addition, the initially chosen strategy has a
distinct effect on the prospects of membership. In some countries the chosen
strategy was pursued consistently, yet in others no clear strategy could
emerge in the face of strong constraints.
The EU's transfers have also been influential in this process.
Conditional transfers seem to have encouraged some of the countries, yet
others have not benefited from this system. The constraints and choice
strategies have interacteci with historical developments and the initial years of
transition to determine each applicant's unique position.
It is important to emphasise that no single part of the developments
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detailed in this thesis can be considered without taking the other parts into
account. While evidence of constraints is pervasive in some countries, others
have fared better despite having a difficult starting point of accession. The
next section will explore how this interaction might influence future
developments.
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The transition in the CEECs, which started with the revolutions of 1989
and 1990, is now a decade old. The countries, which overthrew communism
in CEE, soon applied to the EU for full membership. Joining the most
successful economic and political organisation in Europe was seen as a
cornerstone of integration into a Western system based on democracy and a
market economy. Yet ten years onwards, not a single one of the applicant
countries has achieved membership and it is currently impossible to foresee
when even the first countries will join.
The process of accession is one which is crucially important to the
applicant countries. It is likely that for at least a number of countries the
accession process will continue for a number of years, if not decades. Within
this process, the question of constraints is crucially important. The analysis,
using an economic model, has identified a number of important constraints,
namely Political Feasibility, Time Inconsistency and Uncertainty. These
constraints need to be addressed within the context of accession in order to
pursue an optimal path to membership.
The preceding analysis in this section has shown that there is strong
evidence of constraints in all of the applicant states. The Political Feasibility
constraints are noticeable in the election patterns of Eastern European
applicants, where, with a few exceptions, the initial reformist governments
were replaced in subsequent elections by a reconstituted communist
government. While, in some countries, this has not changed the orientation
towards the EU, the process slowed for a number of years. In other countries,
the electoral decisions have seriously hindered the accession process, most
notably in Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia. While Slovakia started among the
front runners of the process (albeit behind its initial federal partner, the Czech
Republic) Bulgaria and Romania already started the process behind the other
applicant states. In other countries the initial position was difficult, as they
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were initially members of larger, authoritarian states. This was particularly
true for Slovenia and the Baltic States. Yet some of these countries initiated
strong reform programmes to gain a place among the front runners. The
following table links the starting point of the accession process with initial
developments and emerging evidence of constraints. Such a table is, by its
nature, only an indicative statement of relative position. Yet an attempt to
apply an objective scale for each of the criteria has been made and the table is
based on the evidence and modelling presented in previous parts of this
thesis.
Table 5.C.1: Linking developments to the current position in the
accession process
Country Historical Revolutions Evidence of Current
Starting and initial Constraint Ranking in
Point Reform Negotiations
Bulgaria Very Low Unconvincing Very Strong 9
Czech Rep. High Gradual Serious 5
Estonia Low Big Bang Some 4
Hungary High Gradual Few 1
Latvia Low Changeable Some 6
Lithuania Low Changeable Serious 7
Poland Medium Big Bang Serious 3
Romania Very Low Unconvincing Very Strong 10
Slovakia Medium Unconvincing Strong 8
Slovenia High Changeable Few 2
To illustrate the relationship between the developments and the
current position in the accession process, a rank is assigned to each qualitative
statement in the previous table.
Table 5.C.2: Scoring and ranking the qualitative statements
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Country Historical Revolutions Evidence of SUM
Starting and initial Constraint
Point Reform
Bulgaria 3 3 4 10
Czech Rep. 0 1 2 3
Estonia 2 0 1 3
Hungary 0 1 0 1
Latvia 2 2 1 5
Lithuania 2 2 2 6
Poland 1 0 2 3
Romania 3 3 4 10
Slovakia 1 3 3 7
Slovenia 0 2 0 2
The sum of the ranked qualitative statements is now contrasted to the current
position in the accession process. The following table shows this relationship.
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Table 5.C.3: Ranks of developments and position in the accession
process compared




Bulgaria 10 =9 9 Similar
Czech Rep. 3 =3 5 Similar
Estonia 3 =3 4 Similar
Hungary 1 1 1 Identical
Latvia 5 6 6 Identical
Lithuania 6 7 7 Identical
Poland 3 =3 3 Similar
Romania 10 =9 10 Similar
Slovakia 7 8 8 Identical
Slovenia 2 2 2 Identical
The table shows that the current position of the applicant countries is
crucially determined by a combination of the different developments and not
a single isolated policy. In particular, the starting point of the accession
process, given by previous historical development, the strategy of the
applicant country chosen after the revolutions and the constraints the
countries face, combine to determine the position of the applicant in the
accession process. These developments are inter-related, yet it is clear that by
regarding only one of the aspects of the accession process, no accurate picture
can be formed.
It is thus clear that the way forward is determined by current strategy,
including the influence the EU can assert over the process. Yet it is impossible
to disregard the previous development which will, to a large degree,
determine the success of any such strategy. The distance from membership
needs to be addressed in the context of these countries' positions and there is
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no single accession strategy which will fit every country at every stage of
development.
In particular, those countries furthest away from membership need to
reassess their position in the accession process. The need to develop a gradual
strategy to overcome constraints and an unfavourable starting position is
paramount. The EU can encourage this process by not insisting on reforms for
membership but rather by freeing substantial transfers without conditionality.
If these issues are not addressed it is likely that the constraints will become
more prominent in those countries furthest away from membership, most
notably Romania and Bulgaria. As a result, the accession process will become
more and more costly for these countries and might eventually leaci to the
abandonment of EU membership aspirations.
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CONCLUSIONS
The thesis has examined the accession process by combining different
methodologies from political science, historical examination and economic
modelling. This has enabled a complete examination of the process of
accession, which is dominating policy considerations in CEE. The historical
examination in Chapter 2 has determined the starting point of accession,
demonstrating that some of the CEECs started the transition process from a
disadvantaged position. This is most notably the case for the Balkan and
Baltic applicants. Chapter 3 has demonstrated that the policies pursued by the
applicants after the revolutions have seriously influenced their current
position in the accession process, with countries pursuing 'Big Bang1
strategies, like Estonia and Poland, faring better than countries which have
delayed reform, such as Bulgaria and Romania. The political analysis has also
shown that political uncertainty can be a crucial set-back in the pursuit of
accession, with Slovakia being the most notable example. Finally, economic
modelling, as explored in Chapter 4, provides a framework in which both the
constraints these countries face and the interaction between these constraints
can be understood. The theoretical analysis indicates that there will be strong
evidence of all of the constraints in those countries furthest from accession.
These constraints modelled by the economic analysis in Chapter 4 of
this thesis, can be observed repeatedly in the accession process. The
constraints are in evidence in all of the applicant countries but, in particular,
they can be observed in those countries furthest away from accession, as
demonstrated in Chapter 5. In these countries, most notably Bulgaria and
Romania, Political Feasibility problems have already caused political
instability. The persistent Uncertainty associated with the accession process
together with Time Inconsistent strategies caused by the lack of credible pre-
commitment mechanisms, have imposed substantial costs on these countries.
As the awareness of the length of the accession process becomes more
prevalent, these constraints will be even more binding. For these countries, a
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reassessment of their situation in relation to the EU must occur. In particular,
the conditionality of the Copenhagen criteria will become weaker as the
desired membership fails to materialise.
The EU must reconsider the strategy towards those countries. The
switch to more substantial transfers not linked to accession criteria must be
considered for those applicants furthest from accession. If these changes in
policy do not occur, the current accession process could undermine the final
goal - the full membership of the EU. The accession process is in danger of
ending up as a perpetual negotiation for these countries, instead of a stepping
stone towards full membership.
The historical development of these countries has crucially influenced
the current situation. It is clear that those countries starting from a
disadvantaged position have found it very difficult to overcome the initial
problems. This is linked to the strategy these countries chose in pursuing
reform, which has also crucially influenced their current position. In this
context, this type of analysis can be applied to those countries in CEE, which
have not yet applied to the EU but face a similar transition process. This
application of the analysis could give an indication of how far these countries
are from accession and how they stand in relation to each other. This could
even include countries such as Byelorussia, Russia, and the Ukraine. President
Clinton, on his recent visit to Europe, recommended that no door should be
closed for Russia - neither NATO nor the EU (Spiegel Online, 5.6.2000).
However, it has been noted that some countries, most notably the Ukraine,
are left out of the current accession negotiations. This has even resulted in the
Eastern border of current accession candidates being termed as being behind
a 'Belgian Curtain', imposed by the Commission (Scotsman, 25.7.2000). The
extension of the analysis to these states, whilst feasible, is beyond the scope of
this thesis.
The analysis has combined the different historical, economic and
political elements, with an explicit modelling approach, to show the current
respective positions of the applicant countries. This analysis can be extended
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into the future. The following table shows the prospects and timing of the
applicant, assuming that no major changes in policy and economic trends take
place.
Table C.1: Prospects and Timing for EU membership
Prospects for EU membership Timing
Hungary No major constraints Near Future
Slovenia No major constraints Near Future
Estonia Some problems to be resolved Near Future- Medium Term
Poland Some problems to be resolved Near Future- Medium Term
Czech Rep. Some problems to be addressed Medium Term
Latvia Faster progress necessary Medium Term- Long Term
Slovakia Faster progress necessary Medium Term-Long Term
Lithuania Major problems not addressed Long Term
Bulgaria Progress doubtful Long Term- Not foreseeable
Romania Progress doubtful Long Term- Not foreseeable
The analysis has demonstrated that for some countries, fast accession is
a distinct possibility, namely Estonia, Hungary and Slovenia. The Czech
Republic and Poland still have to overcome many constraints, but are likely to
join the EU in the foreseeable future. A number of countries can only expect
membership in the medium or long term, namely Latvia and Slovakia. For
others, namely Bulgaria and Romania, the position is even more difficult,
with the prospect of membership being doubtful even in the long term. It is
interesting to note in this context, that a frequent argument for membership
has been a need to stabilise the political situation in CEE. This argument
would suggest that those countries furthest from membership should be
given precedence, contrary to the current position in membership
negotiations.
The thesis has thus combined historical development with the
transition period and economic modelling to develop a complete picture of
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the current position of the applicant countries. The combination of this
analysis with current evidence has demonstrated that some of the applicant
countries are close to accession with few problems expected, while for those
furthest from membership, the situation is becoming increasingly difficult
and their membership is becoming a doubtful proposition.
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APPENDIX A
The tables in Annex A have been constructed to derive numerical results for
Chapter 4, section g. The numerical simulation determines the effects of all
variables on the choice variables and on residual uncertainty, as well as
combined welfare. Annex A illustrates numerical values of the effect of
uncertainty in case of overall positive reforms.





The notation for W, R, f and M is unchanged.
bn refers to different values of b, where bl represents an increasing
series from 0.1 to 1, with steps of 0.1, and b2 to b4 represent a different fixed
value of b. fn refers to different values of f, where fl represents an increasing
series from 0.25 to 10, with irregular steps, and f2 to f4 is derived from
different fixed value of b.
Table A.l shows the different combinations of b and f used to illustrate
the effect of different residual uncertainties and different benefit differentials
between the EU and the CEECs
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Table A.1: Different values for bn and fn
bl b2 b3 b4 fl f2 f3 f4
0.1 0.1 0.5 1 0.25 0.5 1 4
0.2 0.1 0.5 1 0.5 0.5 1 4
0.3 0.1 0.5 1 0.75 0.5 1 4
0.4 0.1 0.5 1 1 0.5 1 4
0.5 0.1 0.5 1 2 0.5 1 4
0.6 0.1 0.5 1 3 0.5 1 4
0.7 0.1 0.5 1 4 0.5 1 4
0.8 0.1 0.5 1 6 0.5 1 4
0.9 0.1 0.5 1 8 0.5 1 4
1 0.1 0.5 1 10 0.5 1 4
Table A.2 shows different values of M and R where Ml and R1 are used to
determine s, 1, a and W in the right hand columns, s, 1 and a are derived from
the initial values to determine welfare, W. The table shows that only if R is
larger than M, welfare is positive. M2 and R2 are used in the following tables
to determine similar welfare results. Mn refers to different values of M, where
Ml represents an increasing series from 10 to 200, with irregular steps, and
M2 represents a fixed value of M. Rn refers to different values of R, where R1
represents an decreasing series from 50 to 1, with irregular steps, and R2
represents a fixed value of R.
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Table A.2: Different values for M and R and resulting s, I, a and W
Ml R1 M2 R2 s(Ml,Rl) 1(M1,R1) a(Ml,Rl) W(M1,R1)
10 50 90 10 1 -0.55555 -0.55555 -38.8888
20 35 90 10 1 -0.7 -0.7 -52.5
30 30 90 10 1 -1 -1 -90
40 25 90 10 1 -2.5 -2.5 -262.5
50 20 90 10 1 2 2 240
70 17 90 10 1 0.47222 0.47222 74.1388
90 14 90 10 1 0.22580 0.22580 43.8064
120 10 90 10 1 0.1 0.1 25
150 6 90 10 1 0.04347 0.04347 13.3043
200 1 90 10 1 0.00505 0.00505 2.02525
Table A3 shows resulting values of s resulting from different combinations of
b and f. The equilibrium levels of s and d are calculated, in Table A.3 and A.4,
which are denoted by s(bn,fn) and d(bn,fn). For these R2 and M2 are used in
the calculation.
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Table A.3: Resulting values of s
sl(b2,fl) s2(b3,fl) s3(b4,fl) s4(bl,f2) s5(bl,f3) s6(blf4)
40 8 4 20 10 2.5
20 4 2 10 5 1.25
13.3333 2.66666 1.33333 6.66666 3.33333 0.83333
10 2 1 5 2.5 0.625
5 1 0.5 4 2 0.5
3.33333 0.66666 0.33333 3.33333 1.66666 0.41666
2.5 0.5 0.25 2.85714 1.42857 0.35714
1.66666 0.33333 0.16666 2.5 1.25 0.3125
1.25 0.25 0.125 2.22222 1.11111 0.27777
1 0.2 0.1 2 1 0.25
Table A.4 shows the resulting values of 1.
Table A.4: Resulting values of I
11 12 13 14 15 16
-0.14084 -0.28571 1 -0.32258 -0.90909 2.5
-0.32258 2 0.2 -0.45454 -5 0.76923
-0.56603 0.54545 0.15789 -0.76923 1.42857 0.45454
-0.90909 0.4 0.14285 -2.5 0.625 0.32258
-10 0.28571 0.125 2 0.4 0.25
4.28571 0.26086 0.12 0.71428 0.29411 0.20408
2.5 0.25 0.11764 0.43478 0.23255 0.17241
1.76470 0.24 0.11538 0.3125 0.19230 0.14925
1.53846 0.23529 0.11428 0.24390 0.16393 0.13157
1.42857 0.23255 0.11363 0.2 0.14285 0.11764
The derived values of 1 and s are multiplied with each other and b to arrive at
the probability a that a reform does happen.
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Table A.5: Resulting values of a
al a2 a3 a3 a5 a6
-0.56338 -1.14285 4 -0.64516 -0.90909 3.125
-0.64516 4 0.4 -0.90909 -2.5 0.48076
-0.75471 0.72727 0.21052 -1.53846 0.47619 0.18939
-0.90909 0.4 0.14285 -5 0.15625 0.10080
-5 0.14285 0.0625 4 0.08 0.0625
1.42857 0.08695 0.04 1.42857 0.04901 0.04251
0.625 0.0625 0.02941 0.86956 0.03322 0.03078
0.29411 0.04 0.01923 0.625 0.02403 0.02332
0.19230 0.02941 0.01428 0.48780 0.01821 0.01827
0.14285 0.02325 0.01136 0.4 0.01428 0.01470
Table A6 shows the resulting values for welfare, showing that certain
combinations of the choice values can produce negative welfare, while
welfare values can peak at other combinations. Table A.6 uses the previously
derived values to calculate aggregate welfare. The effect of changes in M and
R is calculated by using Ml and Rl. For simplicity b4 and f3 are used as the
fixed values in this calculation. Table A.6 thus shows the resulting values for
W.
Table A.6: Results of the numerical analysis in terms ofWelfare
W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6
-678.732 -290 580 -406.129 -344.545 569.375
-406.129 670 52 -303.636 -840 116.009
-342.830 117.272 32.6315 -366.923 163.968 61.1994
-344.545 70 27.1428 -965 59.2187 42.4848
-1640 40 22.1875 670 34.8 33.4375
538.571 35.2173 21.2 217.142 25.0326 28.2043
281.875 33.4375 20.8088 123.664 20.1091 24.8267
183.529 32 20.4807 85 17.2716 22.4795
155.673 31.3970 20.3392 64.4715 15.4847 20.7598
142.857 31.0697 20.2613 52 14.2857 19.4485
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APPENDIX B
The tables in Annex B have been constructed to derive further results for
Chapter 4, section g. The numerical simulation determines the effects of all
variables on the choice variables and on residual uncertainty, as well as
combined welfare. Annex B illustrates numerical values of the effect of
uncertainty in case of conditional transfers.





The notation for W, R, f and M is unchanged.
bn refers to different values of b, where bl represents an increasing
series from 0.1 to 1, with steps of 0.1, and b2 to b4 represent a different fixed
value of b. fn refers to different values of f, where fl represents an increasing
series from 0.25 to 10, with irregular steps, and f2 to f4 represent a different
fixed value of b.
Table B.l shows the different combinations of b and f used to illustrate
the effect of different residual uncertainties and different benefit differentials
between the EU and the CEECs
286
Table B.1: Different values of bn and fn
bl b2 b3 b4 fl f2 f3 f4
0.1 0.1 0.5 1 0.25 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.2 0.1 0.5 1 0.5 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.3 0.1 0.5 1 0.75 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.4 0.1 0.5 1 1 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.5 0.1 0.5 1 2 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.6 0.1 0.5 1 3 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.7 0.1 0.5 1 4 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.8 0.1 0.5 1 6 0.1 0.25 0.5
0.9 0.1 0.5 1 8 0.1 0.25 0.5
1 0.1 0.5 1 10 0.1 0.25 0.5
111 Table B.2, Mn refers to different values of M, where Ml represents an
increasing series from 10 to 200, with irregular steps, and M2 represents a
fixed value of M. Rn refers to different values of R, where R1 represents an
decreasing series from 50 to 1, with irregular steps, and R2 represents a fixed
value of R.
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Table B.2: Different values of M and R and resulting s, I, a and W
Ml R1 M2 R2 s(Ml,Rl) 1(M1,R1) a(Ml,Rl) W(M1,R1)
10 50 90 10 3.8875 0.125 0.48593 -43.8115
20 35 90 10 3.67857 0.125 0.45982 -22.8515
30 30 90 10 3.4375 0.125 0.42968 -12.1728
40 25 90 10 3.1 0.125 0.3875 -1.96875
50 20 90 10 2.59375 0.125 0.32421 7.40478
70 17 90 10 1.68382 0.125 0.21047 17.8833
90 14 90 10 0.38392 0.125 0.04799 24.4521
120 10 90 10 -2.75 0.125 -0.34375 20.7031
150 6 90 10 -10.0625 0.125 -1.25781 -27.6064
200 1 90 10 -108.5 0.125 -13.5625 -1106.46
The equilibrium levels of s and d are calculated in Table B.3 and B.4, which
are denoted by s(bn,fn) and d(bn,fn). For these R2 and M2 are used in the
calculation.
Table B.3: Resulting levels of s
sl(b2,fl) s2(b3,fl) s3(b4,fl) s4(bl,f2) s5(bl,f3) s6(blf3)
0.2875 1.8875 3.8875 0.895 0.2875 0.075
-0.15714 0.64285 1.64285 1.7 0.47857 0.04285
-0.55416 -0.02083 0.64583 2.475 0.6375 -0.025
-1.1 -0.7 -0.2 3.16 0.7 -0.2
-2.45 -2.25 -2 3.6875 0.59375 -0.5625
-5.11372 -4.98039 -4.81372 3.83823 0.08382 -1.37352
-9.61785 -9.51785 -9.39285 3.625 -0.81607 -2.61785
-23.9833 -23.9166 -23.8333 1.7 -3.55 -5.9
-62.4875 -62.4375 -62.375 -4.125 -10.4625 -13.825
-599.99 -599.95 -599.9 -95 -108.5 -123
Similarly, we can calculate the resulting level of 1, as shown in Table B.4.
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Table B.4: Resulting levels of I
11 12 13 14 15 16
0.125 0.125 0.125 0.05 0.125 0.25
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.125 0.25
0.375 0.375 0.375 0.05 0.125 0.25
0.5 0.5 0.5 0.05 0.125 0.25
1 1 1 0.05 0.125 0.25
1.5 1.5 1.5 0.05 0.125 0.25
2 2 2 0.05 0.125 0.25
3 3 3 0.05 0.125 0.25
4 4 4 0.05 0.125 0.25
5 5 5 0.05 0.125 0.25
These results from B.3 and B.4 are then multiplied with each other and b to
arrive at the probability a that a reform does happen, as shown in Table B.5.
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Table B.5: Resulting levels of a
al a2 a3 a3 a5 a6
0.00359 0.11796 0.48593 0.00447 0.00359 0.00187
-0.00392 0.08035 0.41071 0.017 0.01196 0.00214
-0.02078 -0.00390 0.24218 0.03712 0.02390 -0.00187
-0.055 -0.175 -0.1 0.0632 0.035 -0.02
-0.245 -1.125 -2 0.09218 0.03710 -0.07031
-0.76705 -3.73529 -7.22058 0.11514 0.00628 -0.20602
-1.92357 -9.51785 -18.7857 0.12687 -0.07140 -0.45812
-7.195 -35.875 -71.5 0.068 -0.355 -1.18
-24.995 -124.875 -249.5 -0.18562 -1.17703 -3.11062
-299.995 -1499.87 -2999.5 -4.75 -13.5625 -30.75
Using this value and the previously derived values, welfare for the applicant
is calculated. The effect of changes in M and R is calculated by using Ml and
Rl. For simplicity b4 and f3 are used as the fixed values in this calculation.
Table B.6: Results of the numerical analysis in terms of Welfare (EE)
WEE1 WEE2 WEE3 WEE4 WEE5 WEE6
18.7087 15.2188 45.0001 5.99280 18.7087 31.9201
33.7240 33.8201 59.7831 -0.681 17.5983 32.2652
47.5365 43.6075 60.6526 -5.98990 17.1789 32.5817
61.655 47.475 48.2 -9.41488 17.645 32.74
108.452 46.5625 -20 -10.6787 18.8726 32.1923
166.327 44.6597 -109.136 -9.09950 20.9828 30.5225
298.063 334.467 357.729 -5.73203 23.5668 29.4403
1597.88 5870.52 11124.1 4.776 37.4025 54.92
14364.0 67724.4 134164.3 46.7007 143.089 320.837
1779400.3 8869970.8 17730504.5 5049.5 14600.9 36317.5
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Similarly we can derive the value for welfare for the European Union.
Table B.7: Results of the numerical analysis in terms of Welfare (EU)
WEU1 WEU2 WEU3 WEU4 WEU5 WEU6
0.00449 0.14746 0.60742 0.00223 0.00449 0.00468
-0.01964 0.40178 2.05357 0.017 0.02991 0.01071
-0.23378 -0.04394 2.72460 0.05568 0.08964 -0.01406
-1.1 -3.5 -2 0.1264 0.175 -0.2
-12.25 -56.25 -100 0.23046 0.23193 -0.87890
-80.5411 -392.205 -758.161 0.40301 0.05500 -3.60551
-346.242 -1713.21 -3381.42 0.57093 -0.80332 -10.3078
-2590.2 -12915 -25740 0.408 -5.325 -35.4
-14997 -74925 -149700 -1.39218 -22.0693 -116.648
-299995 -1499875 -2999500 -47.5 -339.062 -1537.5
Finally, we can thus derive aggregate welfare, as demonstrated in Table B.8.
Again, the results show a wide degree of variation, from negative values of
aggregate welfare to high positive values.
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Table B.8: Results of the numerical analysis in terms of Welfare (Total)
W1 Total W2 Total W3 Total W4 Total W5 Total W6 Total
18.7132 15.3663 45.6076 5.99503 18.7132 31.9248
33.7043 34.2219 61.8367 -0.664 17.6282 32.2759
47.3027 43.5636 63.3772 -5.93421 17.2686 32.5676
60.555 43.975 46.2 -9.28848 17.82 32.54
96.2025 -9.6875 -120 -10.4482 19.1046 31.3134
85.7860 -347.546 -867.298 -8.69648 21.0378 26.9170
-48.1793 -1378.74 -3023.69 -5.16109 22.7635 19.1325
-992.315 -7044.47 -14615.8 5.184 32.0775 19.52
-632.924 -7200.54 -15535.6 45.3085 121.019 204.189
1479405.3 7370095.8 14731004.5 5002 14261.8 34780
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